Loucks v. State

• Decision Date: 21 December 1937
• Docket Number: 26865.
• Citation: 11 N.E.2d 694,213 Ind. 108
• Parties: LOUCKS v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

11 N.E.2d 694

213 Ind. 108

LOUCKS v. STATE.

No. 26865.

Supreme Court of Indiana

December 21, 1937

Appeal from Hamilton Circuit Court; Cassius M. Gentry, Judge.

Harold A. Beeler and Worth H. Castor, both of Noblesville, for appellant.

Omer S. Jackson, Atty. Gen., and Jas. K. Northam, Deputy Atty Gen., for the State.

TREANOR Chief Justice.

The appellant, James Loucks, was prosecuted by the State on an affidavit charging attempted robbery with physical injury inflicted. One Edwin Bowman was charged with the same crime. The appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged in the affidavit and the court below entered judgment on this plea, imposing a sentence of life imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison. Two days after the judgment was entered counsel appeared for appellant and by motion requested the trial court to set aside and vacate the judgment and to permit the withdrawal of the plea of 'guilty.' The motion was overruled. The only error assigned upon appeal is the court's overruling of the motion to vacate the judgment and to permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty.

The following excerpts are from the record of the proceedings in the Hamilton circuit court:

'The State of Indiana vs. James Loucks Edwin Bowman

'Affidavit for Assault and Battery With Intent to Commit Robbery--Physical Injury Inflicted.

'Be it Remembered, That on this day, before me Chesley E Baldock, Clerk of Hamilton Circuit Court, personally came Robert Bell, who, being duly sworn, upon his oath, says that James Loucks and Edwin Bowman on or about the 14th day of March A. D., 1937, at the County of Hamilton, in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully inflict wounds and physical injury upon the head and body of Robert Bell, with a deadly and dangerous weapon or instrument, bar or iron, while attempting to commit robbery, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

'Robert S. Bell

'Subscribed and sworn to in open Court, before me, this 15 day of March A. D., 1937.

'[Seal.] Chesley E. Baldock'

'Clerk of Hamilton Circuit Court

'Comes now the defendant, James Loucks, who, after being first duly arraigned, pleads guilty to the crime charged in the affidavit, to wit: 'Assault and Battery with Intent to Commit Robbery--Physical Injury Inflicted.' And comes now the defendant, Edwin Bowman, who, after being first duly arraigned, pleads not guilty to the crime charged in the affidavit. And the Court now finds the defendant, James Loucks guilty of the crime charged in the affidavit, and that said defendant is thirty-six years of age and that his punishment should be imprisonment for life in Indiana State Prison at Michigan City, Indiana.

'It is therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court, that the defendant, James Loucks, is guilty of the crime charged in the affidavit, to wit: 'Assault and Battery with Intent to Commit Robbery--Physical Injury Inflicted.' It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court, that said defendant is thirty-six years of age and that his punishment should be life imprisonment in Indiana State Prison at Michigan City, Indiana.'

'Petition to Vacate Judgment.

'Your petitioner respectfully shows to the court:

'That he is the defendant in the above entitled cause. That he appeared in the Hamilton Circuit Court and before the Judge thereof on March 15th, 1937. That he was not at that time acquainted with any of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime in Indiana and did not know that he had the right to be heard in person and by counsel and to be tried by a jury.

'That he was ignorant of the nature and consequences of any plea alleged to have been made and of what punishment might be inflicted against him on any plea.

'That the court made no inquiry of him to ascertain if he knew of his rights under the Constitution or if he understood the effects of a plea of guilty or the severity of the sentence which would be imposed thereunder before any plea was made.

'That your petitioner was not asked if he desired counsel or advised that he was entitled to have counsel. That he always desired the advice of counsel, and did obtain the same at his earliest opportunity.

'That he is ignorang and uneducated as to the law and knew nothing of his rights as an accused person thereunder. That if permitted to withdraw his plea and be defended by counsel he can show he is not guilty of the crime charged.

'That he desires a jury trial and desires to withdraw any plea heretofore made and be defended by counsel.

'That if the Court had been advised of the facts heretofore alleged he would not have accepted any plea from this defendant without his being advised by counsel.

'Wherefore, your petitioner prays that the judgment heretofore entered in this cause be vacated, that he be allowed to have a fair and impartial trial and for all other proper relief.

'James Loucks

'Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March, 1937.'

[Seal.] Harold A. Beeler

'Notary Public.

'And this cause is now submitted to the Court for trial, without the intervention of a jury. And the court now hears evidence relating thereto and argument is had. The Court being duly advised, now denies the defendant's petition and refuses to set aside the judgment formerly entered; exceptions granted.'

The only evidence heard by the Hamilton circuit court upon the trial of the cause presented by the petition was the testimony of appellant, Loucks, upon his direct and cross examinations. His testimony upon direct examination supported the various statements included in his petition.

Appellant calls attention to the important constitutional rights of one who is charged with a criminal offense, and properly insists that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to direct a trial court to set aside any judicial action which results in a denial of these rights. It is not necessary, however, that one who is charged with a criminal offense take advantage of all the procedural rights, or privileges, guaranteed by the Constitution. Under the law of Indiana, a defendant can, by his own free choice, dispense with a trial by entering a plea of guilty when arraigned, thereby establishing, as a matter of law, his guilt of the offense as charged in the affidavit or indictment. There is no provision in the Constitution which makes it the duty of the trial court to insist that a defendant either have a trial or be represented by counsel, if the defendant chooses to enter a plea of guilty. But cases have come before this court in which it clearly appeared that the defendant, acting without advice of counsel, entered his plea of guilty, and under such circumstances that his plea could not have been entered freely and understandingly. And in those cases this court held that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional protection by the action of the trial court in permitting him to enter a plea of guilty. The following excerpts from the case of Rhodes v. State ^[1] indicate the attitude of this court in such a situation:

'This court has expressed disapproval of trial courts receiving pleas of guilty from defendants charged with serious crime, who are not represented by counsel, until 'after reasonable inquiry into the facts to discover whether a plea of guilty is entered freely and understandingly.'' (Citing cases.)

'Did appellant enter a plea of guilty freely and understandingly?'

'Hence, the ruling of the trial court must stand, unless this court can say, from the unconflicting evidence as the controlling factor, and in connection with all of the evidence given, that the trial court abused its discretion.'

It is evident from the foregoing that the crucial test of the trial court's action in accepting a plea of guilty is whether the defendant entered his plea of guilty 'freely and understandingly.' If the acts which constitute the alleged offense are such that the defendant can readily understand whether he has committed them, and if he understands that his plea of guilty amounts to an acknowledgment that he has committed the acts in question and if he also understands the legal consequences of this acknowledgment, a trial court should accept a plea of guilty. There are cases in which the facts are such that there could be differences of opinion as to their legal effect. In such a case the trial court should not accept the plea of guilty until after the defendant has had the benefit of legal advice or, at least, until the trial...