Love v. Delta Air Lines

• Decision Date: 12 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 00-D-676-N.,CIV. A. 00-D-676-N.
• Citation: 179 F.Supp.2d 1313
• Parties: Cynthia LOVE, Plaintiff, v. DELTA AIR LINES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

179 F.Supp.2d 1313

Cynthia LOVE, Plaintiff, v. DELTA AIR LINES, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. 00-D-676-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

October 12, 2001.

Charles A. Everage, Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for James Willis Garrett, Jr., Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for Defendant.

Letta D. Gorman, Letta Dillard Gorman, Attorney at Law, Montgomery, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court are the following Motions: 1) a Motion For Summary Judgment, filed July 13, 2001, by Delta Air Lines, Inc. ("Defendant") and 2) a Motion For Summary Judgment, filed July 17 2001, by Cynthia Love ("Plaintiff"). The parties have filed briefs and evidentiary submissions in support of and in opposition to the respective Motions. After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant's Motion is due to be denied in part and granted in part, and Plaintiff's Motion is due to be denied.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if the moving party shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As to materiality, substantive law determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. As to genuineness, a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989). "In assessing whether the movant has met [its] burden, the courts should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1997) (citations omitted).

III. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has had Polio since the age of three and is paralyzed.¹ She is constrained to a wheelchair and has no ability to stand or walk.² Plaintiff's cause of action arises from events occurring on May 26, 1998, during a flight on Defendant airline from Montgomery, Alabama to Colorado Springs, Colorado.³ When making reservations prior to the flight, Plaintiff notified Defendant of her "`special needs.'"⁴ During the flight, Plaintiff became ill and had to be carried to the restroom by her son.⁵

Plaintiff claims Defendant "engaged in a discriminatory practice with reckless indifference to [her] federally protected rights."⁶ The federally protected rights referred to in the complaint are those provided under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Air Carrier Access Act ("ACAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 41705.⁷ Generally, Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with reasonable accommodations and access to services and facilities.⁸ More specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to provide an accessible "call button" for Plaintiff to page the flight attendant;⁹ that Defendant failed to provide an aisle chair to assist her in accessing the restroom facilities;¹⁰ that the restroom was too small to accommodate Plaintiff;¹¹ that Plaintiff was not provided privacy in the restroom;¹² and that Defendant failed to provide adequately trained flight personnel.¹³

IV. DISCUSSION

As stated, Plaintiff brings claims under the ADA and the ACAA. The court addresses each claim separately.

A. The Americans With Disabilities Act

While not raised by Defendant, it is clear that Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under the ADA because aircraft are not covered under Title III of the ADA. Plaintiff's allegations fall under Title III of the ADA — Public Accommodations And Services Operated By Private Entities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, and the regulations promulgated thereunder.¹⁴ Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination in commercial facilities, places of public accommodation, and specified public transportation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12184.

Title 28, Part 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations implements Title III of the ADA. Plaintiff argues that 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 requires Defendant in this case to provide to Plaintiff an on-board aisle chair, access to a call button, an accessible restroom, privacy in the restroom, and adequately trained flight personnel.¹⁵

When a court interprets a statute, "the plain meaning of the statute controls unless the language is ambiguous or leads to absurd results." U.S. v. McLymont, 45 F.3d 400, 401 (11th Cir.1995). Airlines are not included in the statutory definitions of "commercial facilities," 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2), or "public accommodation," 42 U.S.C. § 12181(4). In addition, aircraft are expressly excepted from the statutory definition of "specified public transportation," 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10).

Applying the plain meaning of the statute, the court finds that aircraft are exempted from Title III of the ADA. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims based on violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182-12189, or any regulations promulgated thereunder, are due to be dismissed.

B. The Air Carrier Access Act

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, the court raises sua sponte the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under the ACAA. As federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, any order by a federal court lacking subject matter jurisdiction, other than an order of dismissal or remand, is void. See Christopher v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 240 F.3d 95, 100 (1st Cir.2001); Shirley v. Maxicare Texas, Inc., 921 F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir.1991). Thus, the court "must inquire into ... subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte even if the parties have not challenged it." Rembert v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (11th Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction arises in the context of whether there is a private cause of action available under the ACAA. The ACAA, 49 U.S.C. § 41705, provides that an air carrier "may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the following grounds: (1) the individual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) the individual has a record of such impairment; (3) the individual is regarded as having such an impairment." No private cause of action is expressly mentioned in the ACAA. Thus, whether Plaintiff can bring an action under the ACAA is contingent upon there being an implied private cause of action for violations of the ACAA.

a. Implied Private Causes Of Action — Generally

The court first addresses the genesis of the treatment of implied private causes of action by the United States Supreme Court. Beginning in 1975, courts applied the four factor implied cause of action analysis established in the case of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975).¹⁶ However, the Cort v. Ash analysis has been extensively criticized by members of the U.S. Supreme Court.

In Cannon v. University of Chicago, Justice Powell's dissent traced the advent of cases that led to the Cort decision, discussed the decision itself, and the implications of the decision. 441 U.S. 677, 730-49, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that Cort was decided "against [a] background of almost invariable refusal to imply private actions, absent a complete failure of alternative enforcement mechanisms and a clear expression of legislative intent to create such a remedy." Id. at 739, 99 S.Ct. 1946. The purpose of the Cort analysis, according to Justice Powell, was to determine "whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action." Id. at 739-40, 99 S.Ct. 1946. However, Justice Powell noted, "the Cort analysis too easily may be used to deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court instead to substitute its own views as to the desirability of private enforcement." Id. at 740, 99 S.Ct. 1946. Justice Powell continued, "[o]f the four factors mentioned in Cort, only one refers expressly to legislative intent. The other three invite independent judicial lawmaking." Id. Justice Powell noted that from the time the Cort decision was rendered until 1979, the Supreme Court consistently turned its back on attempts to create private actions, finding no implied cause of action in four cases, while at the same time the United States Courts of Appeals went in the opposite direction, with at least twenty decisions finding private causes of action implied in federal statutes. Id. at 741, 99 S.Ct. 1946. The decision in Cort, argued Powell, violates the doctrine of separation of powers and Article III of the Constitution, allowing the "Judicial Branch to assume policy-making authority vested in the Legislative Branch." See id. at 743-49, 99 S.Ct. 1946.

Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon was echoed in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988). Justice Scalia stated that

[i]t could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co., v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82, (1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979), converting one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three merely indicative of its presence or absence.

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