Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company v. Parish

Decision Date20 January 1893
Docket Number640
Citation33 N.E. 122,6 Ind.App. 89
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
PartiesLOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY & CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY v. PARISH

From the Orange Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

E. C Field and W. S. Kennan, for appellant.

T. B Buskirk and J. J. Lingle, for appellee.

OPINION

REINHARD, C. J.

This was an action by the appellee against the appellant commenced before a justice of the peace for services rendered the company. On appeal to the court below, the appellee recovered. The facts are these:

The appellant operates a line of railroad through this State and into the city of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky. The appellee is a resident of Orange County, Indiana, and a householder, entitled under the laws of this State to an exemption of $ 600 in property, from sale on execution for debt.

On the 11th day of August, 1890, the appellant being indebted to the appellee for services as above stated, one H. G. Gardner, in said city of Louisville, Kentucky, commenced a suit against the appellee and one John H. Steers, as principal defendants, before a justice of the peace, in said city, for an alleged indebtedness, in which suit the appellant was summoned as garnishee, on account of the debt due from it to the appellee. The appellant appeared in response to said summons and filed its answer admitting that it owed the appellant the sum of $ 40.97, but alleging that the appellee was a resident householder of Orange County, Indiana, that the entire property owned by him was worth less than $ 600, and that under the laws of this State he was entitled to an exemption of an amount equal in value to $ 600. On the 11th day of November, 1890, a personal judgment was rendered by said justice of the peace at Louisville, against the appellee as principal defendant, and against the appellant, as garnishee, for $ 28.05, in favor of said Gardner. Execution issued upon said judgment, and such proceedings were had that appellant subsequently, and before the bringing of this action, paid the amount of such judgment to said justice. The appellant pleaded these facts in its answer below, and offered to confess judgment for $ 27.22, the residue owing to said appellee. The answer was, however, subsequently stricken out by the court. On the trial in the court below, the appellant introduced in evidence a certified transcript, in due form, from the Kentucky justice, showing, among other things, the nature of the process issued by him against the appellee as principal defendant in said cause. This process is called a "warning order," and is a notice to the appellee, as defendant in said cause, that the same is pending, and when it will be heard and determined. There was evidence tending to show that this notice had been duly mailed to the appellee at Louisville, directed to him at his postoffice in Orange County. The only evidence of its receipt is by the appellee, who testified that he did not receive it until after the trial. He also testified that he received a telegram from Louisville, on the day of the trial, notifying him of the same. There was no other service upon the appellee, nor any appearance by him. It was further shown that the justice at Louisville appointed an attorney to defend said non-residents, Parish and Steers. It was not shown that Parish ever employed or authorized such attorney to appear for him, and it is admitted that he did not. Appellee also admitted that he had been told of the pendency of the suit at Louisville, and that the company had been garnished in such suit, by one of the attorneys for appellant. It is admitted that appellee was the owner of property not exceeding $ 600 in value.

The controlling question presented for our consideration is whether the judgment of the justice of the peace, of Jefferson County, Kentucky, is a defense, pro tanto, which the appellant can rightfully invoke, to this action. The court below, by rendering judgment for the appellee for the full amount of his claim, decided that it was not. The appellant contends that this was error.

It was said by Black, J., in a case recently decided by this court:

"When, in such an ex parte proceeding in attachment against a non-resident who makes no appearance, judgment is rendered against him without jurisdiction, a garnishee will not be protected by the judgment rendered against himself, or by his payment thereof, when he is subsequently sued by the principal defendant. The garnishee, for his own protection, must see that the court has jurisdiction of the principal defendant. Drake on Attachment, section 691, et seq.; Matheney v. Earl, 75 Ind. 531." Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Lake, 5 Ind.App. 450, 32 N.E. 590.

Did it sufficiently appear that the justice at Louisville had jurisdiction of the person and subject matter of the principal defendant, the appellee in this cause? If so, the judgment rendered by...

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1 cases
  • Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Parish
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 20 Enero 1893
    ... ... Action by Richard Parish against the Louisville, N. A. & C. Railway Company to recover for services rendered. From a judgment for plaintiff, ... ...

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