Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-1263.,No. 04-1261.,04-1261.,04-1263. |
| Citation | 431 F.3d 1268 |
| Parties | Linda LOUGHRIDGE; William P. Loughridge; Jerry Hannah; Nancy Hannah; Donna L. Garth; Ronald Hochfield; Marsha Hochfield; Balaju, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; Dale V. Kesler; Judith A. Kesler; Rosemarie Glas; Christopher W. Congalton; Susan T. Congalton; Claire Beck; Calvin Daks; Carol Daks; Justine Parker; Howard G. Parker; Janet Sutterley; Randy Kilgore; Sue Taylor; Darrell Taylor; Janet G. Upton; Charles R. Upton; Robert B. Grossman; Gale K. Grossman; Mark A. Lathrop; Susan K. Lathrop; Janice C. Meyer; Gary Q. Barnett; Julia Watson Barnett; Robert S. Julian; Corey Bender Mindlin; Addison L. Piper; Richard C. Raczuk; Claudette L. Raczuk; Thomas A. Hardilek; Sandra J. Hardilek; Fuyu Farms, a Colorado general partnership; Donald K. Hagar; Leila M. Hagar; Donald M. Johnson; Teresa Y. Johnson; Steve Shuman; Karen Shuman; David Price; Mary Price; Tim Borden; Janet Borden; John W. Paul; Linda T. Paul; Marcus Meyer; Karrie Meyer; James C. Holzwarth; Niki K. Holzwarth; Martha W. Hibbard; Robert C. Comyn; Noelle L. Comyn; Kiefer Mendenhall; Mary Mendenhall; William F. Gorog, on behalf of the Grantor Retained Income Trust, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. CHILES POWER SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., doing business as Heatway Radiant Floors and Snowmelting, Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Appellee, v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, an Ohio Corporation, Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Stephen G. Masciocchi, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, CO, (David L. Black, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, CO, William W. Maywhort and J. Lee Gray, Holland & Hart LLP, Greenwood Village, CO, Geoffrey P. Anderson, Burns, Figa & Will P.C., Englewood, CO, Rohn K. Robbins, Law Offices of Rohn K. Robbins LLC, Vail, CO, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Roger P. Thomasch, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, Denver, CO, (Mary A. Wells and L. Michael Brooks, Jr., Wells, Anderson & Race LLC, Denver, CO, David L. Lenyo and Chad Schmit, Garfield & Hecht, P.C., Aspen, CO, with him on the briefs for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, and Wendelyn K. Walberg and Lynaia M. South, Walberg, Dagner & Tucker, P.C., Centennial, CO, on the brief for Appellee Chiles Power Supply Company), for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Good Year Tire and Rubber Company.
Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge and, KELLY Circuit Judge.
This appeal and cross-appeal arise from a diversity action brought under Colorado state law by the owners of 36 Colorado homes ("Homeowners") against Defendants Chiles Power Supply, Inc. d/b/a Heatway Radiant Floors and Snowmelting ("Heatway") and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company ("Goodyear"). After a jury trial and post-trial motions, many, but not all, of the Homeowners were awarded damages against Goodyear only. We affirm the district court's amended judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In the 1980s, Heatway began selling parts for hydronic radiant heating systems. These systems use hose to circulate warm fluid under indoor flooring as an alternative to conventional heating systems, or under driveways and sidewalks to melt snow and ice. Heatway originally contracted with Dayco Rubber Products Company ("Dayco") to produce the hose, "Entran," used in Heatway's radiant systems. In 1989, Heatway contracted with Goodyear to manufacture a new hose, "Entran II." By 1990, Heatway discontinued Dayco as a supplier and thereafter used Goodyear as its sole supplier of hose. Goodyear made Entran II until 1993 and supplied it exclusively to Heatway.
As early as 1991, some homeowners began noticing problems with their hydronic heating systems, including cracking, leaking and sediment build-up in their Entran II hose. In many cases, these problems required the removal and replacement of the hose in its entirety, as well as the replacement of most other parts of the hydronic heating system. By 1992, Heatway began receiving complaints from homeowners about hardening of the Entran II hose and leaks in the installed heating systems. Believing that the Entran II hose was causing the leaks, Heatway stopped paying Goodyear for hose shipments. As a result, Goodyear sued Heatway in 1997 in federal district court in Ohio (the "Ohio action"). Heatway filed a counterclaim alleging that the Entran II hose was defective. Goodyear had by this time manufactured 25,000,000 feet of Entran II hose. The Ohio action went to trial on the issue of the merchantability of all 25,000,000 feet of Entran II hose. The jury returned a verdict for Goodyear, whereupon Heatway declared bankruptcy.
