Louis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.

• Decision Date: 14 January 2016
• Docket Number: 15 Civ. 3122 (NRB)
• Parties: Mesline Louis, individually and on behalf of infants G.A.H., G.A.L. and N.V.S., Plaintiffs, v. New York City Housing Authority, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

152 F.Supp.3d 143

Mesline Louis, individually and on behalf of infants G.A.H., G.A.L. and N.V.S., Plaintiffs,

v.New York City Housing Authority, Defendant.

15 Civ. 3122 (NRB)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed January 14, 2016

Dana R. DiBlasi (Stricker), Law Office of Dana Stricker, PLLC, Bronx, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Nabiha Rahman, New York City Housing Authority, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Mesline Louis (“Louis”) brings this action on behalf of herself and her children G.A.H., G.A.L., and N.V.S. (collectively, “plaintiffs”), alleging that defendant New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) refused to make reasonable accommodations to the disabilities of Louis and N.V.S. in its administration of the Section 8 tenant-based assistance program, in violation of, inter alia, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.

Plaintiffs also allege that NYCHA's denial of Louis's requests for an emergency transfer when she complained of sexual harassment by her landlord was negligent and a breach of contract and NYCHA's statutory duties.

Originally filed in New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, on or about March 27, 2015, the case was removed to this Court on April 21, 2015. On June 25, 2015, the Court held a conference at which it granted plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint” or “Am. Compl.”) to cure certain deficiencies in their original complaint. Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint on July 13, 2015. On August 10, 2015, NYCHA moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

, and the motion was fully briefed on October 9, 2015.

For reasons discussed more thoroughly below, we grant NYCHA's motion to dismiss. To briefly summarize, the gravamen of plaintiffs' disability discrimination claims, brought principally as reasonable accommodation claims under Title II of the ADA, is that NYCHA denied plaintiffs an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing by failing to provide them with an apartment modified to accommodate Louis's and N.S.V.'s disabilities and to meaningfully assist them in obtaining such an apartment. While we are sympathetic to plaintiffs, who have struggled to find suitable housing, we agree with NYCHA that their ADA claims must be dismissed. At the outset, they are barred in part by the relevant statute of limitations and are inadequately plead as to Louis's alleged disability. Further, plaintiffs' allegations do not demonstrate that plaintiffs were denied meaningful access to benefits actually provided by NYCHA through its administration of the Section 8 tenant-based program, which does not supply housing, but instead provides subsidies to low-income families who find their own units to rent from private landlords. Because plaintiffs' demand for modified housing would substantively alter the benefits provided by the program, it does not give rise to a cognizable ADA claim. Moreover, to the extent that some form of assistance in locating accessible housing is required to put Section 8 voucher holders with disabilities on the same footing as nondisabled voucher holders, plaintiffs' Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations suggesting that any obstacles plaintiffs faced in utilizing their vouchers were as a result of any disability.

Finally, plaintiffs' other claims, based both on NYCHA's failure to accommodate and NYCHA's denial of Louis's requests for an emergency transfer, either fail as a matter of law or are more appropriately remanded to the state court at this stage of the litigation.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts¹

The Section 8 tenant-based housing assistance program is a federal program providing rent subsidies to low-income tenants in private housing. NYCHA is a public housing agency (or “PHA”) that administers the Section 8 tenant-based program in New York City in accordance with the United States Housing Act of 1937 (the “Housing Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq.,

and regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).

In or about 1999, plaintiffs began receiving vouchers through the Section 8 tenant-based program.² Louis “suffers from several disabilities including, but not limited to, mental illness, stroke

, and seizures.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Her son N.V.S. suffers from “several disabilities including, but not limited to, continuing and debilitat[ing] lung disease necessitating monitors, ventilators and other apparatus to sustain his life.” Id. By 2009, Louis had provided documentary proof of these conditions to NYCHA.

From April 2009 through March 2011, Louis repeatedly notified NYCHA that she was being sexually harassed by her landlord, Michael Hill (“Hill”). Louis visited a NYCHA office in Brooklyn approximately 60 times to request an emergency transfer, and reported the harassment via complaint forms and to her assigned NYCHA representative during those visits. NYCHA failed to act on these complaints and did not grant Louis an emergency transfer, despite her counsel's attempts to obtain one on her behalf. In addition, during a meeting in November 2009, Louis was told by a NYCHA representative that she “could not say anything about the sexual harassment or she would not find a new place to live.” Am. Compl. ¶ 13. Ultimately, Louis and her family were “wrongfully evicted” from the apartment owned by Hill pursuant to a holdover proceeding. Id. ¶ 12.

Since February 2011, plaintiffs have not had suitable housing. Despite “many written and oral requests” by Louis, NYCHA has “merely provided Plaintiffs with section 8 vouchers,” and has “failed to assist Plaintiffs in obtaining housing in any meaningful way as well as failed to provide housing modified to assist Plaintiffs with their disabilities, including, but not limited to, the extensive medical apparatus necessary to care for [N.V.S.]” Id. ¶ 8. In or about March 2015, NYCHA notified Louis that she was no longer eligible for Section 8 vouchers, and plaintiffs remain homeless.

II. The Amended Complaint

The Amended Complaint sets forth two causes of action, each of which includes a set of factual allegations and appears to assert numerous claims. All of the claims in the “First Cause of Action” section are tied to NYCHA's alleged failure to “make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services when such accommodations were necessary to afford Plaintiffs an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling,” including NYCHA's failure to make “reasonable modifications to common use portions of the dwelling,” to “assist Plaintiffs in obtaining housing in any meaningful way,” and to “provide housing modified to assist Plaintiffs with their disabilities.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8. Based on these alleged failures, plaintiffs contend that NYCHA has discriminated against them on the basis of disability in violation of Title II of the ADA and the New York State Executive Law § 296.18(2), failed to comply with its 1996 “Voluntary Compliance Agreement” with HUD (the “1996 VCA”), acted negligently, breached an unspecified contract, and breached unspecified statutory duties. In the “Second Cause of Action,” plaintiffs allege that NYCHA's denial of Louis's requests for an emergency transfer while she was subject to her landlord's sexual harassment was negligent and constituted a breach of contract and unspecified statutory duties. Id. ¶ 13.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. See, e.g.,

Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir.2008). However, it is not enough for the complaint to offer “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Specifically, plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to show that there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id. and if plaintiffs have not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

II. Plaintiffs' ADA Claims

The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)

. Plaintiffs' ADA claims are brought pursuant to Title II of the ADA (or “Title II”), which provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. § 12132. A public entity includes a state or local government body or any instrumentality thereof, and a qualified individual with a disability is, to the extent pertinent here, “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for ... the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(1), (2).

In order to prove a violation of Title II, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the defendant is subject to [the ADA]; and (3) he...