Love v. King County

• Decision Date: 11 April 1935
• Docket Number: 25576.
• Citation: 44 P.2d 175,181 Wash. 462
• Parties: LOVE v. KING COUNTY et al. (BOOTH, Intervener.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

44 P.2d 175

181 Wash. 462

LOVE v. KING COUNTY et al. (BOOTH, Intervener.

No. 25576.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 11, 1935

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Malcolm Douglas, Judge.

Action by Henry K. Love against King County and others, wherein Laurence S. Booth intervened as plaintiff. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Warren G. Magnuson, Edwin C. Ewing, and McMicken, Ramsey, Rupp &amp Schweppe, all of Seattle, for appellants.

Bruce C. Shorts, C. H. Hartson, and Bruce Shorts, Jr., all of Seattle, for respondents.

STEINERT Justice.

This is an action by a taxpayer to enjoin a county and certain of its officers from issuing and delivering a series of indigent relief bonds. A second taxpayer intervened in the action and by his complaint asked the same relief. Demurrers to the complaints having been overruled, and the defendants having elected to stand thereon, the court entered judgment enjoining the issuance of the bonds. The defendants have appealed.

The material facts alleged in the complaints, and admitted by the demurrers, are these: At an election held November 8, 1932 the qualified voters of King county, by requisite vote authorized the issuance of general negotiable serial coupon bonds in the total principal sum of $2,000,000, to provide funds for the relief of the poor, indigent, and infirm residents of the county. Bonds totaling $1,650,000 in amount were issued and sold prior to December 6, 1934. At the general election held November 6, 1934, the people of the state adopted Initiative Measure No. 94, and the same became effective December 6, 1934.

That act provides, in part, as follows:

'Except as hereinafter provided, the aggregate of all tax levies upon real and personal property by the state, county, school district, road district, and city or town shall not in any year exceed forty mills on the dollar of assessed valuation, which assessed valuation shall be fifty per cent of the true and fair value of any such property in money; and the levy by the state shall not exceed two mills to be exclusively for the support of the University of Washington, Washington State College and the Normal Schools of the state; the levy by any county shall not exceed ten mills including the levy for the county school fund, the levy by or for any school district shall not exceed ten mills, the levy for any road district shall not exceed three mills, and the levy by any city or town shall not exceed fifteen mills: * * * Provided, further, That the limitations imposed by this section shall not prevent the levy of additional taxes, not in excess of five mills per annum and without anticipation of delinqencies in payment of taxes, in an amount equal to the interest and principal payable in the next succeeding year on general obligation bonds, outstanding at the time of the taking effect of this act, issued by or through the agency of the state, or any county, city, town, or school district, nor the levy of additional taxes to pay interest on or toward the reduction, at the rate provided by statute, of the principal of county, city, town, or school district warrants outstanding on December 8, 1932; but the millage limitation of this proviso with respect to general obligation bonds shall not apply to any taxing district in which a larger levy is necessary in order to prevent the impairment of the obligation of contracts: Provided, further, That any county, school district, road district, city or town shall have the power to levy taxes at a rate in excess of the rate specified in this act, when authorized so to do by the electors of such county, school district, road district, city or town by a three-fifths majority of those voting on the proposition at a special election, to be held in the year in which the levy is made, and not oftener than once in such year, in the manner provided by law for holding general elections, at such time as may be fixed by the body authorized to call the same. * * *' Chapter 2, Laws 1935.

Thereafter, on December 17, 1934, the board of county commissioners called for bids on the remaining $350,000 of authorized bonds, the same to be dated January 1, 1935, and to mature annually, in numerical order, on and after January 1, 1937. A syndicate of bond houses and banks submitted a bid for the bonds, subject to certain terms and conditions hereinafter to be noted. Following receipt of the bid, the commissioners adopted resolution No. 5503, authorizing the issuance of the bonds in prescribed form and specifically providing that for the punctual payment of the bonds, principal, and interest, there should be levied annually on all the taxable property within King county a direct tax, without restriction or limitation as to the rate or amount thereof. The resolution contained the further provision that the county thereby irrevocably bound and obligated itself to make such annual tax levies without restriction or limitation as to rate or amount. These provisions were incorporated into the resolution to meet the conditions, referred to above, which had been imposed by the bidders.

