Love v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 July 1951
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 8371.
• Citation: 99 F. Supp. 641
• Parties: LOVE v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

99 F. Supp. 641

LOVE v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Civ. A. No. 8371.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

July 13, 1951.

Harry Norman Ball, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Owen B. Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

McGRANERY, District Judge.

This case arises as an action on a life insurance policy by the widow of the insured. The policy had been issued by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company on May 17, 1946 and the insured died on the following July 31. The defendant has refused payment alleging that the insured made false statements in his application, fraudulently inducing the issuance of the contract of insurance. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant, and in addition answered in the affirmative the following interrogatories:

"In his application for an insurance policy did the insured give answers which were, in fact, false, knowing them to be false when he gave them; or did he deliberately fail to furnish details asked for with the intention of concealing the truth, thereby behaving in bad faith?"

"Did the insurance company rely on the answers given by the insured in his application in issuing the policy to him?"

The plaintiff now moves for judgment n. o. v. or, in the alternative for a new trial.

The physical examination conducted by the defendant's doctor did not reveal a heart condition, from which the insured died. In his application for the policy (the answers being in the handwriting of the defendant's medical examiner), the insured denied that he had ever had any disease of the heart. In answer to the question, "Have you ever had any ailment or disease of the stomach or intestines, liver, kidneys, or genito-urinary organs?" the insured replied that he had had a "stone of the left ureter" in 1941; after the direction to state the "name and address of every physician consulted", he answered, "Chester Hospital—recovered". To the question, "Have you ever had a surgical operation?" he answered, "Yes. Appendectomy. Removel of stone left ureter; 1940, 1941 * * *"; and after the direction to state the "name and address of every physician consulted", he responded, "Recovered—Taylor Hospital, recovered— Chester Hospital." To the question, "What clinics, hospitals, physicians, healers or other practitioners, if any, not named above, have you consulted or been treated by within the past five years? If none, so state", the answer was "None". A report made to the defendant by an independent retail credit company indicated that the insured had not lost any time from work.

In fact, however, the insured had suffered from heart disease, having consulted a prominent specialist, and having lost 62 days from work beginning January 7, 1944, because of a "coronary thrombosis", and 48 days beginning September 14, 1944, as the result of "coronary disease".

In his motion for a new trial, plaintiff avers that the verdict was based upon interrogatories which were contrary to the law in the case. Upon a review of the record, the court has concluded that while the interrogatories correctly reflected abstract principles of law, they did not adequately present the law relevant to this particular case. The questions presented to the jury should not have been merely whether the insured knowingly made false representations (but see Magaw, "Representations in the Law of Life Insurance", 11 Temple Law Quarterly 463), and whether the defendant relied on them; the jury should have been asked whether the defendant had or ought to have had such notice of the facts as to estop it from asserting a defense in connection with the misrepresentations.

Ordinarily, fraudulent representations are not actionable unless the hearer was justified in relying on them in the exercise of common prudence and diligence. See Emery v. Third Nat. Bank, 314 Pa. 544, 547, 171 A. 881. In other words, the hearer may be charged with a...