Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Laney

• Decision Date: 19 October 1915
• Docket Number: 209
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. v. LANEY.

69 So. 993

14 Ala.App. 287

LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO. v. LANEY.

No. 209

Court of Appeals of Alabama

October 19, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; W.W. Pearson, Judge.

Action by J.E. Laney against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for damages for injury to him while a passenger. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The first count states the relation of passenger and carrier and a right to ride from East St. Louis to Montgomery, and that at a point in Tennessee, known as Franklin, plaintiff was ejected from said train by the conductor in charge thereof he at the time using language derogatory to plaintiff's character as an honest man, etc. The second count states the cause of action in the same manner, but a little more fully. The third count is for willfully and forcibly ejecting plaintiff. The fourth count alleges the purchase by plaintiff of a ticket at East St. Louis, Ill., from the agents and servants of defendant entitling him to ride upon passenger trains operated by defendant from said initial point to Montgomery, Ala., and that he took passage on one of said trains on the night of November 27, 1913, having previously obtained said ticket at and for the sum of $15.02, and that on the 20th day of November, 1913, while plaintiff was on said train, at a point in Tennessee known as Franklin, a station on defendant's railway line, the conductor servants, or agents of defendant in charge of the train, on which plaintiff was, ejected plaintiff from said train, and in so doing said servants and agents used abusive, insulting and derogatory language concerning plaintiff and his character as an honest man, in the presence and hearing of sundry persons, and by reason of such conduct plaintiff was greatly humiliated, etc. Defendant filed to each and every count of the complaint the following plea:

It says that this court ought not to have and maintain jurisdiction of the action set up therein, for that said defendant avers that the alleged cause of action therein set up, if any plaintiff has, did not arise, nor did the injury therein complained of occur, in Montgomery county in the state of Alabama, but in the state of Tennessee, and that plaintiff does not reside in the said county of Montgomery and defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kentucky; wherefore, since the said action is brought for a personal injury within the meaning of section 6112, Code of Alabama, in a county other than the county in which the injury occurred, and other than the county in which plaintiff resides, the defendant corporation prays the judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery county if said court will or ought to have further cognizance of said action.

This plea was duly verified.

The following charges were refused to defendant:

(1) Affirmative charge as to the fourth count.

(2) General affirmative charge.

(3) In this case plaintiff cannot recover any damages on account of the wrongful conduct of defendant's conductor or agent.

(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that defendant conductor requested of plaintiff that he furnish him his ticket authorizing him to ride upon said train, or pay his fare for riding thereon, and that after such request plaintiff failed or refused to present his ticket to the conductor or to pay his fare, then you cannot find a verdict for defendant.

(5) If you believe from the evidence that plaintiff failed or refused to exhibit his railroad ticket to the conductor or to pay his railroad fare to the conductor after demand was made therefor by said conductor, and such failure or refusal took place without any wrongful conduct on the part of defendant' s said conductor, or of any employé or agent of defendant in charge of said train, then your verdict must be for defendant.

(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff was required to leave the train as the result of any negligence on the part of the conductor of the Pullman car, then you cannot find a verdict for plaintiff under count 4.

(7) If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff's inability to furnish his ticket to the conductor, upon request to him made therefor by such conductor, and that such failure was the result of the negligence or wrongful act of employé of the Pullman Car Company, then you cannot find a verdict for plaintiff in this case.

(8) If the jury find from the evidence that defendant has proven to their reasonable satisfaction one of its pleas filed in this case, then the judgment must be for defendant.

(9) If you believe that plaintiff is entitled to recover, then I charge you he can recover only the amount which it reasonably cost him from being delayed in passage.

(10) In this case plaintiff cannot recover damages for any personal injury or insult to him on the part of the servant or agent of defendant in charge of the train.

(11) The only damages which can be asserted in this case against defendant, if you find from the evidence that plaintiff is entitled to recover, are such damages as are a direct result of a breach of the contract sued on, and no recovery can be had by plaintiff on account of any wrongful conduct on the part of defendant's agents or servants.

(14) The only damages which the jury can assess against defendant are the costs to plaintiff of his railroad ticket, purchased at East St. Louis and at Nashville, and at Franklin, and his board at Memphis.

(15) The jury cannot assess any damages against defendant on account of anything said to plaintiff by defendant's conductor Billings.

(17) Plaintiff cannot recover damages in this case on account of any humiliation suffered by him as the result of any rude conduct towards him of defendant's conductor.

There was verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $750.

Tyler Goodwyn, of Montgomery, for appellant.

Rushton, Williams & Crenshaw, of Montgomery, for appellee.

BROWN J.

By an act of the Legislature approved November 23, 1907, the courts of this state are authorized to entertain jurisdiction of all causes of action, whether for tort or breach of contract, arising in another state, the act providing:

"Such cause of action shall be enforceable in the courts of this state, in any county in which jurisdiction of the defendant can legally be obtained in the same manner in which jurisdiction could have been obtained if the cause of action had arisen in this state." Acts Sp.Sess.1907, p. 67.

The plaintiff's cause of action arose in the state of Tennessee, and this action was brought in the circuit court of Montgomery county. The appellant now insists that this act was repealed by section 10 of the Code, and the act adopting the Code, approved August 26, 1909 (Acts Sp.Sess.1909, p. 174).

The manuscript prepared by the Code Commissioner, after it had been revised by a joint committee from House and Senate, was adopted in manuscript form during the latter part of the regular session of the Legislature of 1907, by act approved July 27, 1907, in the second section of which the following provision is made:

"No act passed on or after the 9th day of July, 1907, shall be repealed or affected in any manner by the adoption of this Code." Acts 1907, p. 499.

The act in question having been passed at a session of the LegislatUre subsequent to this first act adopting the Code, it is manifest that it is in no way affected by that act or the Code as thus adopted.

After the Code was printed and bound in three volumes, designated the "Political," "Civil," and "Criminal" Code, by the same Legislature at the special session of 1909, it was adopted by act approved August 26, 1909, supra. The second section of the last act above referred to contains the following saving provisions, to wit:

"That all acts of the Legislature *** passed at the general or special sessions are unaffected by the adoption of this Code."

The act approved November 23, 1907, passed at one of the special sessions referred to in this last adopting act, is clearly within a class that it was the manifest intention of the Legislature to save, and was not repealed by the adoption of the Code. State v. Lamar, 178 Ala. 77, 59 So. 473; Larue v. Kershaw Contracting Co., 177 Ala. 441, 59 So. 155. This...