Between 1998 and 2000 a number of suits were filed in Colorado state and federal courts by homeowners against Goodyear, Heatway, or both. Eight of these cases were consolidated. Homeowners sought recovery from Goodyear for sale of a defective product, negligence, negligent failure to warn, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act ("CCPA"), and civil conspiracy. Homeowners claimed that Goodyear was liable for the costs of removing and replacing the Entran II hose installed in their homes, the diminution in value of their homes, and other costs and losses. Four homeowners — Rosemarie Glas, Robert Julian, Corey Bender Mindlin, and Jane and Charles Upton (the "Heatway plaintiffs") — also sought recovery against Heatway for violation of the CCPA and civil conspiracy. Goodyear and Heatway asserted cross-claims against one another for contribution or indemnification under Ohio law. Goodyear cross-claimed against Heatway for deceit (fraud), and Heatway cross-claimed against Goodyear for sale of a defective product.
After the close of evidence, Goodyear moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), for judgment as a matter of law as to the claims of three homeowners who sold their homes prior to trial: James and Nikki Holzwarth (the "Holzwarths"), Janet Sutterley and Randy Kilgore ("Sutterley/Kilgore"), and Ms. Glas. The district court denied Goodyear's motion as to the claims of the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore. However, the district court granted the motion as to Ms. Glas, reasoning that her damages were too speculative. Ms. Glas filed a post-judgment motion asking the court to alter or amend the judgment in her favor and for a new trial concerning damages. The district court denied the motion.
With the exception of one homeowner, William Gorog, the jury returned verdicts in favor of all Homeowners and against Goodyear on three theories of recovery: sale of a defective product, negligence, and negligent failure to warn. The jury awarded Homeowners damages in the aggregate of $4,079,391.50. J.A. at 800-943. The jury found in favor of Goodyear and Heatway on all claims for violation of the CCPA and civil conspiracy. Neither Goodyear nor Heatway prevailed on its cross-claim against the other. The jury did, however, apportion fault evenly between Goodyear and Heatway as to all prevailing Homeowners.
With respect to the jury's apportionment of fault to Heatway, Homeowners filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) and 59(e) respectively. Homeowners argued that because the jury did not find Heatway liable on any of the Heatway plaintiffs' claims or on Goodyear's cross-claim, damages were not appropriately apportioned to it as a nonparty at fault. J.A. at 1146. The district court denied the motion.
As to the Holzwarths, the jury awarded them $243,072 in "reasonable repair and/or replacement costs." The jury awarded Sutterley/Kilgore $240,071 in "other reasonable costs or losses." After the district court entered judgment on the jury's verdicts, Goodyear renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the claims of the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Goodyear argued that the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore presented evidence and were awarded damages for future repair costs that they had not incurred and would never incur because they had already sold their homes. J.A. at 1050-58. The district court construed the motion as a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion and granted it. As such, the district court amended the judgment and reduced the Holzwarths' jury award to $43,072 and Sutterley/Kilgore's jury award to $44,000 thereby eliminating the portions of their awards which the district court interpreted as representing future repair costs.
With respect to Mr. Gorog, the only homeowner against whom Goodyear had asserted a statute of limitations defense, the jury found in favor of Goodyear on all claims. But the jury did not answer the questions on the verdict form about Goodyear's statute of limitations defense. The district court entered judgment against Mr. Gorog. After entry of judgment, Mr. Gorog moved for judgment as a matter of law, to alter or amend the judgement or for a new trial. The district court denied the motion.
After trial, Homeowners moved for prejudgment interest. The district court held that Homeowners were entitled to prejudgment interest from the date on which the hydronic heating systems, containing Entran II, were originally installed in the Homeowners' respective homes. The district court awarded prejudgment interest in the aggregate of $5,701,367.
Homeowners appeal from the district court's order contending that (1) the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts and the district court's attempt to reconcile the verdicts conflicts with the jury instructions and Colorado law, and the district court erred (2) in reducing the jury's award of damages to the Holzwarths and Sutterley/Kilgore, (3) in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Goodyear on Ms. Glas's damage claims, and (4) in granting judgment in favor of Goodyear on Mr. Gorog's claims...
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