Louis Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur Evansville Railway Company
Decision Date | 10 December 1900 |
Docket Number | No. 438,438 |
Citation | 179 U.S. 335,21 S.Ct. 171,45 L.Ed. 220 |
Parties | LOUIS J. GABLEMAN, Jr., by His Next Friend, Louis J. Gableman, Sr., Plff. in Err. , v. PEORIA, DECATUR, & EVANSVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY, Edward O. Hopkins, Receiver of the Peoria, Decatur, & Evansville Railway Company, and George Colvin |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The certificate in this case was as follows:
'The questions of law upon which this court desires the advice and instruction of the Supreme Court are:
[Mr. W. A. Cullop for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Walter S. Horton for defendant in error.
The general policy of the act of March 3, 1887, corrected by the act of August 13, 1888 (24 Stat. at L. chap. 373, p. 552; 25 Stat. at L. chap. 866, p. 433), as is apparent on its face, and as has been repeatedly recognized by this court, was to contract the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 462, 38 L. ed. 511, 514, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, and cases cited.
And it is well settled that a case cannot be removed from a state court into the circuit court of the United States on the sole ground that it is one arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, unless that appears by the plaintiff's statement of his own claim, and, if it does not so appear, the want cannot be supplied by any statement in the petition for removal or in the subsequent pleadings. Walker v. Collins, 167 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 76, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738.
It has also been determined that when the application rests on that ground, and there is more than one defendant, all the defendants must join. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 44 L. ed. 1055, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 854.
And in respect of the removal of actions of tort on the ground of separable controversy, that the existence of such controversy must appear on the face of the plaintiff's pleading, and that it does not so appear, if the defendants are charged with direct or concurrent or concerted wrongful action. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, ante, 67, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67.
In this case the pleadings are not before us, and the certifi- cate states that the receiver removed the cause into the circuit court, on his sole petition, 'upon the ground that it was a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.' A motion to remand was made and denied, 82 Fed. Rep. 791. This decision was afterwards reversed by the circuit court of appeals, but, as is admitted, a rehearing was granted, and this certificate was then made. 41 C. C. A. 160, 101 Fed. Rep. 1.
The receiver rested his contention that the case arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States on the single ground of his appointment by the Federal court; and, upon this record, our opinion of the tenability of that ground is requested.
Section 3 of the acts of 1887 and 1888 reads:
'That every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed; but such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of justice.'
This act abrogated the rule that a receiver could not be sued without leave of the court appointing him, and gave the citizen the unconditional right to bring his action in the local courts, and to have the justice and amount of his demand determined by the verdict of a jury. He ceased to be compelled to litigate at a distance, or in any other forum, or according to any other course of justice, than he would be entitled to if the property or business were not being administered by the Federal court.
The object of the section is manifest, and it is equally plain that that object would be open to be defeated if the receiver could remove the case at his volition. The intention to permit this to be done cannot reasonably be imputed to Congress, and, moreover, such a right would be inconsistent with the general policy of the act.
As, however, the receiver, as the officer of the court, holds the property for the benefit of all who have an interest in it, and is not to be interfered with in its administration and dis- posal by the judgment or process of another court, the closing clause of the section, out of abundant caution, provides that when the receiver is sued, without leave, 'such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which said receiver or manager was appointed, so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of justice.'
Of course it devolves on the court in possession of the property or funds out of which judgments against its receiver must be paid to adjust the equities between all parties, and to determine the time and manner of payment of judgment creditors necessarily applying for satisfaction from assets so held to the court that holds them. But, as we observed in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Johnson, 151 U. S. 103, 38 L. ed. 89, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250, 'the right to sue without resorting to the appointing court, which involves the right to obtain judgment, cannot be assumed to have been rendered practically valueless by this further provision in the same section of the statute which granted it.'
In Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co. 178 U. § 243, 44 L. ed. 1054, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 867, we said, in the language of previous opinions, that when a suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, upon the determination of which the result depends, it is not a suit arising under the Constitution or laws. And it must appear on the record, by a statement in legal and logical form, such as is required in good pleading, that the suit is one which does...
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