Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Holly

• Decision Date: 28 November 1910
• Docket Number: 18,420
• Citation: 127 La. 615,53 So. 882
• Parties: LOUISIANA RY. & NAVIGATION CO. v. HOLLY
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

53 So. 882

127 La. 615

LOUISIANA RY. & NAVIGATION CO. v. HOLLY

No. 18,420

Supreme Court of Louisiana

November 28, 1910

Rehearing Denied January 3, 1911.

Action by the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company against K. D Holly. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff applied for writ of certiorari. Judgment set aside, and case remanded.

Wise Randolph & Rendall, for applicant.

W. A Wilkinson, for respondent.

OPINION

PROVOSTY, J.

The plaintiff railroad company sues to recover of the defendant $ 97.57, being amount of undercharge on a carload of corn consigned to defendant at Coushatta, La., from Chase, Ind. T.

The facts are as follows: The defendant, a merchant at Coushatta, desiring to purchase the corn at Chase, Ind. T., for a customer, applied to the agent of the plaintiff railroad at Coushatta to ascertain what the tariff rates were between Chase and Coushatta, and was informed by the said agent that it was 23 cents per 100 pounds. This was the through rate; but the initial carrier at Chase, the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad, not receiving any special routing instructions, routed the shipment to Shreveport, and from that point it was transmitted to Coushatta. The rate from Chase to Shreveport is 22 cents, and from Shreveport to Coushatta, 32 cents, making a total rate for the route over which the car was carried of 54 cents. These were the rates as fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and as duly printed and posted in the stations of the said two railroads. When the car reached Coushatta, it had an undercharge notation of $ 47.50. The defendant paid this, but under protest. The defendant delivered the corn to his customer, and received payment therefor, including the $ 47.50. Two years later the claim was made for the first time by the plaintiff railroad that an additional amount was due; and, defendant refusing to pay same, the present suit was brought to enforce payment. The customer of defendant has, in the meantime, become insolvent; and, if defendant is forced to pay the amount, he loses it.

In his answer the defendant recites the foregoing facts, and denies that he ever owed anything beyond the through rate of 23 cents per 100 pounds. He pleads estoppel and the prescription of one year, and claims, in reconvention, the $ 47.50 of undercharge paid by him to the plaintiff railroad.

The trial court rejected plaintiff's demand, on two grounds: First, that, there being a through rate between the two points, the plaintiff could not claim more than this through rate; second, estoppel.

In the case of Foster-Glassel Company v. K. C. S. Ry. Co., 121 La. 1053, 46 So. 1014, there was no through rate; but that circumstance does not affect the principle governing cases of this kind, which is that by the acts of Congress, the paramount law of the land, a railroad is prohibited from charging any less freight on interstate traffic than is prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the route over which the shipment has actually been carried. In view of that law, any consent that a local agent may give, or any contract that the entire body of officials of the railroad company, from president down, might enter into, would be no bar to the demand for the freight due according to the rates prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Any such consent, or agreement, would be in violation of said prohibitory law, and, in consequence, null and void.

In the case of Texas & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 242, 26 S.Ct. 628, 50 L.Ed. 1011, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

"A common carrier may exact the legal rate for an interstate shipment, as shown by its printed and published schedule on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and posted in the stations of such carrier, as required by the...