Louis v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 23 July 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–918 ESH
• Citation: 59 F.Supp.3d 135
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Jean Alix Louis, Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

59 F.Supp.3d 135

Jean Alix Louis, Plaintiff

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–918 ESH

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 23, 2014

Alan Scott Bolden, Eric Lawrence Alexander, Katherine Joanne Seikaly, Reed Smith LLP, Troy W. Poole, The Poole Law Firm, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Martha J. Mullen, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Jean Alix Louis, individually and as a representative of the estate of Jean Edny Louis, has sued the District of Columbia and Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officer Paul Riggins, in his individual and official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and assorted provisions of state law. The suit grows out of an encounter between plaintiff's mentally ill brother, Jean Edny Louis (“Louis”), and MPD officers, during which Officer Riggins fatally shot Louis. Before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (“Mot.”, Feb. 19, 2014 [Dkt. No. 35].) Having considered the record and the parties' briefs, and for the reasons stated below, the Court will grant defendants' motion as to plaintiff's federal-law claims and dismiss plaintiff's remaining state-law claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2011, the MPD was called to Louis's apartment to assist the D.C. Mobile Crisis Unit in effecting an FD–12 application for Louis's emergency hospitalization. (FIT Report, Aug. 29, 2012 [Dkt. No. 40–1 Ex. C] at 1.) Louis had been acting irrationally, and his case manager and the Mobile Crisis Unit had concluded he needed emergency psychiatric services pursuant to D.C. Code § 21–521 (2003).

When MPD officers arrived at Louis's apartment, the three mental health professionals on the scene informed the officers that Louis was in an agitated state and was armed with a screwdriver. (FIT Report at 1.) At the time, Louis was located inside the bathroom. (Id. ) After fifteen to twenty minutes of failed attempts to convince Louis to exit the bathroom, the officers attempted to enter. (Dep. of Gordon Peterson, Oct. 3, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35–7] at 48–49.) When the door opened, Louis swung an eleven-inch screwdriver with an artificially sharpened, seven-inch blade at the officers and stabbed Officer Rafeal Sarita in the right arm, causing a puncture wound. (Id. at 49–50; FIT Report at 1; Incident–Based Event Report, June 14, 2011 [Dkt. No. 35–1] at 2.) Officer Sarita sprayed a one-second burst of OC (pepper) spray at Louis, who, unfazed, threw water at the officers and slammed shut the bathroom door. (FIT Report at 1.) The commanding officer on the scene then declared a barricade situation and requested the Special Operations Division Emergency Response Team (“ERT”) to respond to the scene. (Id. )

Upon arriving at Louis's apartment building, the ERT members were briefed on prior events, including Louis's stabbing of Officer Sarita with the screwdriver. (Dep. of Robert Glover, Dec. 10, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35–6; 40–1 Ex. E] at 174–75; Dep. of Paul Riggins, Dec. 17, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35–9; 40–1 Ex. M] at 344.)) ERT members were also informed that in prior instances requiring Louis's emergency hospitalization, it had taken several officers to subdue Louis. (Glover Dep. at 175.) The ERT established sniper observation posts with lines of sight into Louis's bathroom and formed a tactical entry team. (FIT Report at 2; see Glover Dep. at 176.) A short time later, the tactical entry team entered Louis's apartment with ERT negotiators. (FIT Report at 2.)

ERT negotiators unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with Louis for around an hour and a half. (Glover Dep. at 81.) The negotiators failed to establish a meaningful dialogue with Louis, who would repeat (in English)¹ what the negotiators said to him, speak unintelligibly, or not respond at all. (Id. at 121; FIT Report at 2.)

