Louisville Area Inter-Faith Committee for United Farm Workers v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., INTER-FAITH

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before EDWARDS, PECK and LIVELY; PECK; EDWARDS
• Citation: 542 F.2d 652
• Parties: 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600, 79 Lab.Cas. P 11,762 LOUISVILLE AREACOMMITTEE FOR UNITED FARM WORKERS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NOTTINGHAM LIQUORS, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Decision Date: 29 September 1976
• Docket Number: INTER-FAITH,No. 75-1901

Page 652

542 F.2d 652 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600, 79 Lab.Cas. P 11,762 LOUISVILLE AREA INTER-FAITH COMMITTEE FOR UNITED FARM
WORKERS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
NOTTINGHAM LIQUORS, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 75-1901. United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit. Argued Feb. 3, 1976.
Decided Sept. 29, 1976.

Page 653

J. Reuben Rigel, Clayton, Mo., Kurt Berggren, Legal Aid Society of Louisville, Inc., Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellants.

James Foley, Henry A. Triplett, Louisville, Ky., for defendants-appellees.

Before EDWARDS, PECK and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

PECK, Circuit Judge.

On February 14, 1975, defendant-appellee State Circuit Court Judge Hubbs signed, at the request of defendant-appellee Nottingham Liquors, an order restraining plaintiffs-appellants, the Louisville Area Inter-Faith Committee for United Farms Workers ("Committee"), ^* from mass picketing and mass marching on or near Nottingham's business premises; the order limited the pickets to two who "shall not block any driveways or doorways to the store, nor cause or create any disturbance." The restraining order was served on the Committee on February 14, but there was no attempted service of summons until March 7, 1975.

Rather than challenge the restraining order in state court, for example, by moving to dissolve the order, see Ky. Rule Civ.P. 65.03, the Committee on February 21, 1975, filed the instant complaint in federal district court. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the restraining order, claiming that the ex parte issuance of the order and the order itself violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights. Plaintiffs also prayed for $2,500 in damages against Nottingham. On March 24, 1975, defendants filed a three-paragraph answer. On May 23, 1975, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, "abstain(ing)" from exercising its jurisdiction because plaintiffs "may raise (their claims) in state court and pursue their remedies there and in the Kentucky appellate court if they so desire."

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in "abstaining" because there was no pending state court proceedings at the filing of their federal complaint on February 21, 1975, and because even if there were pending proceedings those proceedings were neither criminal (Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)) nor sufficiently "in aid of and closely related to criminal" proceedings (Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975)) to require the district court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction. Even if the district court properly refused to consider declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs urge that the district court should have considered their damage claim. On the merits, plaintiffs argue that the state order violated their constitutional rights.

Although defendants' briefs have been of very little assistance, we have concluded that the district court properly dismissed the complaint, and we therefore affirm.

The district court and parties have used "abstention" nomenclature, but we view the refusal to consider injunctive and declaratory relief as being "equitable restraint" deriving from federalism, comity, and traditional equitable concepts. See Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc. v. Silva Recio, 520 F.2d 1342, 1344 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1975); H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts & the Federal System 1043-1044 (1973). Because federal courts are reluctant to interfere with state court proceedings, and because plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law in state court in that state judges "are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional claims," Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2567, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975); Huffman, supra, 95 S.Ct. at 1211, the refusal to consider equitable relief was proper.

Page 654

Plaintiffs concede that, had there been a criminal (Younger ) or "quasi-criminal" (Huffman ) action pending in state court on February 21, 1975, the refusal to consider equitable relief would be proper. But Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 233 (1975), and Salem Inn, supra, establish the applicability of the doctrine of equitable restraint even if the federal action were "commenced" prior to the state action. Accord, Hearing Aid Ass'n. v. Bullock, 413 F.Supp. 1032 (E.D.Ky., filed March 10, 1976); B. Coleman Corp. v. Walker, 400 F.Supp. 1355 (N.D.Ill.1975). Even accepting plaintiffs' claim that the state proceedings were not "commenced" for Younger-Huffman purposes until the attempted service of the summons on March 7, 1975, there had been no "proceedings of substance on the merits . . . in the federal court" as of March 7, 1975. Hicks, supra, 95 S.Ct. at 2292. In fact, the federal proceedings were then "in an embryonic stage (with) no contested matter ha(ving) been decided." Salem Inn, supra, 95 S.Ct. at...