Louisville v. Wallace

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MAGRUDER
• Citation: Louisville v. Wallace, 136 Ill. 87, 26 N.E. 493 (Ill. 1891)
• Decision Date: 22 January 1891
• Parties: LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v. WALLACE.

136 Ill. 87

26 N.E. 493

LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO.

v.WALLACE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; FRANK BAKER, Judge.

David J. Wile, for appellant.

Hobert H. Patton, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, J.

This is an action in assumpsit, brought by appellee, Wallace, who is an attorney at law, against the appellant company, to recover for professional services. The declaration contains only the common counts. The plea was non assumpsit. The cause was put upon what is called the ‘short cause calendar,’ provided for in the act of June 1, 1889, entitled ‘An act to expedite the trial of certain suits at law in courts of record.’ Laws 1889, p. 222. Before the trial began the defendant moved to strike the case from the calendar, on the ground that said act was unconstitutional.

The first question presented is the constitutionality of the act of 1889, above referred to. We have already considered this subject in Jensen v. Fricke, (Ill.) 24 N. E. Rep. 515. In that case we held the law to be constitutional, and see no reason now for changing the views there expressed. Counsel, however, claims that the view presented in the present case was not called to the attention of the court in that case. The act provides that ‘upon the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, in any suit at law pending in any court of record, filing an affidavit that he verily believes the trial of said suit will not occupy more than one hour's time, and upon ten days' previous notice to the defendant, his agent or attorney, said suit shall be placed by the clerk upon said ‘short cause calendar.” It is claimed that this provision grants to the plaintiff only the right to put a case upon the ‘short cause calendar,’ and does not extend the same right to the defendant, and that therefore the legislation is unequal and partial. It might as well be said, where a party has the right to bring a suit before either one of several courts of concurrent jurisdiction, as in a certain class of claims in Cook county, before either the circuit court, or the superior court, or the county court, or, in claims involving less than $200, before either a justice of the peace or the circuit court, that the law is partial to the plaintiff because he has the right of choosing the tribunal, and the defendant has not such right. The provisions of the constitution which are alleged to be violated are section 2 of article 2, that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,’ and section 22 of article 4, prohibiting special legislation regulating the practice in courts of justice. We cannot see that any question of life, liberty, or property is involved. The rights of the defendant, so far as they depend on the result of the litigation, are not affected in any way. The provision in question has reference to the remedy only; it merely regulates the mode of procedure. As we said in Jensen v. Fricke, supra: ‘Parties litigant have no vested right in the rules of practice or modes of procedure prescribed by law.’ Under our system of practice the plaintiff has control of the commencement of the suit, and is supposed to be the party who is most injured by delay. Nor is the provision obnoxious to the charge of being special legislation. It affects all persons in the same class with appellant, and is applicable to all persons and causes similarly situated. ‘Laws are general and uniform, not because they operate upon every person in the state, for they do not, but because every person who is brought within the relations and circumstances provided for is affected by the laws.’ People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388;Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302. We do not regard the law as unconstitutional for any of the reasons now urged. The trial court committed no error in refusing to strike the case from the ‘short cause calendar.’

The second and only other point made by appellant relates to the admission of evidence. The case was tried before a jury who found a verdict for the plaintiff. No instructions were asked by or given for either side. The defendant introduced no evidence. The plaintiff, after testifying himself, examined four attorneys as witnesses. By his own testimony and that of one of the witnesses he proved what legal services he had rendered, and by the testimony of the three other witnesses, as well as by his own evidence, he proved the value of his services. The witnesses were asked to state what the services which had been described in their hearing were reasonably and fairly worth, or what would be a fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiff's services, as detailed in the evidence given in their presence. The questions thus asked were objected to, because they called for the opinions of the witnesses as to the value of the services, and, the objections being overruled by the trial court, exceptions were taken. It is said that the witnesses were thus allowed to usurp the province of the jury, and that they should only have been required to state the usual and customary charges for such or similar services. In Reynolds v. McMillan, 63 Ill. 46, where the proceeding was an amicable partition suit, requiring no great legal skill, but merely the ordinary attainments of a good clerk, and where an...