Louisa Sauer v. City of New York 130 12, 13 1906

Decision Date07 January 1907
Citation51 L.Ed. 1176,27 S.Ct. 686,206 U.S. 536
PartiesLOUISA SAUER, Gertrude Crane, Individually and as Administratrix of George W. Sauer, Deceased, et. al., Plffs. in Err., v. CITY OF NEW YORK. No 130. Argued December 12, 13, 1906. Ordered for reargument
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

George W. Sauer, the intestate of the plaintiffs in error (hereafter called the plaintiff), became, on July 1, 1886, the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land on the corner of One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street and Eighth avenue, in the city of New York. There was then upon the land a building used as a place of public resort. The city of New York was and is the owner of the fee of One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street and Eighth avenue, which it holds in trust for the public for highways.

Before the passage of the act hereinafter referred to One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street had been graded from Eighth avenue in a westerly direction, until it reached a high, and, for street sues, impassable, bluff, on the summit of which ran St. Nicholas place, a public highway. The street, as laid out on the records, ascends the bluff, and continues westerly to the Hudson river. It extends easterly to the Harlem river at a point where the river is bridged by McComb's Dam bridge.

In 1887 the legislature of the state of New York enacted a law which authorized the city of New York, for the purpose of improving and regulating the use of One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street, to construct over said street from St. Nicholas place to McComb's Dam bridge an elevated iron viaduct for the public travel, with the proviso that no railways should be permitted upon it. There was no provision for damages to the owners of land abutting on the street. Subsequently the viaduct was constructed, resting upon iron columns placed in the roadway. The surface of the viaduct consisted of asphalt and paving blocks laid on iron beams. Opposite the plaintiff's land it is 63 feet wide and about 50 feet above the surface of the original street, which, except as interfered with by the viaduct, remains unobstructed for public travel. At the junction of the street with Eighth avenue it is widened into a quadrangular platform, 80 by 160 feet in extent. Near the plaintiff's land the viaduct may be reached by a stairway. By the construction and maintenance of the viaduct the plaintiff's access to his land and the free and uninterrupted use of light and air have been impaired, and the value of his property has been decreased by reason of the dust, dirt, and noise occasioned by the structure. This action was brought to enjoin the defendant from maintaining the viaduct, or, in the alternative, for the recovery of damages caused by it. There was judgment for the defendant by the supreme court, affirmed by the appellate division and the court of appeals. 180 N. Y. 27, 70 L.R.A. 717, 72 N. E. 579. After the last decision the case was remitted to the supreme court, where there was final judgment for the defendant, and it is now here on writ of error under the claim that—— First. Plaintiff has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and

Second. That the act under which the viaduct was constructed, as construed by the court, impairs the obligation of a contract, in violation of § 10, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States.

Messrs. Abram I. Elkus and Carlisle J. Gleason for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. Theodore Connoly and Terence Farley for defendant in error.

Messrs. Henry B. Anderson and Chandler P. Anderson for certain property owners similarly situated.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 539-541 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Moody, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

The acts of the defendant for which the plaintiff sought a remedy in the courts of New York may be simply stated. The plaintiff owned land with buildings thereon situated at the junction of One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street and Eighth avenue, two public highways, in which the fee was vested in the city upon the trust that they should be forever kept open as public streets. As One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street was graded at the time the plaintiff acquired his title, it was isolated to a considerable extent from the street system of the city. Its west end ran into a high and practically impassable bluff, which rendered further progress in that direction impossible. The east end ran to the bank of the Harlem river at a grade which rendered access to McComb's Dam bridge, which crossed the river at that point, impossible. Under legislative authority the city constructed, solely for public travel, a viaduct over One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street, beginning at the bridge and thence running with gradual ascent to the top of the bluff. This viaduct enabled travelers to use One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street, in connection with other streets of the city, from which it had previously been disconnected. The viaduct rested upon columns planted in the street, and they, and the viaduct itself, to a material extent, impaired the plaintiff's access to his land and the free admission to it of light and air. The plaintiff, in his complaint, alleged that this structure was unlawful, because the law under which it was constructed did not provide for compensation for the injury to his private property in the easements of access, light, and air appurtenant to his estate. The court of appeals denied the plaintiff the relief which he sought, upon the ground that, under the law of New York, he had no easements of access, light, or air, as against any improvement of the street for the purpose of adapting it to public travel. In other words, the court in effect decided that the property alleged to have been injured did not exist. The reasons upon which the decision of that court proceeded will appear by quotations from the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Haight. Judge Haight said:

'The fee of the street having been acquired accordig to the provisions of the statute, we must assume that full compensation was made to the owners of the lands through which the streets and avenues were laid out, and that thereafter the owners of lands abutting thereon hold their titles subject to all of the legitimate and proper uses to which the streets and public highways may be devoted. As such owners they are subject to the right of the public to grade and improve the streets, and they are presumed to have been compensated for any future improvement or change in the surface or grade rendered necessary for the convenience of public travel, especially in cities where the growth of population increases the use of the highways. The rule may be different as to peculiar and extraordinary changes made for some ulterior purposes other than the improvement of the street, as, for instance where the natural surface has been changed by artificial means, such as the construction of a railroad embankment, or a bridge over a railroad, making elevated approaches necessary. But as to changes from the natural contour of the surface, rendered necessary in order to adapt the street to the free and easy passage of the public, they may be lawfully made without additional compensation to abutting owners, and for that purpose bridges may be constructed over streams and viaducts over ravines, with approaches thereto from intersecting streets. . . . In the case under consideration, as we have seen, One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street continued west to Bradhurst avenue. There it met a steep bluff 70 feet high, on the top of which was St. Nicholas place. The title of the street up the bluff had been acquired and recorded, but it had never been opened and worked as a street. The bluff was the natural contour of the surface, and, for the purpose of facilitating easy and safe travel of the public from St. Nicholas place to other portions of the city, the legislature authorized the construction of the viaduct in question. It is devoted to ordinary traffic by teams, vehicles, and pedestrians. It is prohibited for railroad purposes. It is one of the uses to which public highways are primarily opened and devoted. It was constructed under legislative authority, in the exercise of governmental powers, for a public purpose. It is not, therefore, a nuisance, and the plaintiff is not entitled to have its maintenance enjoined or to recover in this action the consequential damages sustained.'

The plaintiff now contends that the judgment afterwards rendered by the supreme court of New York, in conformity with the opinion of the court of appeals, denied rights secured to him by the Federal Constitution. This contention presents the only question for our determination, and the correctness of the principles of local land law applied by the state courts is not open to inquiry here, unless it has some bearing upon that question. But it may not be inappropriate to say that the decision of the court of appeals seems to be in full accord with the decisions of all other courts in which the same question has arisen. The state courts have uniformly held that the erection over a street of an elevated viaduct, intended for general public travel, and not devoted to the exclusive use of a private transportation corporation, is a legitimate street improvement, equivalent to a change of grade; and that, as in the case of a change of grade, an owner of land abutting on the street is not entitled to damages for the impairment of access to his land and the lessening of the circulation of light and air over it. Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 14 L.R.A. 370, 29 Am. St. Rep. 278, 10 So. 457; Willis v. Winona City, 59 Minn. 27, 26 L.R.A. 142, 60 N. W. 814; Colclough v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 182, 65 N. W. 1039; Walish v. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 16, 69 N. W. 818; Home Bldg. & Conveyance Co. v. Roanoke, 91 Va. 52, 27 L.R.A. 551, 20 S. E....

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