Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Keefer
Decision Date | 01 October 1896 |
Docket Number | 17,560 |
Citation | 44 N.E. 796,146 Ind. 21 |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Parties | Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Keefer |
From the Greene Circuit Court.
Reversed.
Baker & Daniels and Davis & Moffett, for appellant.
Matson & Giles, for appellee.
Appellant was employed as an express messenger by the American Express Company, which was carrying on the express business over the road of appellant between Bedford and Switz City, Indiana. While so employed and engaged in his usual duties on the express car of said train, the place provided by appellant for him to ride, he was injured by the falling of appellant's railroad bridge, and brought this action against appellant to recover damages therefor. A demurrer to the complaint for want of facts was overruled. Appellant answered in three paragraphs, and appellee's demurrers to the second and third of said paragraphs were sustained. The case was tried by a jury and a verdict returned in favor of appellee, and over a motion for a new trial judgment was rendered against appellant. The action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the complaint and in sustaining the demurrer to the second and third paragraphs of answer is assigned as error. It is first insisted that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint. While the allegations are not as specific and complete as they should have been made, we have concluded that the complaint is sufficient on demurrer.
The third paragraph of answer avers that the appellee was, at the time of the injury, upon the train and in the express car as a messenger of the American Express Company, in charge of its express matter then therein; that he had not paid or tendered fare or compensation for his carriage, nor had he agreed to pay; that his right to be upon the train was secured to him and to the express company by a contract in writing between the railroad company and the express company, and that he was then riding upon the train in pursuance of the contract and not otherwise, and that the only compensation the railroad was to receive was the compensation to be paid by the express company, under the contract for the express privileges granted it thereby. It is also alleged that appellee, in consideration of his employment by the express company, and at the time thereof, executed a contract in writing--which is set out in the answer--in which appellee covenanted and agreed as follows:
That under the contract between the express company and appellant, said express company was granted express privileges and facilities on the railroad lines of appellant, and the express company agreed with appellant that, "It is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto, that the express company will assume all risks and damages to its property, freight and valuable packages, and also assume all risks and damages to its agents and messengers on the said road."
Appellee insists that a common carrier cannot protect itself by contract from liability for negligence to a person riding as appellee was on appellant's train, for the reason that such a contract is void as against public policy.
This is a correct statement of the law in this State where the carrier is at the time performing a duty it owes to the public as a common carrier. A common carrier may, however, become a private carrier or bailee for hire where, as a matter of accommodation or special engagement he undertakes to carry something which it is not his business to carry. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall, on p. 377; Coup v. Wabash, etc., R. W. Co., 56 Mich. 111, 56 Am. Rep. 374; 22 N.W. 215; Robertson v. Old Colony, R. R. Co., 156 Mass. 525, 32 Am. St. Rep. 482; 31 N.E. 650; Chicago, etc., R. W. Co. v. Wallace, 66 F. 506, 14 C. C. A. 257, 30 L. R. A. 161.
Was appellant, in the carriage for the express company of goods and appellee its agent in charge thereof, performing a duty as a common carrier, or was it performing a service foreign to its duties as a common carrier, and which it could not have been compelled to perform? Railroad companies are not required by usage or common law to transport the traffic of independent express companies over its lines in the manner in which the traffic is usually carried and handled, and they need not, in the absence of a statute requiring it, furnish to such express companies equal facilities for doing an express business upon their passenger trains. Sargent v. Boston, etc., R. R. Corp., 115 Mass. 416; Express Cases, 117, U.S. 1.
In the case last cited, the railroad companies had undertaken to perform for the public the express business, before that time done over the same lines by express companies. The express companies applied for space in the express cars for their goods and messengers, and the railroad companies refused to furnish the space or carry their messengers, and these suits were brought to compel the railroad to furnish the desired express facilities. The court held that it was not the duty of railroads to carry the goods and messengers of express companies, and that a railroad in such service was not performing a duty it owed to the public as a common carrier. That such right could only be acquired by an express company by contract with the railroad company. The court, by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, said:
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