Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't Waste Mgmt. Dist. v. Jefferson Cnty. League of Cities, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2021
• Docket Number: 2019-SC-0520-DG
• Citation: Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't Waste Mgmt. Dist. v. Jefferson Cnty. League of Cities, Inc., 626 S.W.3d 623 (Ky. 2021)
• Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
• Parties: LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT WASTE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT; Greg Fischer, in His Official Capacity as Mayor of Louisville Metro Government and Robert Schindler, Appellants v. JEFFERSON COUNTY LEAGUE OF CITIES, INC.; City of Bancroft ; City of Bellewood ; City of Indian Hills; City of Jeffersontown; City of Seneca Gardens; City of Shively; Commonwealth of Kentucky, Energy and Environment Cabinet; Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Attorney General Daniel J. Cameron; National Waste and Recycling Association, Kentucky Chapter, Appellees

626 S.W.3d 623

LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT WASTE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT; Greg Fischer, in His Official Capacity as Mayor of Louisville Metro Government and Robert Schindler, Appellants

v.JEFFERSON COUNTY LEAGUE OF CITIES, INC.; City of Bancroft ; City of Bellewood ; City of Indian Hills; City of Jeffersontown; City of Seneca Gardens; City of Shively; Commonwealth of Kentucky, Energy and Environment Cabinet; Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Attorney General Daniel J. Cameron; National Waste and Recycling Association, Kentucky Chapter, Appellees

2019-SC-0520-DG

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

JUNE 17, 2021

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Peter Frank Ervin, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, JEFFERSON COUNTY LEAGUE OF CITIES: Culver Vaughn Halliday, Louisville, Adam Clay Reeves, Lexington, Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, CITY OF BANCROFT: Terri Elaine Boroughs, Chapin Elizabeth Scheumann, Richard Paul Schiller, Schiller Osbourn Barnes & Maloney, PLLC, Louisville.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, CITY OF BELLEWOOD; CITY OF INDIAN HILLS AND CITY OF SHIVELY: Finn Robert Cato, Cato & Cato.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES, CITY OF JEFFERSONTOWN AND CITY OF SENECA GARDENS: Schuyler John Olt, Louisville.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT CABINET: Daniel Clark Cleveland, Joseph Anthony Newberg.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL DANIEL J. CAMERON : Barry Lee Dunn, Matthew Franklin Kuhn, Victor Bruce Maddox, Assistant Attorney General.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, NATIONAL WASTE AND RECYCLING ASSOCIATION, KENTUCKY CHAPTER: Robert Kenyon Meyer, Young-Eun Park, Louisville, Joshua Tanner Watkins, Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, Kathryn Kirby Wood.

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS, KENTUCKY RESOURCES COUNCIL: Thomas Joseph FitzGerald, Frankfort.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VANMETER

Kentucky Constitution Section 156a permits the legislature to classify cities on a number of bases but requires that "[a]ll legislation relating to cities of a certain classification shall apply equally to all cities within the same classification." In 2017, the legislature amended KRS¹ Chapter 109 to give home rule cities located in a county containing a consolidated local government certain rights with respect to the waste management district in the county. The question we must resolve is whether the amended statutes comply with the requirement of Section 156a. We hold that they do not. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals’ opinion and remand this matter to the Franklin Circuit Court for the entry of a new judgment in conformity with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The legislature appears to have first considered garbage and refuse disposal on a statewide basis in 1966 with the enactment of KRS Chapter 109.² Over the ensuing decades, it made a number of changes in the chapter, significantly in 1978³ and 1991.⁴ All of these enactments were general acts applying statewide to every county and/or every city regardless of size. See, e.g. , Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 115 § 2(2)-(3) (defining "city" as "an existing city of any class[,]" and "county" as the "governing body of a county, including urban county governments[ ]"); Act of March 23, 1966, ch. 66 § 2(1) ("[t]he fiscal court of any county may ... establish and maintain one or more garbage and refuse disposal districts[ ]"); Id. § 2(3) ("[a]ny city ... may ... establish and maintain one or more garbage and refuse disposal districts[ ]").

In 1980, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion holding that the 1978 Act did not vest full control over garbage collection to a county, and cities retained that power within their limits. City of Radcliff v. Hardin Cnty. , 607 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Ky. App. 1980). The legislature wasted little time in clarifying that it intended counties to be the primary local government unit in charge of solid waste disposal. Act of Mar. 9, 1982, ch. 74 § 1(9), 1982 Ky. Acts 112 (stating legislative intent that KRS Chapter 109 and KRS 67.083(3)(o) was to "provide counties with exclusive authority to develop a solid waste management system for solid waste generated within the geographical boundaries of the county, consistent with the provisions of this chapter and KRS Chapter 224[ ]"). This Court recognized that statutory change in 1996. See E. Ky. Res. v. Arnett , 934 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. 1996) (stating "[t]he management of solid waste, including its disposal, is vested exclusively in county fiscal courts[ ]"). Explicitly the Court cited KRS 67.083(3)(o) including among a fiscal court's powers "[e]xclusive management of solid wastes by ordinance or contract or both[.]" Id.

