Louisville v. Bodenschatz-Bedford Stone Co.
Decision Date | 05 February 1895 |
Citation | 141 Ind. 251,39 N.E. 703 |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Parties | LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v. BODENSCHATZ-BEDFORD STONE CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county; George W. Grubbs, Special Judge.
Action by the Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company against the Bodenschatz-Bedford Stone Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.E. C. Field and W. S. Kinnan, for appellant. E. F. Runyan, M. F. Dunn, and Iglehart & Taylor, for appellee.
This was an action by the appellant to enforce specific performance of a written contract. So much of the contract as is material to this controversy is as follows:
The amended complaint is based on the above contract, and alleges, in substance: That after the date of said written agreement, and in express performance thereof, the defendant stone company procured from the landowners whose property lies between the point of connection of said proposed switch and the quarry of said stone company conveyances of the right of way for said proposed railroad. That the stone company then proceeded to grade, construct, and complete the roadbed for such proposed switch, upon the survey and plans of plaintiff's chief engineer. That afterwards, in June, 1890, said stone company notified the plaintiff that it had completed said roadbed ready for the superstructure, and requested the plaintiff to lay down the ties and rails on such graded roadbed, and complete said railroad from plaintiff's main-line grade to said stone company's quarry. That before the plaintiff laid down the ties or rails upon such grade the stone company exhibited to plaintiff a form of deed, purporting to convey said right of way with certain restrictions and covenants, which were contrary to said contract of March 10, 1890, to which restrictions and covenants the plaintiff objected, and refused to receive the same, as being contrary to said contract. That the stone company retained said conveyance, and agreed that the objection of the plaintiff thereto was a proper and valid objection, and that it would execute a new deed for such right of way, and would omit such objectionable restrictions and conditions. That, relying upon such promise, the plaintiff purchased, shipped, and laid down a large amount of the iron and track material, and entirely completed said switch railroad over the said right of way, making a continuous line of railroad from plaintiff's main track to said stone company's quarry. That the plaintiff expended a large sum of money for such ties, rails, and labor, to wit, the sum of $4,321.45, for which sum plaintiff rendered a statement to said stone company, which, however, did not include the cost of survey or transportation of said track material. That on the 18th day of November, 1890, the stone company paid in advance to plaintiff said sum. That afterwards the plaintiff notified said stone company that it was ready to switch cars into and from said quarry, but said defendant said it was not ready, and shortly thereafter, on December 10, 1890, erected obstructions across the said switch a short distance from its connection with the main line of the plaintiff's railroad, and also took out the track, and dug a ditch across the right of way, and carried off some of the rails in such switch, so as to disconnect the said switch from the said main track of plaintiff's railroad, and refused to allow the plaintiff to make any use of said track, and claimed that said switch belongs exclusively to said defendant as its own property, and that the plaintiff has no right or title to said switch, nor any right to operate the same, or to run its trains upon the same, except as said defendant may choose to permit. That the defendant refuses to perform its covenants in said agreement, or to procure and have conveyed to the plaintiff the right of way described therein, so as to vest a perfect title in the plaintiff, but claims the exclusive title thereof to be in the defendant, and that the plaintiff has no right, title, or interest therein, or any right whatever to operate the same. That the defendant, in disregard of the plaintiff's rights, has entered into an agreement with the Evansville & Richmond Railroad Company, which owns and operates a line of railroad running east and west, and crossing the line of the plaintiff's railroad in the city of Bedford, Ind., a short distance from defendant's quarry, and has bound itself in some manner to procure the right of way for and construct a line of railroad from the main tracks of the Evansville & Richmond Railroad to said switch, intersecting the same just outside the main right of way of plaintiff's railroad, and that the defendant has given the Evansville & Richmond Railroad Company the right to run its engines, cars, and trains over said switch to and from the defendant's quarry situated thereon. Plaintiff has in all things kept and performed covenants obligatory upon it under said contract of March 10, 1890, and prays that the court adjudge that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner, in fee simple, of said right of way, and that said defendant be ordered to specifically perform said contract, and execute, or cause to be executed and delivered, to the plaintiff proper deeds of conveyance, vesting in the plaintiff the perfect legal...
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Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co. v. Corley
... ... for specific performance of a contract to convey such a ... Louisville ... Railroad Company v. Bodenchatz-Bedford Stone Co., ... 141 Ind. 251, 39 N.E. 703 ... ...
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Cincinnati, Bluffton And Chicago Railroad v. Wall
... ... remedy in equity. 26 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 38; ... Louisville etc., R. Co. v. Bodenschatz Stone ... Co. (1895), 141 Ind. 251 at 251-263, 39 N.E. 703; ... Ikerd ... ...
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Horner v. Clark
... ... the part of the defendant will be a fraud upon the plaintiff ... Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bodenschatz, ... 141 Ind. 251, 39 N.E. 703; Ikerd v ... Beavers, 106 Ind. 483, ... ...