Lott v. Louisville Metro Gov't

• Decision Date: 17 March 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-271-RGJ
• Parties: TYROME LOTT PLAINTIFF v. LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al. DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

TYROME LOTT PLAINTIFF v. LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-271-RGJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

March 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Tyrome Lott alleges violations of state law and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution against Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government ("Metro Government"), Steve Conrad ("Conrad"), individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Louisville Metro Police Department, and Vanessa Burns ("Burns"), individually and in her official capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Assets for Metro Government. [DE 1-3 at 17-24]. Defendants move for summary judgment [DE 21] and to strike Plaintiff's class action allegations, definition, and claims. [DE 23]. Plaintiff moves for class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3). [DE 26-1 at 801]. Briefing is complete, and the motions are ripe [DE 22; DE 24; DE 25; DE 27; DE 28; DE 29]. For the reasons below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 21] is DENIED, Defendants' Motion to Strike [DE 23] is DENIED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification [DE 26] is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2005, Louisville Metro Council passed Louisville Metro Ordinance 72.062 ("Ordinance"). [DE 22 at 338]. The Ordinance provides that "Metro Government tow lot shall charge $10 as a handling charge on all passenger cars, pick-up trucks, vans and motorcycles plus a storage charge of $10 for each of the first seven days or fraction thereof the vehicle is retained in storage and a charge of $5.00 per day for each additional day the vehicle remains in storage." [DE 1-3 at 26]. The Ordinance also provides that "[t]he Cabinet Secretary for Public Works and Services shall set all towing charges in writing. The fees set forth in this section are the initial fees and hereinafter the Cabinet Secretary for Public Works and Services may raise the fees no more than 10% each year." Id. (emphasis added)

Plaintiff alleges that on "February 2, 2008, and with no written record of approval of the increase, the Secretary . . . raised the storage fee to $11 per day. This action eliminated the bifurcated fee schedule set forth in the Ordinance which charged $10 per day for the first seven days, and $5.00 for each day thereafter." [DE 22 at 338 (internal citation and formatting omitted)]. Plaintiff asserts that "[w]hen the Secretary took this action, the maximum increase (10% per year) for storage of a vehicle after seven days would have been $5.50 per day. It would not have been $11 per day for every day of impoundment." Id. Defendants dispute Plaintiff's claim that there is "no written record of approval" for the increase of storage fees in 2008. [DE 24 at 662-63].

The Secretary increased the storage fee to $12 in December 2009 and $13 in August 2012. [DE 22 at 338]. Conrad recommended the 2012 increase based on "what had been before," but did not "go back and look at what anybody had done in 2008 or 2009." [DE 23-12 at 652]. Defendants do not dispute that since 2008 they have been overcharging individuals for vehicles stored more than seven days. [DE 24 at 665 ("The excess charges were simply an unintended mistake by the police in relying on the daily storage rate per the approved 2012 fee Memorandum, a copy which is attached to the Complaint. The predicate mistake began with the 2008 increase and formed the basis for errant calculations thereafter of rates for storage and excess of sevendays")].

On September 9, 2018, police officers towed Plaintiff's car to the Metro Government tow lot. [DE 22 at 339]. Police officers alleged that they towed Plaintiff's car because it was illegally parked and had a marijuana joint¹ in plain view inside it. [DE 28-1 at 881]. Forty-four days later, Plaintiff paid the tow lot approximately $700 to retrieve his car. [DE 22 at 340]. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff knew that Metro Government had overcharged him in violation of the Ordinance when he paid the tow lot. [DE 22 at 359; DE 24 at 675].

A few days after Plaintiff retrieved his car, Defendants sent him a certified letter informing him that:

WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, THE REGISTERED OWNER AND/OR LIENHOLDERS OF RECORD, IF ANY, MAY REQUEST IN WRITING A HEARING PURSUANT TO KRS 82.625 TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF THE IMPOUNDMENT. IF NO HEARING IS REQUESTED, THE VEHICLE SHALL BE DEEMED ABANDONED UNLESS THE CHARGES THEREON ARE PAID WITHIN FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS OF NOTICE. THE REQUEST FOR A HEARING MUST BE MADE IN WRITING TO THE REPUBLIC PARKING, 430 SOUTH THIRD STREET, LOUISVILLE, KY 40202.

[DE 21-1 at 135 (capitalization in original)].

In March 2019, Plaintiff sued in Kentucky state court [DE 1-3]. Defendants removed to this Court. [DE 1-2]. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative class, asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), unjust enrichment (Count II), negligence per se (Count III)², negligent misrepresentation (Count IV), and declaratory and injunctive relief (Count V). [DE 1-3 at 17-23]. Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant Louisville Metro Government had and has an unconstitutional practice, custom, policy, and pattern of using its agents and employees to assessand collect from the Plaintiff and members of the Class storage and impoundment fees in excess of the amounts authorized by Louisville Metro Ordinance 72.062." Id. at 18. Plaintiff requests class certification for:

[A]ll persons with vehicles registered to them whose vehicles were assessed in excess of the maximum storage fee charge of $10 for each of the first seven days a vehicle is in storage, plus a $5.00 fee per day for each additional day thereafter that a vehicle remains in storage as authorized by Louisville Metro Ordinance 72.062, and those who had their automobile auctioned, since on or about February 2, 2008.

Id. at 14-15.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Summary Judgment³

1. Standard

Summary judgment is required when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of specifying the basis for its motion and showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party must produce specific facts showing a material issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "Factualdifferences are not considered material unless the differences are such that a reasonable jury could find for the party contesting the summary judgment motion." Bell v. City of E. Cleveland, 125 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252).

A district court considering a motion for summary judgment may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations but must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Int'l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2000). The non-moving party must do more than show some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the non-moving party must show a genuine factual issue exists by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]" Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B); see also Shreve v. Franklin Cty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 2014). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

2. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1983 class action claim is barred by the relevant one-year statute of limitations: "This action was commenced on March 15, 2019 within six months of the date Lott's car was towed of September 5, 2018, yet Lott seeks relief on behalf of a putative class for those he alleges to be 'similarly situated persons' who were assessed unauthorized fees dating back to October 2, 2008." [DE 21-1 at 141]. Plaintiff disagrees. [DE 22 at 341-55].

Section 1983 does not provide its own statute of limitations, so federal courts "borrow" the limitations period for personal injury actions from the state where the events occurred. Owens v.Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). For constitutional torts committed in Kentucky, the one-year limitation period under KRS § 413.140(1)(a) for bringing general personal injury actions applies. Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 181-82 (6th Cir. 1990). Federal law, on the other hand, governs when the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim begins to run. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). And the Sixth Circuit has held that the "statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has occurred." Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry is objective and the court looks "to what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights." Hughes v. Vanderbilt, 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir.2000); J. Geils Band Emp. Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1254 (1st Cir.1996) (noting that the objective standard is the appropriate test for determining a "date of discovery"); Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1417 (9th Cir.1987) ("[T]he extent to which a plaintiff used reasonable diligence is tested by an objective standard"). This is known as the ...