Lourie v. Keene State College, 80-138

• Decision Date: 03 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-138,80-138
• Parties: Elizabeth M. LOURIE v. KEENE STATE COLLEGE et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 902

428 A.2d 902

121 N.H. 233

Elizabeth M. LOURIE v. KEENE STATE COLLEGE et al.

No. 80-138.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

April 3, 1981.

R. J. Shortlidge, Jr., Keene, by brief and orally, for plaintiff.

Bell, Falk & Norton, Keene (Ernest L. Bell, III, Keene, on the brief and orally), for defendant.

KING, Justice.

The plaintiff, Elizabeth M. Lourie, appeals from the granting of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. RSA 491:8-a (Supp.1979). She argues that because there were issues of material fact to be resolved, it was error for the trial court to grant the defendants' motion and that this error deprived her of her constitutional right to a trial by jury. The plaintiff also asserts that it was error for the court to deny her request for findings. For the reasons herein stated, we reject the plaintiff's arguments and affirm the trial court.

For several years prior to the 1973-74 academic year, the plaintiff worked as a lecturer in physical education at Keene State College, a unit of the University of New Hampshire. In 1973, she received a notice of short-term or special appointment to teach art at the Wheelock Elementary School, a laboratory school operated by Keene State College as part of its teacher education program.

The appointment was for the 1973-74 academic year and called for a salary of $1,800. The notice of appointment bore facsimile signatures of the president of the University of New Hampshire and the defendant Leo F. Redfern, president of Keene State College. Although the notice of appointment required the plaintiff to sign the notice and return it, she failed to do so. She did perform the duties of an art teacher and cashed the checks which she received for her services.

After the close of the 1973-74 academic year, the college decided not to rehire the plaintiff and hired another person instead. This person had a "prospective" master's degree in art whereas the plaintiff had a master's degree with an emphasis in physical education.

On February 8, 1977, the plaintiff brought an action against Keene State College, Clarence G. Davis, a former dean of the college, and Leo F. Redfern, president of the college. The writ alleged that: (1) the plaintiff was not paid a sufficient salary during the 1973-74 academic year; (2) the defendants had actually hired the plaintiff for the 1974-75 academic year and that she was improperly discharged; (3) the individual defendants had interfered with the plaintiff's right to receive adequate compensation during the 1973-74 academic year and with her continued employment during the subsequent academic year; (4) the individual defendants had maliciously interfered with the plaintiff's employment because of their feelings toward her husband; and (5) the individual defendants had interfered with her employment in violation of the official oppression statute, RSA 643:1, making it a misdemeanor for a public servant to commit an unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office or knowingly refrain from performing a duty imposed on him by law with a purpose to benefit himself or another, or to harm another.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit of Redfern. The plaintiff filed an answer to this motion supported by her affidavit. The Trial Court (Randall, J.) denied the motion without prejudice and with the right to renew after the taking of depositions. The plaintiff conducted considerable discovery, deposing both the individual defendants and an independent witness. On February 27, 1980, after a hearing at which the court had all the outstanding motions and the depositions before it, the Court (DiClerico, J.) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On March 7, 1980, the plaintiff filed a motion for findings of fact and rulings of law which the court denied.

The first issue which we address is whether the trial court erroneously granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment thereby denying the plaintiff her right to a trial by jury. "Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits filed, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." RSA 491:8-a (Supp.1979). The salutary purpose behind the summary judgment statute is to save the time, effort, and expense of a trial when there is no genuine issue...