Louisville, N.A. & C. RY. Co. v. Creek

• Decision Date: 07 January 1892
• Parties: LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v. CREEK.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

130 Ind. 139

29 N.E. 481

LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO.

v.CREEK.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 7, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Carroll county; A. W. REYNOLDS, Judge.

Action by Moses Creek, administrator, against Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

E. C. Field and C. C. Matson, for appellant. John H. Gould, for appellee.

McBRIDE, J.

Suit by the appellee, as administrator of the estate of Matilda McClintic, who was killed on a highway crossing by one of the appellant's locomotive engines. The complaint charges in substance that the decedent's death was caused by the actionable negligence of the appellant in this: That appellant had allowed a hedge, together with trees, bushes, and weeds, to grow along the line of its track, and adjacent to said crossing, to such height and so densely that for a long distance all view of the track was cut off from persons on the highway; that the same obstructions, together with buildings erected along and near its track, tended to deaden and cut off the sound of approaching trains; that employes of appellant, in charge of and operating said locomotive engine, and drawing a train of cars, ran the same upon and over said crossing at a speed of 30 miles an hour, without having given the signals required by statute; that the decedent, with her husband, was traveling along said highway in a buggy; that they were at the time passing over said crossing, using due care, and guilty of no negligence, and were struck by said locomotive, and decedent was killed. Verdict for the appellee. With the verdict the jury returned answers to 46 interrogatories propounded by the appellant. The appellant moved for a judgment on the answers to interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict. This motion was overruled, and this ruling presents the only question in the record.

The appellee contends that the motion was fatally defective, and does not raise the question argued. The record entry of the motion is as follows: “Comes now the defendant, and moves the court for a judgment upon the answers of the jury to the interrogatories submitted notwithstanding the general verdict, which motion is in these words: ‘State of Indiana, Carroll county-ss.: In the Carroll circuit court, May term, 1889. Creek, Adm'r McClintic, vs. L., N. A. & C. Ry. Co. The defendant files motion for judgment on the answers to interrogatories, notwithstanding the general verdict for plaintiff.”’ This motion was in writing and was signed by counsel for the appellant. Counsel for the appellee say: We submit that it is no motion at all. It merely announces that the appellee files motion, but where is it? And for whom is judgment asked? No question was presented by such a paper. Besides, as the appellant did not move for a judgment in its favor, it is not injured by the court's ruling. The motion is certainly lacking in formality and in certainty. Rules of practice and procedure are necessary for the orderly conduct of litigation, and as aids in the administration of justice. It is no hardship to require of litigants substantial conformity to reasonable rules. It is possible, however, by an over rigid and strict enforcement of the rules of practice, to make them hindrances to the doing of justice, rather than aids. When a substantialcontroversy in fact exists between parties, which is so presented that the court can apply the law and adjust their rights, it would not be in accordance with the spirit of an enlightened jurisprudence to refuse to do so merely because of some slight informality, or a failure by one party to comply strictly with the rules of practice, in matters where the informality or omission will not work injustice or impose any hardship upon the opposite party. Thus applied, most beneficent rules might often serve as intrenchments for injustice. In our opinion, notwithstanding the informality and lack of precision and certainty in the motion, it is sufficient as a motion by the appellee for a judgment in its favor, and it is our duty to consider the questions thus presented. The motion for a judgment non obstante in based upon the grounds (1) that the answers to interrogatories show that the appellee's decedent was guilty of contributory negligence; (2) that, if this is not true, they do show that the husband of the decedent, with whom she was riding at the time she was killed, was guilty of negligence, and that his negligence should be imputed to her, and precludes a recovery by her administrator. A motion for a judgment on special findings notwithstanding the general verdict should only be sustained when the special findings and the general verdict cannot be reconciled with each other under any supposable...