Lott v. Marietta Mun. Court
| Decision Date | 17 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-cv-00377 |
| Parties | HARRY WILLIAM LOTT, Plaintiff, v. MARIETTA MUNICIPAL COURT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Harry William Lott ("Mr. Lott" or "Plaintiff") brings this action against a group of government Defendants. They include: (1) the Marietta Municipal Court ("the MMC"), (2) the Fourth District Court of Appeals ("the Fourth District"), (3) Belpre, Ohio prosecutor Andrew S. Webster ("Mr. Webster"), (4) the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Ohio ("the U.S. Attorney's Office"), and (5) the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"). He alleges a number of constitutional violations, including violations of his right to procedural due process, and of his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. This matter is before the Court for consideration of several pending motions. For the reasons below, the Court ORDERS:
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Harry William Lott proceeds without the assistance of counsel and brings this action under section 1983. His suit stems from a speeding ticket. According to his complaint, Mr. Lott "was charged with a speeding violation and his court date was scheduled on 11/05/2012." Doc. 4 ¶ 1, at 1. He alleges that he then "sent in his answer to the allegation along with depositions over the incident." Id. ¶ 2, at 1. Mr. Lott then alleges that Judge Janet D. Welch denied his request for a jury trial in the Marietta Municipal Court for his speeding charge. See id. ¶ 4, at 1.
Based on these allegations, Mr. Lott filed suit in this Court in April of 2013. Doc. 1. He submitted an amended complaint a week later. Doc. 4. With it, and based on the allegations laid out above, he asserts the following claims: (1) a general violation of his right to procedural due process, id. ¶ 1, at 2; (2) an additional violation of his right to due process "by the Marietta Municipal Court for not giving a notice for no jury trial," id. ¶ 2, at 2; (3) a violation of his right to a trial by jury under the Ohio Constitution, id. ¶ 3, at 2; (4) an additional violation of his rights "by the Marietta Municipal Court for failing to take legal principles under consideration," id. ¶ 4, at 2; (5) another violation of his rights "by the Belpre prosecutor not complying and not wanting to answer deposition [sic] by the way of Motion to Quash notice of deposition . . . which led to prejudice in the court house," id. ¶ 5, at 2; (6) a procedural due process violation by the MMC and the Fourth District Court of Appeals for "not following the Seventh Amendment," id. ¶ 6, at 2; (7) a violation of his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, id. ¶¶ 8-9, at 2; and (8) a claim of retaliation based on the exercise of his First Amendment rights, see id. ¶ 10, at 2.
Several motions are now ripe for consideration. Mr. Lott moves for summary judgment and for default judgment against each Defendant. Doc. 11 (); doc. 20 (motion for summary judgment). The U.S. Attorney's Office for this district and DOJ move to dismiss this action. Doc. 12. The MMC, doc. 14, and the Fourth District, doc. 16, have done the same. Finally, Mr. Lott has moved for a hearing on all of the pending motions. Doc. 25.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Lott moves the Court for both default judgment and summary judgment. As for default, his motion applies to all of the named Defendants. But because Mr. Lott has not complied with the proper default sequence under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, his motion is denied.
According to the Rules, a party seeking default must follow a set sequence. A plaintiff must first move for the Clerk to enter default pursuant to Rule 55(a) before a court can determine whether to grant a motion for default judgment. See O.J. Distrib., Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 352 (6th Cir. 2003) (); id. ( ; Brantley v. Runyon, No. C-1-96-842, 1997 WL 373739, at *1 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 1997) (). Mr. Lott has failed in this case to comply with the proper steps for securing default. The docket indicates that he did not first obtain an entry of default according to Rule 55(a). By further asking for a default judgment—without a prior entry of default—Mr. Lott asks the court to act out of turn with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hornell, 340 F.3d at 352. Accordingly, his motion for default is denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of actions that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generally, an action will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief." Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 863 F. Supp. 2d 677, 690 (S.D. Ohio 2012). An example includes the situation where "there is no law to support the claims made." Stew Farm, Ltd. v. Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., No. 2:12-CV-0299, 2013 WL 4517825, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2013) (citing Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978)). Another example is the failure to allege facts in a sufficient manner according to Rule 8(a)(2). To meet this standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). The Supreme Court has laid out a "two-pronged approach" for determining facial plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. First— "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. Second—focus on the remaining "well-pleaded factual allegations" to "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id.
As an additional note applicable to this case, a pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and have been held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Even so, pro se plaintiffs must still comply with the procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); see also Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) ().
DOJ and the U.S. Attorney's Office move for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). As they see it, Mr. Lott makes no claims against them; Mr. Lott does not respond to this argument in any of the documents he has filed.
DOJ and the U.S. Attorney's Office are correct—Mr. Lott's complaint does not allege any fact that applies to them. Even construing Mr. Lott's pleading liberally, he "allege[s] no facts that allow a reasonable inference that" DOJ and the U.S. Attorney's Office committed any violation of law against Mr. Lott, meaning he has "thus failed to state a claim." Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App'x 322, 329 (6th Cir. 2013). In short, because DOJ and the U.S. Attorney's Office have no involvement in this suit even according to Mr. Lott's own pleadings; because none of the claims or facts applies to them; and because Mr. Lott thus fails to state a claim against them, their motion to dismiss is granted.
2. The MMC
The MMC makes two arguments for dismissal. One relates to the failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the other to immunity. Because it bears in part on jurisdiction, the Court deals first with its immunity-related argument.
The MMC argues that, as a municipal court, Ohio Revised Code § 2744.01(F) provides shelter from suit. The Court disagrees. This statute exists as part of the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, which "granted sovereign immunity to political subdivisions," save for a few exceptions not at issue here. Theobald v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 332 F.3d 414, 416 (6th Cir. 2003); see Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02 (). But, according to the terms of the statute, the MMC does not qualify as a "political subdivision." See Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.01(F) (); see also Phelps v. Coy, 164 F. Supp. 2d 961, 976 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (). Even if it did, Mr. Lott asserts constitutional claims under section 1983. To this end,...
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