Louisville v. Faylor

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Mitchell
• Citation: Louisville v. Faylor, 126 Ind. 126, 25 N.E. 869 (Ind. 1890)
• Decision Date: 21 November 1890
• Parties: Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Faylor.

126 Ind. 126

25 N.E. 869

Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co.

v.Faylor.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 21, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, White county; John H. Gould, Judge.

Geo. W. Friedley, Geo. R. Eldridge, and E. C. Field, for appellant. E. P. Hammond, Wm. B. Austin, Alfred W. Reynolds, and E. B. Sellers, for appellee.

Mitchell, J.

Faylor sued the railroad company to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of the company, in October, 1886. The plaintiff below was a passenger at the time he suffered the injury complained of, and was occupying a seat in a caboose attached to a freight train, in which he was transporting a carload of cattle. While the train on which he was being carried was ascending a steep grade, a number of the cars, including the caboose in which the plaintiff and others were seated, became detached from the engine and the forward part of the train. The detached cars, running backwards, came in collision with the engine of an advancing train, which, it is claimed, was following in dangerous proximity. The plaintiff sustained severe injuries. On the same day, and while suffering from the injuries received to an extent which, it is claimed, rendered him mentally incapable of transacting business, the plaintiff signed and executed a receipt and release, in settlement and satisfaction of all damages sustained, as follows: “Received, Cedar Lake, Indiana, October 27th, 1886, of the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, the sum of seventy-five dollars, in full of all damages sustained by me, by reason of being injured in an accident to a train on said railroad, at this place, on this day, I being a passenger thereon; and, in consideration of said sum, I do hereby release and discharge said railway company from all rights of action that have accrued, or may hereafter accrue, to me in consequence of said injuries so received by me in said accident.” The plaintiff below claimed that the money alleged to have been received by him in settlement of the damages sustained was not paid to him, but that it was placed in the hands of a nurse employed by the company to take care of him; that, upon returning to consciousness, he declined to accept the money, and notified the company that he disaffirmed the compromise and settlement on account of his mental incapacity at the time it was made. The railroad company set up the compromise and payment in pursuance thereof as a defense. It also answered specially that, at the time of the injury complained of, the plaintiff was in charge of a car-load of cattle, and was riding under a contract in which it was stipulated that, in consideration of a free pass, and other valuable considerations, the company was to be exempt from any liability for any injury which the plaintiff might sustain while in charge of the cattle. This answer was held insufficient, and the plaintiff replied pleading his mental incapacity, his refusal to receive the money, and notice that he disaffirmed the settlement, before instituting the suit.

The complaint proceeds upon the assumption that the railroad company was guilty of negligence in so coupling its cars that a portion of the train became detached, and that it was negligence to run its trains in such close proximity as that one might run into the other without being observed. It is an established principle in the law that, while common carriers are not insurers of the safety of passengers, the very highest degree of practical diligence, care, and skill is exacted of them in the performance of their duties; and a passenger, who sustains injury on account of any neglect against which human prudence and foresight might have guarded, may demand compensation from the carrier. Railroad Co. v. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551; Railroad Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. Rep. 836. The essential and imperative duty inherent in the very nature of the employment of a common carrier is that of care, vigilance, and skill in providing suitable and safe means for the carriage of those who intrust themselves to him for transportation and of safely carrying them to their destination. A stipulation that the carrier shall not be bound to the exercise of care and diligence is in effect an agreement to absolve him from one of the essential duties of his employment, and it would be subversive of the very object of the law to permit the carrier to exempt himself from...