Lott v. State

• Decision Date: 27 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-617.,05-617.
• Citation: 150 P.3d 337,2006 MT 279,334 Mont. 270
• Parties: Jason Lee LOTT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 337

150 P.3d 337

2006 MT 279

334 Mont. 270

Jason Lee LOTT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent.

No. 05-617.

Supreme Court of Montana.

October 27, 2006.

OPINION and ORDER

W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, Judge.

¶ 1 On June 2, 1992, the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, sentenced Jason Lee Lott to fifty years in Montana State Prison on four separate counts: Count I, ten years for aggravated kidnapping, with a ten-year sentence enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, a hunting knife, to run consecutively with the aggravated kidnapping sentence, for a total of twenty years; Count II, twenty years for sexual intercourse without consent, with a ten-year sentence enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, a hunting knife, to run consecutively with the sexual intercourse without consent sentence, for a total of thirty years; Count III, ten years for aggravated burglary, with a ten-year sentencing enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, a hunting knife, to run consecutively for a total of twenty years; and Count IV, ten years for felony assault, with a ten-year enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, a hunting knife, to run consecutively with the felony assault sentence, for a total of twenty years. The court ordered Counts I and II to run concurrently and Counts III and IV to run concurrently.

¶ 2 In the time since the court sentenced Lott, we ruled in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, ¶ 16, 293 Mont. 224, ¶ 16, 975 P.2d 312, ¶ 16, that application of the weapons enhancement to a felony offense that itself requires proving the use of a weapon violates Montana's constitutional protection against double jeopardy. We reasoned that Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution offers protection against "multiple prosecutions for offenses arising out of the same transaction, and multiple punishments imposed at a single prosecution. . . ." Guillaume, ¶ 8. A few years later, in State v. Whitehorn, 2002 MT 54, ¶ 45, 309 Mont. 63, ¶ 45, 50 P.3d 121, ¶ 45, we held that Guillaume applies retroactively and clarified that felony assault with a weapon and aggravated burglary (since the offenses themselves require use of a weapon) are the only offenses that may not be enhanced under § 46-18-221, MCA. Whitehorn, ¶ 45.

¶ 3 Pursuant to Guillaume and Whitehorn, Lott now argues that the District Court unconstitutionally enhanced his sentence in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.¹ In response, the State contends that Lott is prohibited from making such an argument at this juncture. Characterizing Lott's petition as a writ of habeas corpus, the State asserts that under § 46-22-101(2), MCA, the writ of habeas corpus "is not available to attack the validity of the conviction or sentence of a person who has been adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record and has exhausted the remedy of appeal." The State further notes that although Lott could have raised any constitutional arguments on direct appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief, he did not, and he is time-barred from relief under the postconviction statute, § 46-21-102, MCA, which during the time period relevant to Lott's 1992 conviction required a petitioner to file within five years of sentencing.²

¶ 4 In light of Guillaume and Whitehorn, it is apparent that the District Court unconstitutionally enhanced Lott's sentence with regard to the aggravated burglary and felony assault convictions. However, under the current statutory scheme, relief is unavailable to Lott, as he is time-barred from filing either a direct appeal or a petition for postconviction relief, and the habeas corpus statute prohibits Lott, who pled guilty and failed to appeal (thereby exhausting his remedy of appeal), from challenging his sentence. See § 46-21-102, MCA, and § 46-22-101(2), MCA. Given Montana's constitutional right to habeas corpus provided for in Article II, Section 19, the issue we address today is whether the procedural bar established in the current habeas corpus statutory scheme is unconstitutional as applied to a facially invalid sentence. We hold that, as applied to Lott, it is.

