Loughran v. United States

Decision Date18 April 1963
Docket Number17696.,No. 17653,17653
Citation317 F.2d 896
PartiesJohn LOUGHRAN et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. MAURY CORPORATION, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Mr. A. Donald Mileur, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Asst. Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark and Mr. Roger P. Marquis, Attorney, Department of Justice, were on the motion, for appellee.

Mr. James F. Reilly, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Kevin P. Charles, Washington, D. C., was on the brief in opposition to the motion, for appellants.

Mr. G. William Hammer, Falls Church, Va., entered an appearance for appellant in No. 17696.

Before PRETTYMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and FAHY and BURGER, Circuit Judges.

PRETTYMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

The United States brought a civil action for the taking of real property under power of eminent domain. The authority for the taking was recited as the condemnation statutes of 1888, 1929 and 1949 "and the Act of July 27, 1962 (Public Law 87-552, 76 Stat. 222)." The complaint said, "The use for which said land is taken is as a site for construction of an addition to the headquarters building of the International Monetary Fund." A declaration of taking was executed by the proper official on behalf of the United States, and $406,300 was deposited in the registry of the court as the estimated just compensation. The United States filed a motion for an order for delivery of possession. The fee owners and lessees of the property filed answers and also filed motions to dismiss the complaint and to deny the motion of the Government for possession. The District Court denied both motions of the owners and lessees. The court then ordered that all persons in possession or control of the property surrender possession on or before May 1, 1963.

The defendants (fee owners and lessees) contended and continue to contend that the taking is not for a public purpose and is therefore illegal.

The International Monetary Fund is a permanent intergovernmental organization designed to promote certain policies in the area of foreign exchange. It presently has 76 members (all nations, of course), and the fund amounts to approximately fifteen billion dollars. The Congress in July, 1962, adopted a joint resolution (now Public Law 87-552) which provided:

"The Administrator of General Services is hereby authorized, on the basis of full reimbursement by the International Monetary Fund, (1) to acquire, by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, the land in the northwest section of the District of Columbia known as lots I and R in square 141, together with any buildings and improvements thereon, and (2) to convey the property so acquired to the International Monetary Fund for use in expanding the principal office of the Fund."

The resolution as adopted was approved July 27, 1962. The property mentioned (lots I and R in square 141) is the property here involved. The United States is avowedly proceeding under this act of the Congress.

The owners and lessees appealed to this court from the judgment of the District Court granting the United States possession of the property, and also from the judgment in which that court held the taking to be for a public purpose and a lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain. The United States moved to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the judgments appealed from were not final orders or judgments. That motion is now before us.

The Government rests upon the decision and opinion of the Supreme Court in Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). It contends that the Court there held that the right of an owner to appeal from the taking of property does not lie until the final judgment in the proceeding has been rendered. Such final judgment is not rendered until the just compensation has been determined and judgment for that amount included in the order. The Court held in that case that the property owners could not appeal from the judgment of taking or transfer of possession. The Court said that under the War Purposes Act of 1917 the rule was the same as it has been historically in condemnation matters and that in the taking, prior to the payment of just compensation, the United States acquired a defeasible title. The Government concedes here that under the judgment of the District Court the title which the United States will acquire is a defeasible title, and urges that in an appeal from a judgment awarding just compensation the property owners could present their contentions respecting the invalidity of the transfer of title, and that if successful in that contention they could require a return of the property.

This property includes land and a hotel building.

The International Monetary Fund was established by Articles of Agreement between the United States and other powers, known as the Bretton Woods Agreement, effective December 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401 et seq. The Agreement provides (Art. IX, Sec. 3, Id. at 1413):

"The Fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by
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7 cases
  • South Dakota Dept. of Transp. v. Freeman
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 1, 1985
    ...I also dissent. Numerous courts and jurisdictions, for various reasons, have permitted such appeals. See, e.g., Loughran v. United States, 317 F.2d 896 (D.C.Cir.1963); Van Dyke v. Midnight Sun Mining & Ditch Co., 100 C.C.A. 503, 177 Fed. 85 (9th Cir.1910); 1.67 Acres of Land, Etc. v. State,......
  • City of Sunland Park v. PASEO DEL NORTE
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • September 3, 1999
    ...against those contentions. {14} Post-Catlin decisions of the federal appellate courts do not help Defendants. In Loughran v. United States, 317 F.2d 896, 897 (D.C.Cir.1963), the taking was for the purpose of deeding the property to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The order being appe......
  • United States v. 58.16 ACRES OF LAND, ETC.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • April 13, 1973
    ...which an appeal, interlocutory in character, is permissible. Such a circumstance presented itself in Loughran v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 317 F.2d 896 (1963). In that case the authorizing statute provided that the land to be acquired was to be conveyed to the International Monet......
  • Coleman v. United States, 17444.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • April 19, 1963
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