During the negotiations, Louis went silent for approximately twenty minutes. (Glover Dep. at 106.) Members of the sniper team informed the tactical team that Louis was sitting on the toilet and appeared either asleep or unconscious. (Id. ) Commanding officer Lieutenant Robert Glover, concerned about Louis's safety and also concerned that this “might be the only opportunity to safely take [Louis] into custody,” authorized a tactical plan for a four-man team to safely apprehend Louis. (Id. at 105–06.) Under the plan, Officer Mark Wascavage was to breach the door, and Officers Paul Riggins, Gregory Robinson, and William Powell were to enter the bathroom, in that order. (Dep. of William Powell, Dec. 10, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35–8; 40–1 Ex. D] at 94.) Although the officers wore protective gear and shields, their necks, arms and thighs were exposed, (Defendants' Statement of Facts (“DSOF”), Feb. 19, 2014 [Dkt. No. 35] ¶ 10), and the shields were not designed to protect against sharp objects. (Dep. of Mark Wascavage, Dec. 17, 2013 [Dkt. No. 35–11; 40–1 Ex. P] at 88.) Before entering, Officer Riggins looked through a hole in the bathroom door and personally observed Louis sitting on the toilet seat with his head dropped, appearing to be either asleep or unconscious. (Riggins Dep. at 68–69.)

Less than one minute later, Officer Wascavage breached the bathroom door with a one-man battering ram. (DSOF ¶ 1; Riggins Dep. at 69; Powell Dep. at 129.) Upon entering the bathroom, Officer Riggins realized that Louis was no longer sitting on the toilet, but was now positioned behind the bathroom door with a screwdriver in his right hand. (Riggins Dep. at 346.) Louis then pushed himself against the door to try to keep Officer Robinson from entering behind Officer Riggins. As Officer Robinson pushed back against the door, Louis swung the screwdriver—which he held pointing downward—in a stabbing motion around the door multiple times at Officer Robinson. (Riggins Dep. at 31–32, 346; Dep. of Gregory Robinson, Jan. 3, 2014 [Dkt. No. 35–10; 40–1 Ex. N] at 197.) At this point, Officer Riggins—between three and five feet from Louis (Riggins Dep. at 288, 323 (less than three feet); Dep. of Charles Key, Jan. 31, 2014 [Dkt. No. 38–17] at 163 (up to five feet))—believed that Louis had stabbed Officer Robinson. (Riggins Dep. at 54, 322, 346.) Officer Riggins threw down his can of OC spray and drew his service pistol, at which point Louis slid along the door and raised the screwdriver in a stabbing motion toward Officer Riggins. (Id. at 42, 189, 317, 322.) Officer Riggins fired two shots at Louis, hitting Louis once in the right side of the head and once in the right shoulder. (Id. at 21, 23, 41–42, 189.) Louis fell unconscious immediately. (DSOF ¶ 9.) The confrontation in the bathroom lasted between only seven and ten seconds (Robinson Dep. at 197), during which Officers Robinson and Riggins were unable to see one another. (Id. at 198.) Although an EMT-certified ERT member attempted first aid on Louis, Louis was later pronounced dead at Howard University Hospital. (FIT Report at 2.) Approximately four hours passed between the time officers were originally called to Louis's apartment and when Louis was shot. (See id. at 1–2.)

Plaintiff, as a representative of Louis's estate and Louis's survivor, filed this suit against the District of Columbia and “John Doe Police Officers” on June 6, 2012. (Compl., June 6, 2012 [Dkt. No. 1].) On October 2, 2012, plaintiff added Officer Riggins as a named defendant. (First Amd. Compl., Oct. 2, 2012 [Dkt. No. 9].) On September 5, 2013, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, which contained two federal- and four state-law counts: (1) an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Riggins; (2) a municipal liability claim under section 1983 against the District of Columbia; (3) a state-law assault and battery claim against both defendants; (4) a state-law negligent excessive force claim against both defendants; (5) a state-law survival act claim against both defendants; (6) a state-law wrongful death claim against both defendants. (Second Amd. Compl. (“SAC”), Sept. 5, 2013 [Dkt. No. 31] ¶¶ 28–54.) Discovery has closed and defendants now move for summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must then “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual disagreement is insufficient to preclude summary judgment: a dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party; a fact is “material” only if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; accord Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C.Cir.1987).

The court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.’ ” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) ). However, a court should not consider a non-moving party's “unsubstantiated allegations.” Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Ci...