The Court of Appeals followed Arnett in 2005, recognizing county primacy in the area, but also noting "[u]nder the present statutes, cities do not act unilaterally in the regulation of solid waste, but are permitted to act with the permission of counties which have developed a solid waste management plan." City of Salyersville v. Magoffin Cnty., ex rel. May , 178 S.W.3d 539, 541 (Ky. App. 2005). Further, the court stated, "in cities already operating solid waste management systems the responsibility rests jointly with the county and the city. Only when it is in the public interest, and by mutual agreement and approval of the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet, may a county delegate its authority to cities." Id. (citing KRS 109.011(6) ).

Against this backdrop, the Jefferson County Fiscal Court adopted a waste management district in December 1990. Jefferson Cnty., Ky., Ordinance 16-1990 (adopted and effective Dec. 11, 1990); see also Plan for solid-waste management district OK'd , Courier-Journal [Louisville, KY], Dec. 12, 1990, at 23. Following the 2003 approval of the merger of Louisville and Jefferson County as consolidated local government, "[t]he Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government Waste Management District succeeded to the county's and Jefferson County Waste Management District's designation by the Cabinet as the solid waste management area within and for the geographical boundaries of the county." Louisville Metro Am. Ordinance No. 44-2005; see also KRS 67C.113 ("any ... special taxing or service districts of any kind existing upon successful passage of the question to consolidate a city of the first class and its county shall continue in existence[ ]"). As a result, since 1990, the District has been responsible for policies related to solid waste management in Jefferson County. In Urban Services District, roughly the former City of Louisville, the Louisville Metro Department of Public Works is responsible for trash pickup. The home rule cities in Jefferson County contract with a private waste management company, such as Eco-Tech Environmental LLC, Rumpke, or Waste Management, within their boundaries. And Jefferson County homeowners not located in an incorporated area contract with a private waste management company.

In 2014, in order to reduce solid waste going to landfill, the District passed a regulation requiring yard waste to be placed in paper bags and prohibiting the collection of yard waste in plastic bags. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't Waste Mgt. Dist. Reg. 51.507R. The purpose of the change was to reduce waste going to the landfills by directing yard waste collected in paper bags to composting facilities.

The change was not, apparently, universally popular. As a result, in 2017, the legislature enacted HB 246. Act of March 21, 2017, ch. 105, 2017 Ky. Acts 782 (the "Act").⁵ The effect of the Act was to modify the composition of a Board of a waste management district in a county containing a consolidated local government, and to prohibit certain regulations of the District from going into effect without the approval of a home rule city in the county.

In the case at bar, the Franklin Circuit Court held that Section 2 of the Act concerning the organization and structure of a local governmental unit constituted a reasonable classification that did not violate Kentucky Constitution Sections 59 and 60. The trial court, however, ruled the balance of the Act was unconstitutional. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the trial court erred as to its decision concerning Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. It therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. The District filed its motion for discretionary review which we granted.

Before proceeding, we note that the District concedes the constitutionality of Section 2 (relating to the organization and structure of local government), and Section 5 (relating to the responsibility of individual property owners and having statewide application). Section 6 relates to the composition of the District Board, as reorganized by Section 2. Since the District has conceded the constitutionality of Section 2, logic dictates that Section 6 is also constitutional. As to Section 7, the emergency declaration, that section only advances the effective date of the Act. As noted by the trial court in its final Opinion and Order, the passage of time has mooted any claim under Kentucky Constitution Section 55 ; see Zuckerman v. Bevin, 565 S.W.3d 580, 604 n.29 (Ky. 2018) (absent an effective emergency clause, an act becomes effective ninety days following legislature's adjournment); McIntyre v. Commonwealth , 221 Ky. 16, 20, 297 S.W. 931, 933 (1927) (holding that when emergency clause in bill was ineffective, "the bill took effect 90 days after the adjournment of the [l]egislature[ ]"). Our review is therefore limited to the District's claims as to the constitutionality of Sections 1, 3 and 4 of the Act.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Act under the Kentucky Constitution. We recognize, of course, that all laws "contrary to this Constitution, shall be void." Kentucky Constitution Section 26. "Our functions are to determine the constitutional validity and to declare the meaning of what the legislative...