Louisiana v. Mississippi

Decision Date02 April 1984
Docket NumberO,No. 86,86
Citation104 S.Ct. 1645,80 L.Ed.2d 74,466 U.S. 96
PartiesState of LOUISIANA v. State of MISSISSIPPI et al. rig
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

This original action was filed by Louisiana against Mississippi and a riparian landowner (Dille) to resolve a dispute as to the boundary between the two States in a reach of the Mississippi River. In 1970, Louisiana, acting in its capacity under Louisiana law as the owner of the riverbed out to the boundary line, executed an oil and gas lease covering the disputed area. In 1971, Dille, as the owner of riparian land in Mississippi who, under Mississippi law, has title to the riverbed out to the boundary line, executed a similar lease to the same lessee, who drilled a well directionally under the river from a surface location on Dille's land on the Mississippi side. The location of the "bottom hole" of the well—which was completed in 1972 and has been producing continuously since then—is known and agreed upon. After trial, the Special Master filed a Report, concluding that at all times during the disputed period of 1972-1982 the well's bottom hole was within Louisiana, west of wherever the boundary might have been, and that it was not necessary to delineate the specific boundary during the relevant years. Mississippi filed exceptions to the Report.

Held:

1. At all times since the completion of the well in 1972 its bottom hole has been within Louisiana. Pp. 99-106.

(a) Earlier original-jurisdiction litigation between Louisiana and Mississippi in this Court has established that the "live thalweg" of the navigable channel of the Mississippi River is the boundary between the two States. A boundary defined as the live thalweg follows the course of the stream as its bed and channel change with the gradual processes of erosion and accretion. The ordinary course of vessel traffic on the river defines the thalweg. Pp. 99-101.

(b) The Court agrees with the Special Master's conclusion, which is consistent with the testimony of Louisiana's two expert witnesses, that the live thalweg was to the east of the well's bottom hole location for each of the years in question, thus leaving the well within Louisiana throughout the disputed period, and with his rejection of the view of Mississippi's expert witness that the boundary line migrated so as to shift the jurisdictional location of the well back and forth between the States during the relevant years. This conclusion resolves the case so far as the Louisiana and Dille leases, and the consequences that flow therefrom, are concerned. Pp. 101-106.

2. The Master properly concluded that the only issue to be resolved centered on the location of the well's bottom hole and that it was not necessary to delineate the specific boundary in the area for each of the 11 years from 1972 to 1982. Pp. 106-108.

Exceptions to Special Master's Report overruled and Report confirmed.

J.I. Palmer, Jr., Jackson, Miss., for defendants.

David C. Kimmel, Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiff.

Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion for the Court.

This original action was filed by the State of Louisiana against the State of Mississippi and Avery B. Dille, Jr., to resolve a dispute as to the boundary between the two States in a reach of the Mississippi River above the Giles Bend Cutoff, upstream from the city of Natchez. The Report of the Special Master, however, stops short of ascertaining the entire boundary along this stretch, for the Master would have us resolve the case in Louisiana's favor with the conclusion that throughout the period 1972-1982, the years relevant to this litigation, the actually contested point—the place in the riverbed of the "bottom hole" of a particular producing oil well—at all times was west of wherever that boundary line might have been and was within the State of Louisiana. Therefore, the Special Master observes, we need go no further in bringing this controversy to an end.

Mississippi has filed exceptions to the Special Master's Report, Louisiana has filed its response to those exceptions, the case has been argued orally, and the matter, thus, is before us for disposition.

I

In the area in question, the Mississippi River marks the boundary between Mississippi and Louisiana. See Act of Apr. 8, 1812, 2 Stat. 701, admitting Louisiana to the Union; Act of Mar. 1, 1817, 3 Stat. 348, and Joint Resolution of Dec. 10, 1817, 3 Stat. 472, admitting Mississippi to the Union. Under Mississippi law, an owner of land riparian to the Mississippi River has title to the riverbed out to the Louisiana line. Morgan v. Reading, 11 Miss. 366 (1844); The Magnolia v. Marshall, 39 Miss. 109 (1860); Wineman v. Withers, 143 Miss. 537, 547, 108 So. 708 (1926). Under Louisiana law, however, the State owns the riverbed out to the Mississippi line. State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 106, 83 So. 421, 425 (1919); Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 251, 90 So. 637, 638 (1922).

