Louisville v. Woodson
Citation | 134 U.S. 614,10 S.Ct. 628,33 L.Ed. 1032 |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Decision Date | 07 April 1890 |
Parties | LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. WOODSON |
Ed. Baxter, for plaintiff in error.
A. A. Freeman, for defendant in error.
Woodson sued the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to recover damages for injuries sustained by him through its negligence. The defendant plead not guilty. Upon the trial in the circuit court of Haywood county, Tenn., the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, assessing his damages at $3,000, which on motion was set aside, and a new trial granted, upon the ground that the verdict was not sustained by the evidence. A second trial was then had, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff of $5,000, which was again set aside, on motion, upon the same ground. A third trial was then had, resulting in a verdict of $3,000, upon which judgment was entered. And the record then states: Defendant prayed an appeal to the supreme court of Tennessee, which was granted, and an appeal-bond given accordingly.
The bill of exceptions sets forth all the evidence adduced upon the trial, and the charge of the court in full. This charge is of considerable length, and presented the case to the jury with apparent case. It is nowhere therein states that there was no evidence upon which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. On the contrary, it assumes that there was some evidence which would justify a verdict for the plaintiff. It was said by the trial judge, among other things: It is stated that the bill of exceptions is to the judgment of the court in overruling the objections to the admission of testimony, and also in overruling the motion for new trial, and in arrest of judgment. It does not appear that the court was asked to instruct the jury, as matter of law, that no recovery could be had upon any view which could be properly taken of the facts the evidence tended to establish; and it is evident, from the extracts above given from the charge of the court, that the trial judge must have been of opinion that a verdict for the plaintiff could be sustained upon some view that might be properly taken.
The railroad company assigned 13 errors in the supreme court of the state as grounds for the reversal of the judgment of the circuit court. Nearly all of these questioned the rulings of the court in relation to the admission of testi- mony, and in different parts of the charge. The first error assigned was in permitting, under the pleadings, the plaintiff below to make proof of boys besides himself, 'at other times prior to the one when plaintiff below was injured, swinging to trains of defendant below other than the freight train which ran over and injured him.' The second error was as follows: 'Because the proof introduced in accordance with the pleadings wholly fails to show that defendant below was guilty of any negligence whatever in running its freight train as alleged, at the time and place alleged, over the plaintiff below, but, on the contrary, shows that plaintiff's injury was the result of his own gross negligence.' This second error, therefore, rested on essentially the same ground as the first, in that it claimed there was a failure of proof, if the evidence were confined to that contended to be alone admissible under the pleadings. The thirteenth error reads thus: 'Because, from the uncontroverted facts in the recor, the verdict should have been for defendant.' The assignment nowhere specifically alleged that the circuit court erred, as matter of law, in the entry of judgment, because there was no evidence to go to the jury, nor is there any allusion to the statute hereafter referred to. The supreme court of Tennessee affirmed the judgment in these words: 'This cause was heard upon the transcript of the record from the circuit court of Hay wood county, and the court adjudges that there is no evidence to support the verdict of the jury, but the defendant having obtained three verdicts of separate juries upon different trials, two of which have been heretofore set aside by the circuit judge; and now, alone upon this ground, the statute of Tennessee forbidding the granting of more than two new trials in the same cause on the facts, which statute is not in conflict with the constitution of the United States, fifth and fourteenth amendments, it is considered by this court that said judgment be affirmed, and that defendant in error, Eddie Woodson, by W. H. Lea, as next friend, recover of the plaintiff in error, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, the sum of three thousand dollars, ($3,000,) amount of judgment of court below, and the costs of said court,' etc.
A writ of error was sued out from this court upon the ground that the validity of a statute of the state of Tennessee was drawn in question as being repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and that the decision was in favor of its validity. A motion is now made to dismiss the writ of error, and with it is united a motion to affirm the judgment.
In each of the constitutions of the state of Tennessee of 1796, 1834, and 1870, it is declared that 'the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,' and also that 'judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony, and declare the law.' Const. 1796, art. 11, § 6; article 5, § 5; 1834, art. 1, § 6; article 6, § 9; 1870, art. 1, § 6; article 6, § 9. The purpose of this latter provision was stated in Ivey v. Hodges, 4 Humph. 155, to be to put a stop to the...
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Jones v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 38998.
...aside jury verdict more than once on weight of evidence are constitutional and must be followed. L. & N.R. Co. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 623, 33 L. Ed. 1032. (6) To compel plaintiff to repeatedly retry his case, because a trial judge disagrees with twenty-four jurors as to amount of damages, den......
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Galloway v. United States, 553
...850. The number of new trials permitted in a given case were usually limited to two or three; see e.g. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 614, 10 S.Ct. 628, 33 L.Ed. 1032. The power of the judge was thus limited to his authority to return the case to a new jury for a new 10 Cf. Baltim......
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Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., s. 783
...after two verdicts upon the facts in favor of the same party, except for error or law...." Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 614, 623, 10 S.Ct. 628, 631, 33 L.Ed. 1032 (1890). See 6A Moore's Federal Practice p 59.08 (1983). Though the adoption of that precept in the federal c......
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Mortgage Corp. of N. J. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., A--130
...N.J.L. 1, 111 A. 602 (Sup.Ct.1920). A second new trial will rarely be directed save for error of law. Louisville & N.R. CO. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 614, 10 S.Ct. 628, 33 L.Ed. 1032 (1890). At common law, a judgment Non obstante veredicto was in its origin a species of judgment on the pleadings......