The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Brief Overview

¶ 5 In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall referred to the writ of habeas corpus as a "great constitutional privilege." Ex parte Bollman and Ex parte Swartwout, 4 Cranch 75, 95, 2 L.Ed. 554, 561 (1807). Literally meaning "you have the body," habeas corpus ensures the integrity of the legal process resulting in imprisonment. Originating in the English common law, habeas corpus is a form of collateral attack that functions as an independent proceeding "to determine whether a defendant is being unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty." Black's Law Dictionary 709 (6th ed., West 1990). "Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to immediate release." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402, 83 S.Ct. 822, 829, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (overturned in part on other grounds).

¶ 6 The so-called "Great Writ of Liberty" existed long before the founders of this nation provided for its protection in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution. "[A] writ antecedent to statute [with] roots deep into the genius of our common law," Fay, 372 U.S. at 400, 83 S.Ct. at 828, English judges and legal authorities described habeas corpus as "the birthright of the people," and "one of the most important safeguards of the liberty of the subject." Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Federal and State Postconviction Remedies and Relief 41 (Harrison 1992). The first known habeas corpus proceeding in the American colonies took place in Virginia in 1682. By the time the founding fathers ensured for its protection in the federal constitution, habeas corpus had already become an established right in the United States. Wilkes, hereinafter Postconviction Remedies at 76, 78.

¶ 7 "Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty." Fay, 372 U.S. at 401, 83 S.Ct. at 828-29. The original common-law interpretation of habeas corpus only applied relief to defendants challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. With time, however, habeas corpus became a collateral remedy for constitutional error. Ira P. Robbins, Habeas Corpus Checklists 141 (Thomson/West 2006). At the federal level, habeas corpus relief was codified by Congress in Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the United States Code, specifically 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 through 2255. Wilkes, Postconviction Remedies at 196. In addressing Congress's authority to define and condition the writ, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law," and also that "judgments about the proper scope of the writ are `normally for Congress to make.'" Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2340, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807) and Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 1298, 134 L.Ed.2d 440 (1996)). The Supreme Court concluded that, in regards to statutory restrictions placed on second habeas petitions, such Congressional restrictions "do not amount to a `suspension' of the writ contrary to Article I, § 9" of the United States Constitution. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664, 116 S.Ct. at 2340. In contrast to the United States Supreme Court's deference to Congress's judgment about the proper scope of the federal writ, we conclude that Montana's guarantee of the privilege of habeas corpus embodies a fundamental, intrinsic principle: the right to challenge the cause of one's imprisonment. In Montana, therefore, there are inherent limits on the Legislature's ability to define or restrict the scope of the writ because the fundamental principle of the writ cannot be "suspended" under Article II, Section 19 of the Montana Constitution.

¶ 8 Until the mid-1930s, postconviction habeas corpus relief for state prisoners in state court was narrowly available and generally not applied to defendants imprisoned pursuant to a criminal conviction unless the conviction or sentence was void for lack of jurisdiction. Wilkes, Postconviction Relief at 107. State courts, however, often recognized as a ground for habeas corpus relief a claim that the statute or ordinance defining the offense for which the defendant had been convicted was unconstitutional, or that the sentence was in excess of the statutory maximum, or otherwise unauthorized. Wilkes, Postconviction Remedies at 107. After 1935, the states began the process of expanding and modernizing their postconviction remedies and by 1970, nearly three-quarters of the states had in some form or another expanded the availability of postconviction relief by a process of liberal interpretation of the writ of habeas corpus and/or the writ of error coram nobis. Wilkes, Postconviction Remedies at 112-13. Today, all states have a modern postconviction remedy authorized by case law, statutory enactment, or promulgation of a rule of court. Wilkes, Postconviction Remedies at 546.

Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Relief in Montana

¶ 9 In Montana, the writ of habeas corpus was first provided for in Article III, Section 21, of the 1889 Constitution. A few decades later, in 1927, this Court explained,

The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to determine the legality or illegality of the restraint alleged to be exercised. It is available only to those persons, or on behalf of those persons, unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, and is independent of the legal proceeding under which the detention is sought to be justified.

August v. Burns, 79 Mont. 198, 213, 255 P. 737, 741 (1927) (citations omitted)....