In July 1970, Louisiana, acting in its proprietary capacity, executed an oil and gas lease covering the area of the riverbed now in dispute. In January 1971, defendant Dille executed a similar lease. Each lease ran to the same operator. The lessee drilled a well directionally under the river from a surface location on riparian land owned by Dille on the Mississippi side. The well was completed in January 1972. Its bottom-hole location is known and agreed upon. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26. It has been producing continuously since its completion. Mississippi acknowledges that when the well was completed and production began, the bottom hole was in Louisiana. Mississippi Exceptions 2.

On June 20, 1979, Dille instituted suit in the Chancery Court of Adams County, Miss., against Louisiana and certain individuals and entities then holding working interests in the leasehold estates under the Dille and Louisiana leases. Dille, as plaintiff, alleged that the boundary between the States had migrated westerly so that the bottom hole of the well was within Mississippi and thus subject to the Dille lease. The defendants in that action removed it to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. It remains pending in that court (Civil Docket No. W79-0069(R) sub nom. Dille v. Pruet & Hughes Co. (a partnership), et al.).

Louisiana, on December 21, 1979, filed a motion with this Court for leave to file a bill of complaint against Mississippi and Dille. Although Mississippi opposed the motion, we granted leave to file. 445 U.S. 957, 100 S.Ct. 1641, 64 L.Ed.2d 232 (1980). The Federal District Court in Mississippi, on the joint motion of the parties to the removed action, then stayed the proceedings before it pending resolution of this original-jurisdiction suit. Meanwhile, the defendants here filed their answer. We appointed Charles J. Meyers of Denver, Colo., as Special Master. 454 U.S. 937, 102 S.Ct. 471, 70 L.Ed.2d 245 (1981).

The Master proceeded with a pretrial conference and a schedule for discovery. A motion to intervene, filed by individuals and corporations asserting mineral interests in the Louisiana lease, was denied by the Master. By the same order, the Master specified that the proper issue for this Court to resolve was the location of the Louisiana-Mississippi boundary relative to the bottom-hole location of the oil well. On that basis, the case went to trial before the Master in New Orleans on September 20, 1982.

II

The bed of the Mississippi River between Louisiana and Mississippi has been the subject of other original-jurisdiction litigation here. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 26 S.Ct. 408, 50 L.Ed. 913 (1906); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 282 U.S. 458, 51 S.Ct. 197, 75 L.Ed. 459 (1931); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 384 U.S. 24, 86 S.Ct. 1250, 16 L.Ed.2d 330 (1966). In all three of those cases, this Court ruled that the "live thalweg" of the navigable channel of the Mississippi River was the boundary between the two States. 202 U.S., at 53, 26 S.Ct., at 423; 282 U.S., at 459, 465, 467, 51 S.Ct., at 200, 201; 384 U.S., at 24, 25, 26, 86 S.Ct., at 1251, 1252. That issue must be regarded as settled. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. It forms the predicate, of course, for the present litigation.

The Giles Bend Cutoff, north of Natchez, was constructed in the 1930's. It captured the main flow of the Mississippi River, which then abandoned an old westerly bend that had marked its principal course. The cutoff, being man-made and effectuating a channel change, obviously, was avulsive; there is, however, no question here as to the state boundary in the latitude of the cutoff itself. We are concerned with the area just upstream from the cutoff.

The proposition, stated above, that the live thalweg of the navigable channel of the Mississippi River is the boundary between Louisiana and Mississippi in itself affords little help in this case and does not take us very far. Indeed, the parties do not dispute the applicable general legal principles. Mississippi itself observes that there is "no serious disagreement . . . as to the law of the case." Mississippi's Exceptions 4. See Reply Brief for Louisiana 5.

A boundary defined as the live thalweg usually will be dynamic in that it follows the course of the stream as its bed and channel change with the gradual processes of erosion and accretion. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 173, 38 S.Ct. 301, 304, 62 L.Ed. 638 (1918); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 397 U.S. 88, 89-90, 90 S.Ct. 784, 785, 25 L.Ed.2d 73 (1970). In contrast, however, the boundary may become fixed when, by avulsive action, the stream suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S., at 173, 175, 38 S.Ct., at 304, 305; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 397 U.S., at 89-90, 90 S.Ct., at 784-785. Thus, merely to say that the live thalweg is the boundary does not lead us here to an easy conclusion, for, as Mississippi argues, that thalweg may wander, and, if it wanders far enough, the bottom hole of this particular well may find...

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