Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Texas State of Louisiana v. United States

• Decision Date: 23 November 1931
• Docket Number: Nos. 36,37,s. 36
• Citation: 76 L.Ed. 201,284 U.S. 125,52 S.Ct. 74
• Parties: LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al. v. TEXAS & N. O. R. Co. et al. STATE OF LOUISIANA et al. v. UNITED STATES et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

284 U.S. 125

52 S.Ct. 74

76 L.Ed. 201

LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.

v TEXAS & N. O. R. Co. et al.

STATE OF LOUISIANA et al.

v. UNITED STATES et al.

Nos. 36, 37.

Argued Oct. 13, 1931.

Decided Nov. 23, 1931.

Messrs. Wylie M. Barrow, of Baton Rouge, La., and Percy Saint, of New Orleans, La., for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 126-128 intentionally omitted] The Attorney General, and Mr. John LordO'Brian, Asst. to the Atty. Gen., for appellees the United States and Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. Harry McCall, of New Orleans, La., for appellees Texas & N. O. R. Co. and others.

Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Interstate Commerce Commission, June 3, 1929 (155 I. C. C. 247), and September 30, 1929 (157 I. C. C. 498), prescribed rates for the transportation of sand, gravel, and other named commodities, hereafter referred to as road materials, in Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and that part of Louisiana west of the Mississippi including certain points on the east bank of the river. The rates were based on straight mileage. Eight cents per ton was added for ferrying such of the traffic as crosses the Mississippi to and from the named points on the east bank. The rates were made to apply alike to interstate and intrastate transportation.

The commissions of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, respectively, adopted for application therein the intrastate rates so prescribed. The carriers applied to the Louisiana Public Service Commission for authority to give them effect in that state. October 12, 1929, the commission adopted them as to traffic between points on and north of the Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad, and between that territory and points in Western Louisi- ana south of the railroad. It refused to apply them on traffic wholly within the territory south of the railroad or on the traffic between that part of the state and the specified places on the east bank of the river.

The first of these suits was brought by the carriers against the commission and its members to enjoin them from interfering with the application of these intrastate rates. The other was brought by the state and the commission to annul them. 28 U. S. C. § 47(28 USCA § 47). A court of three judges heard the cases, held the rates valid, granted a permanent injunction in the first suit, No. 36, and dismissed the other, No. 37, 41 F.(2d) 293. The cases are here on direct appeal. Section 345(4).

Appellants seek reversal on the grounds that the inclusion of the allowance for ferrying the Mississippi gives preference to Galveston, Houston, and other ports of Texas over New Orleans and Baton Rouge in Louisiana in violation of the Constitution, article 1, § 9, cl. 6; that the Interstate Commerce Commission made no findings and had no evidence as to the cost of the ferry service; and that there is no evidence to warrant a finding that the lower intrastate rates in effect under state authority operate as a real and substantial obstruction to, burden upon, or discrimination against, interstate commerce.

The power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is exclusive and has no limitations other than such as arise from the Constitution itself. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 197, 6 L. Ed. 23. The Congress may adopt measures effectually to prevent every unreasonable, undue, or unjust obstruction to, burden upon, or discrimination against, interstate commerce, whether it results from state regulation or the voluntary acts of carriers. Shepard v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. Minn.) 184 F. 765, 795; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 398, 403, 432, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. United States (Com. Ct.) 205 F. 380, 388, affirmed sub nom., Houston E. & W. T R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 353, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341; American Express co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617, 624, 37 S. Ct. 656, 61 L. Ed. 1352; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 245 U. S. 493, 506, 38 S. Ct. 170, 62 L. Ed. 425. And it has empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe intrastate rates in place of those found unduly to discriminate against persons or localities in interstate commerce or against that commerce, section 13(3) (4), 49 USCA § 13(3, 4), and to require the carriers to make and apply on intrastate transportation such reasonable charges as will produce its fair share of the amounts needed to pay operating expenses, provide an adequate railway system, and yield a reasonable rate of return on the value of the property used in the transportation service. Section 15a (49 USCA § 15a). Wisconsin R. R. Comm. v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 585, 588, 42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371, 22 A. L. R. 1086; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 210, 211, 51 S. Ct. 119, 75 L. Ed. 291.

The clause of the Constitution invoked is: 'No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.' The specified limitations on the power of Congress were set to prevent preference as between states in respect of their ports or the entry and clearance of vessels. It does not forbid such discriminations as between ports. Congress, acting under the commerce clause, causes many things to be done that greatly benefit particular ports and which incidentally result to the disadvantage of other ports in the same or neighboring states. The establishing of ports of entry, erection and operation of lighthouses, improvement of rivers and harbors, and the providing of structures for the convenient and economical handling of traffic, are examples. State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 433-435, 15 L. Ed. 435. And see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 80, 28 S. Ct. 428, 52 L. Ed. 681. The construction for which appellants contend would strip Congress of much of the power that it long has been accustomed to exert and which always has been held to have been granted to it by the commerce clause. It is clear that the Constitution does not forbid the allowance for ferrying the Mississippi at Louisiana ports.

Neither the failure of the Commission separately to ascertain and state, nor the absence of evidence to show, the cost to carriers of the ferry service, requires annulment of the rates prescribed for transportation between the places on the east bank of the Mississippi and points west of the river.

Those rates were made by adding eight cents per ton to the mileage scale which was applied generally throughout the above-mentioned states. No rate specifically applies to the carriage across the river. The orders do not relate to divisions under section 15(6) or to allowances under section 15(13), 49 USCA § 15(6, 13). Every railroad shipment requires two terminal services and the line haul. Shipments moving in carloads require switching at places of loading and unloading and frequently at intermediate points. Some require the use of floating equipment and other special facilities. Some are moved on stretches of line where, by reason of physical conditions, the service is performed at costs per mile much in excess of the average on other parts of the haul. Straight mileage schedules appropriately may be applied where conditions affecting transportation are reasonably uniform, but substantial additions to rates so made are necessary to cover extraordinary costs of service. While in the making of...