Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Rhoda

• Decision Date: 18 January 1917
• Citation: 73 Fla. 12,74 So. 19
• Parties: LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. RHODA.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

74 So. 19

73 Fla. 12

LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. RHODA.

Florida Supreme Court

January 18, 1917

Error to Circuit Court, Santa Rosa County; A. G. Campbell, Judge.

Action by L. M. Rhoda, as administrator, against the Louisville &amp Nashville Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Section 3148, Gen. St. 1906, defines the liabilities of railroad companies in certain cases, and in so far as such statute in effect creates a presumption of negligence from 'damage done to persons' 'by the running of the locomotives or cars or other machinery of' 'a railroad company,' such provision is a matter of substance affecting the liability of railroad companies, and, being in conflict with the provisions of the federal Employers' Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S Comp. St. 1913, ss 8657-8665]), it is superseded by the federal act which is paramount and exclusive in cases to which the latter is applicable.

Under the federal Employers' Liability Act, the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove negligence of the defendant that proximately caused the injury alleged; and while the circumstances of the injury, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may warrant in inference or presumption of negligence, such inference or presumption merely requires the defendant to produce evidence in explanation or rebuttal; and the inference or presumption is to be weighed against the evidence in explanation or rebuttal, observing the rule that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff; and, if the probative force of the circumstances and facts in evidence do not preponderate in favor of the presumption and against the defendant's proofs, the plaintiff fails to make out his case.

Even where contributory negligence and assumed risk are rightly pleaded but are not proven, the plaintiff may not recover where the evidence shows without contradiction that the defendant was not negligent as alleged.

COUNSEL Blount & Blount & Carter, of Pensacola, for plaintiff in error.

McGeachy & Lewis, of Milton, and Watson & Pasco, of Pensacola, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

A former judgment herein obtained in the circuit court and affirmed by this court (71 So. 369) was by the Supreme Court of the United States 'reversed upon the authority of Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176; American R. Co. of Porto Rico v. Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145, 33 S.Ct. 224, 57 L.Ed. 456; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173, 33 S.Ct. 426, 57 L.Ed. 785; Garrett v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 235 U.S 308' (35 S.Ct. 32, 59 L.Ed. 242; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rhoda, 238 U.S. 608, 35 S.Ct. 662, 59 L.Ed. 1487).

The amended declaration on which the last trial was had alleges:

That the railroad company 'so carelessly and negligently ran and operated its * * * engine; that the same was run against, over, and upon * * * Clarence Rhoda, the plaintiff's intestate, thereby so greatly wounding and injuring the said Clarence Rhoda that he died from and as a result of the said injuries immediately upon their infliction; that at the time of the injury and death of the said Clarence Rhoda he was employed by the defendant in interstate commerce, and the said injury and death were inflicted upon him while he was performing the duties of such employment; that the plaintiff has been duly appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Clarence Rhoda; that the said Clarence Rhoda left no widow or children surviving him, but did leave surviving him, who still survive him, parents, to wit, Annie Patterson Rhoda, his mother, and L. M. Rhoda, his father; that the said Annie Patterson Rhoda and the said L. M. Rhoda, parents as aforesaid of said Clarence Rhoda, sustained pecuniary damage by the death of the said Clarence Rhoda, in this, to wit, that they lost the pecuniary contributions which they had the reasonable expectation of receiving from the said Clarence Rhoda if he had lived, and were thereby damaged; and the plaintiff, by reason of the death of the said Clarence Rhoda as herein alleged, alleges that the said parents of the said Clarence Rhoda have sustained damages which accrue to the plaintiff for the benefit of said parents, and for which he here sues for their benefit in the sum of $10,000.'

The pleas were not guilty, contributory negligence, and assumed risk. Verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant took writ of error.

At the trial the court gave the following charges which were duly excepted to by the defendant:

'It devolves upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the deceased, Clarence Rhoda, was killed by the locomotive of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Then it would devolve upon the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not negligent in its acts.

'Where the plaintiff shows by the evidence that he has sustained damage and injury by the running of an engine of a railroad company, he is entitled to recover therefor, unless the company makes it appear, or it does not appear by a preponderance of the evidence either that he assumed the risk, or that the injury was not due to the negligence of the agents of the company in charge of such engine.

'If you find, after a consideration of the whole of the evidence, that the plaintiff's intestate, Clarence Rhoda, was killed by an engine of the defendant on its tracks, and you do not find from a preponderance of the evidence that he assumed the risk of injury, but the evidence is equally balanced in your minds between negligence and freedom from negligence on the part of the defendant's servants on said engine, your verdict must be for the plaintiff.'

The court also refused to give the following charge requested by the defendant to which refusal the defendant duly excepted:

'This case arises under the federal Employers' Liability Act, and under that act the burden of proof is upon this plaintiff to show that the deceased, Clarence Rhoda, came to his death in the manner set forth in the declaration, and that his death was the result of the negligence of the defendant.'

The question necessary to be determined are whether the state statute quoted below conflicts with the federal act; and, if it does not so conflict, then whether the defendant has sustained the burden placed upon it by the state statute. If there is substantial conflict, the federal act is paramount, and whether the defendant successfully carried the statutory burden imposed by the local law is quite immaterial.

The federal act is entitled 'An act relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employés in certain casses.' The act provides:

'That every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several states * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employé, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employé; and, if none, then of such employé's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employé, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employés of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves or other equipment.' 35 Stat. 65.

The state statute as originally enacted in 1891 is entitled 'An act defining the liabilities of railroad companies in certain cases.' As re-enacted and brought forward in the General Statute of 1906, the pertinent sections of the law are as follows:

'A railroad company shall be liable for any damage done to persons, stock or other property, by the running of the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of such company, or for damage done by any person in the employ and service of such company, unless the company shall make it appear that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the company.'

'If any person is injured by a railroad company by the running of the locomotives or cars, or other machinery of such company, he being at the time of such injury an employé of the company, and the damage was caused by negligence of another employé, and without fault or negligence on the part of the person injured, his employment by the company shall be no bar to a recovery. No contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding.' Sections 3148, 3150, Gen. Stats. 1906, Comp. Laws 1914.

Sections 3145 land 3146, General Statutes of 1906, provide for a recovery of damages for the death of a person caused by the negligence of another where the party killed could have recovered had he lived.

The federal act was intended to be paramount and uniform in its operation upon the matters within its purview. This supremacy and uniformity can be attained only be excluding all local laws affecting the substantial rights of the parties that conflict with the federal act. The state law is intended to enforce a local state policy substantially different from that disclosed by the terms of the federal act. The state law is long prior in date and cannot be regarded as an aid to the federal act, but it is apparently in positive and material conflict therewith. The local statute was not intended to cover subjects that are controlled by paramount federal regulations.

Until Congress acted on the subject, the laws of the several states...