No levy has ever been authorized by the electors of King county for the payment of any part of these bonds, and at the time of the commencement of this action the bonds had not been issued or sold.

The court in its judgment permanently enjoined the county from issuing all or any part of the bonds under resolution No. 5503, or, so long as Initiative Measure No. 94 remained in force and effect, under any other resolution which bound or obligated, or purported to bind or obligate, the county, to levy taxes without restriction or limitation as to rate or amount thereof, for the purpose of paying the principal and interest of such bonds. All the assignments of error are based upon these provisions of the judgment.

Preliminary to a statement of the specific issue presented in this case, we shall briefly refer to two principles of law that have been definitely established, the acceptance and certainty of which may be said to be the basis upon which the county proceeded, in its attempt to issue these particular bonds. There is no dispute here concerning those principles. They are: (1) Constitutional limitations upon municipal indebtedness prescribed by article 8, § 6, of the state Constitution do not include those necessary expenditures made mandatory in the Constitution and provided for by the Legislature and imposed upon the municipality, or which are necessary in order to perform a governmental duty or to maintain the corporate existence of the municipality. Rauch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568, 48 P. 253, 36 L. R. A. 407, 58 Am. St. Rep. 52; Duryee v. Friars, 18 Wash. 55, 50 P. 583; Farquharson v. Yeargin, 24 Wash. 549, 64 P. 717; Hull v. Ames, 26 Wash. 272, 66 P. 391, Gladwin v. Ames,

30 Wash. 608, 71 P. 189; Pilling v. Everett, 67 Wash. 109, 120 P. 873; Patterson v. City of Edmonds, 72 Wash. 88, 129 P. 895; State ex rel. Taro v. Everett, 101 Wash. 561, 172 P. 752, L. R. A. 1918E, 411; McCarthy v. City of Kelso, 129 Wash. 121, 223 P. 151; State ex rel. Porter v. Superior Court, 145 Wash. 551, 261 P. 90; Weisfield v. Seattle (Wash.) 40 P.2d 149; (2) it is the duty of the county to provide for poor persons therein who are in need of assistance, and the discharge of such duty is a governmental function. Rummens v. Evans, 168 Wash. 527, 13 P.2d 26. See, also, Kruesel v. Collin, 170 Wash. 233, 16 P.2d 442; State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 23 P.2d 1; State ex rel. McDonald v. Stevenson, 176 Wash. 355, 29 P.2d 400.

We come now to the single question involved in this case, which is this: Is it within the power of the Legislature to enact statutes, or of the people effectively to adopt initiative measures, which restrict or limit the amount of taxes that may be levied annually for the payment of bonds subsequently issued by the county? It is the contention of the appellants that the power of taxation, as an atribute of sovereignty, cannot be so restricted when such power is sought to be employed to meet obligations incurred in the correlative exercise of a paramount governmental function involving the right of self-preservation. We shall assume, for the purpose of the argument, that the exigency facing the county meets the hypothesis contained in appellant's contention.

It will be discerned that the theorem advanced by appellants postulates a power to tax without any limitation whatever. It is conceded by respondents that, under Rem. Rev. Stat. §§ 5583-1 to 5583-7, such power would exist, for the purpose of paying the principal and interest of the county's general obligation bonds, were it not for Initiative Measure No. 94.

We need not spend any time in discussing the elemental proposition that the power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty and belongs to, and is possessed by, the government as a matter of right without being expressly conferred by the people. 1 Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.) § 57, pp. 149, 150. The question with which we are now concerned is whether the people constituting the body politic of a state have the right to say, and the power to compel their assertion, that the taxes which may thereafter be levied by the county shall be limited or restricted either in rate or in amount. We have no hesitancy in answering that question in the...