Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1923
• Citation: 295 F. 53
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. v. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

295 F. 53

LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. v. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

October 31, 1923

Rehearing denied December 11, 1923.

John S Stone, of Birmingham, Ala., E. P. Thomas, of Montgomery Ala., and Chas. J. Rixey, Jr., of Washington, D.C., for plaintiff in error and defendant on cross-writ.

Orla E Harrison and Woodson P. Houghton, both of Washington, D.C., and Hugh Morrow, of Birmingham, Ala., for defendant in error and plaintiff on cross-writ.

Before WALKER and BRYAN, Circuit Judges, and CALL, District Judge.

WALKER Circuit Judge.

This was an action brought (as authorized by section 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce (Comp. St. Sec. 8584)) by Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company, a corporation (herein called plaintiff), and two other corporations, against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company (herein called defendant), a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, and several other such carriers, to recover the amount of reparations awarded by the Interstate Commerce Commission (herein called the Commission), by an order made July 12, 1921, in favor of the plaintiffs in that suit severally against the defendant and such other carriers severally. The Commission awarded to the plaintiff reparations on shipments of pig iron in carloads from its furnace in Birmingham over the lines of the defendant and its connecting carriers to Ohio river crossings and to points in Central Freight Association territory during the period from April 17, 1910, to September 16, 1915. A jury having been waived, the court made special findings of fact, based on admitted statements of facts and evidence adduced, and conclusions, with the result that by its judgment it sustained the award made by the Commission, except that it disallowed any reparation or damage for or on account of shipments that moved during the period from April 16, 1912, to July 22, 1913. The plaintiff and the defendant each sued out a writ of error, and each of them assigns as errors rulings adverse to it.

The action of the Commission followed the filing with it on April 16, 1912, of a complaint by the plaintiff and several other corporations against the defendant and several other carriers engaged in interstate commerce. That complaint alleged that the complainants therein 'are corporations severally engaged in the production and sale of pig iron in the several iron producing districts in the states of Alabama and Tennessee,' complained of as unjust, unreasonable, and unequal, in violation of sections 1 and 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, the rates and charges for the transportation in carloads of pig iron from Southern producing districts in Alabama and Tennessee to Ohio and Mississippi river crossings and beyond, and to Eastern cities and interior New England points, both all rail, and rail and water, the rates and charges complained of being shown by Washburn's Joint Pig Iron Tariff No. 4, I.C.C. No. 68, effective September 20, 1910, with supplements thereto, and contained prayers that if, after hearing and inquiry, the Commission shall be of opinion that any of the rates, etc., complained of are unjust or unreasonable, or otherwise in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce as amended, the Commission will determine and prescribe what will be just, reasonable, and equal rates, etc., to be applied to the mentioned traffic in pig iron, and--

'that the rates and charges herein complained of be found and declared to have been unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory for a period of at least two years preceding the filing of this complaint, and that the complainants, together with those of the class represented by them, and all other shippers who may show themselves entitled, may have reparation to the extent of the difference between the rates and charges actually paid by them severally and the rates and charges that may herein be found and declared the just and reasonable maximum rates to be charged in the future.'

After investigation and hearings, the Commission on June 1, 1914, made a report containing findings that the existing rates were unreasonable and that described rates would be reasonable, and the carriers were ordered to put new rates into effect. Neither that report nor the order which accompanied it dealt with the reasonableness of the rates in the past. The matter of reparations was not dealt with or mentioned by the Commission, except that the report contained the following:

'Reparation is prayed for, but under the circumstances of this case we do not believe that it may fairly be awarded.'

On July 22, 1915, the plaintiff and others filed with the Commission a supplemental complaint, containing allegations as to the unreasonableness of the rates complained of before and after the date of the filing of the original complaint, and also containing more specific prayers as to reparations sought on account of shipments both prior to and subsequent to the date of the filing of the original complaint.

The action of the trial court in disallowing any reparations or damages on account of shipments that moved during the period from April 16, 1912, to July 22, 1913, was the result of the conclusions that the original complaint filed with the Commission claimed no reparations on account of shipments made after the date of the filing of that complaint, and that under the supplemental complaint filed on July 22, 1915, reparations on account of shipments made prior to that date were not allowable, except on account of shipments made within two years prior to that date. Act to Regulate Commerce, Sec. 16 (Comp. St. Sec. 8584). It followed from those conclusions that there was no complaint filed with the Commission under which reparations were allowable on account of shipments made during the period between the date of the filing of the original complaint and the date which was the beginning of the two years immediately preceding July 22, 1915, the date of the filing of the above-mentioned supplemental complaint.

We are of opinion that the just mentioned conclusions are erroneous. The Commission is an administrative body. The validity of its proceedings is not dependent upon compliance with procedural rules as to pleading and practice which prevail in courts of law. It 'may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice. ' Its power to make an award of damages for a violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce may be invoked by a complaint or petition, 'which shall briefly state the facts,' and 'be filed with the Commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after. ' Sections 13, 16 (Comp. St. Secs. 8581, 8584). The averments of the above-mentioned original complaint described the commodity involved, specified the rates which were complained of, showed wherein those rates were claimed to be unlawful, and that the exaction thereof caused damage to the plaintiff, and prayed reparation, as shown by the above set out prayer. The language of that prayer does not indicate the existence of an intention to claim reparation only on account of shipments made prior to the filing of the complaint. The language used is general, and broad enough to cover reparations on account of shipments made after, as well as before, the complaint was filed, and to fairly inform the Commission and the carriers proceeded against that the reparation claim asserted went that far. We conclude that the original complaint was sufficient to give the Commission jurisdiction to award reparations on account of shipments during the period covered by the above-mentioned order of July 12, 1921. Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 253 U.S. 117, 40 Sup.Ct. 466, 64 L.Ed. 810; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States (D.C.) 288 F. 88; G. B. Markle Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (D.C.) 271 F. 989; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ferguson Sawmill Co., 235 F. 474, 149 C.C.A. 20; Arcadia Mills v. Carolina, C. & O. Ry. (D.C.) 293 F. 639; opinion by Knapp, Circuit Judge. The following is an extract from the opinion in the last-cited case:

'If the complaint, which assails a rate as unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, also contains such a prayer for reparation as will fairly inform the carrier of the claim made in that regard, the Commission has jurisdiction to award reparation in that proceeding for excessive rates collected during the period from two years before the complaint was filed to the date when

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