Louisville & N.R. Co. v. King

• Decision Date: 08 June 1916
• Docket Number: 5 Div. 607
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. v. KING.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

73 So. 456

198 Ala. 168

LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. v. KING.

5 Div. 607

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 8, 1916

Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 1916

Appeal from Circuit Court, Chilton County; W.W. Pearson, Judge.

Action by Sula King against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Geo. W Jones, of Montgomery, and Smith & Gerald, of Clanton, for appellant.

Middleton & Reynolds, of Clanton, and Hill, Hill, Whiting & Stern, of Montgomery, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

No tenable objection was taken to the complaint. The trouble with plaintiff's case arose out of the evidence. The evidence showed that plaintiff was young and able-bodied; she had been accustomed to labor of a sort that necessarily implied at least the usual strength of women of her age; she did the work of her household; she did the cooking and washing, and she helped her husband in the field. There was nothing to put her in the class of the aged, the very young infirm, or helpless passengers, to whom railroad companies are under obligation to furnish aid in getting on or alighting from their trains. It was the duty of those in charge of the train to announce the station, to stop the train, and hold it such length of time as gave the passengers a reasonable opportunity to alight in safety. There is no intimation that defendant failed of its duty in these respects. Plaintiff was under no disability. She had two hand bags or grips. The conducter might have handled these impediments for her as a matter of courtesy, but he was under no public general duty to do so, nor was there anything in the condition of the plaintiff that raised a special duty as to her. This seems to be the holding of the authorities generally (see Central of Georgia v. Carlisle, 2 Ala.App. 514, 56 So. 737, where numerous authorities are cited), and is a reasonable rule in view of provisions made for checking unwieldy baggage and the duties which trainmen owe to all passengers in common. The conductor's alleged previous promise did not enlarge his duty in this respect. But, even so, in view of the conductor's duty to other passengers, the plaintiff should have called his attention to the fact that she desired assistance. Instead, she picked up her grips and started to alight from the train, along with the other passengers, as if she were abundantly able to manage the situation for herself; and we have been unable to find in the evidence any indication that she was not as able as the ordinary passenger. In no aspect of the case presented by the evidence can plaintiff's fall be referred to negligence or wrong on the part of the conductor. Aside from passengers under known physical or mental disability, it was his public duty to care for all passengers alike. He stood on the platform of the coach, looking over his passengers as they came out of the coaches, while the flagman stood at the bottom of the steps, assisting them to alight. So far as the evidence went to show, the conductor was not under legal duty to do more. The court did not follow this law in ruling upon instructions requested by defendant.

In his closing argument to the jury counsel for the plaintiff ingeniously said to the jury:

"I want to tell you the reason that we did not sue for more than $3,000 in this case. If we had sued for more than that amount, the defendant, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, being a foreign corporation, could have removed the case to the federal court."

The court overruled defendant's ...