Louisville Co v. Holloway

• Decision Date: 15 April 1918
• Docket Number: No. 209,209
• Citation: 38 S.Ct. 379,62 L.Ed. 867,246 U.S. 525
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. HOLLOWAY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

246 U.S. 525

38 S.Ct. 379

62 L.Ed. 867

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

v HOLLOWAY.

No. 209.

Submitted March 15, 1918.

Decided April 15, 1918.

Mr. B. D. Warfield, of Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Clay & Clay, of Henderson, Ky., for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court.

Holloway, a locomotive engineer, was killed on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad while engaged in the performance of his duties. His administrator brought, for the benefit of his widow, an action under the federal Employers' Liability Act in a state court of Kentucky and recovered a verdict of $32,900. The judgment entered thereon was reversed by the Court of Appeals (163 Ky. 125, 173 S. W. 343); and, at the second trial, a verdict was rendered for $25,000. Judgment was entered on this verdict, and was affirmed with ten per cent. amage by the Court of Appeals (168 Ky. 262, 181 S. W. 1126. The case comes here under section 237 of the Judicial Code. The errors assigned in this court and now insisted upon are these:

The first assignment: That the Court of Appeals erred in approving the giving of an instruction and the refusal of another¹ by which the trial judge had denied to the company the benefit of the rule declared in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 491, 36 Sup. Ct. 630, 60 L. Ed. 1117, L. R. A. 1917F, 367, that in computing damages recoverable for the deprivation of future financial benefits, the verdict should be based on their present value.

The third assignment: That the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to reverse the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the damages were excessive, and in holding as part of the loss of benefits the widow might have received and which the jury was entitled to consider 'not only her support and maintenance of $50.00 a month, but in addition thereto, one-half of the savings, which decedent might have accumulated if he had lived out his allotted span' of life.

First. The instruction given, though general, was correct. It declared that the plaintiff was entitled to recover 'such an amount in damages as will fairly and reasonably compensate' the widow 'for the loss of pecuniary benefits she might reasonably have received' but for her husband's death. This ruling did not imply that the verdict should be for the aggregate of the several benefits payable at different times, without making any allowance for the fact that the whole amount of the verdict would be presently paid at one time. The instruction bore rather an implication to the contrary; for the sum was expressly stated to be that which would 'compensate.' The language used was similar to that in which this court has since expressed, in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, supra, 241 U. S. 489, 36 Sup. Ct. 630, 60 L. Ed. 1117, L. R. A. 1917F, 367, the measure of damages which should be applied². The company had, of course, the right to require that this general instruction be supplemented by another calling attention to the fact that, in estimating what amount would compensate the widow, future benefits must be considered at their present value. But it did not ask for any such instruction. Instead it erroneously sought to subject the jury's estimate to two rigid mathematical limitations: (1) That money would be worth to the widow six per cent., the legal rate of interest; (2) that the period during which the future benefits would have continued was 28.62 years—the life expectancy of the husband according to one of several well known actuarial tables. The company was not entitled to have the jury instructed as matter of law either that money was worth that rate, or that the deceased would...