Love v. Salinas, 2:11-cv-00361-MCE-CKD

• Decision Date: 05 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:11-cv-00361-MCE-CKD,2:11-cv-00361-MCE-CKD
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: TIMOTHY R. LOVE, Plaintiff, v. SOCORRO SALINAS, et al., Defendants.

TIMOTHY R. LOVE, Plaintiff, v. SOCORRO SALINAS, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-00361-MCE-CKD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: August 5, 2013

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through this action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Timothy R. Love ("Plaintiff") seeks redress from Defendants Warden Salinas, Chief Deputy Warden Rackley, Correctional Officers Montgomery and Berghorst, and Nurse Galanis, in their individual capacities,¹ as well as the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") (collectively, "Defendants"), based on alleged violations of Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also seeks redress for claims brought under California state law, including negligence, medical malpractice and a violation of California Civil Code § 52.1. By its Order, dated June 30, 2011, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's constitutional claim for failure to protect and state law claim for medical malpractice against CDCR. (ECF No. 31.)

Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants on March 5, 2013. (ECF No. 46.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.²

BACKGROUND³

At the time of the events alleged in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Plaintiff was incarcerated at Deuel Vocational Institution ("DVI"). Plaintiff was housed in cell 317, which was on the third tier (floor) of the C-wing. On the night of February 12, 2010, correctional officers Berghorst and Montgomery were distributing toilet paper to the inmates in C-wing. Toilet paper was distributed by placing the paper outside the door of each cell. One officer remained on the tier, while another officer opened the doors, in groups of eight, using the automatic control panel. The control panel used to automatically open the cell doors consisted of several rows of pairs of buttons that corresponded to the cells in the housing unit. One button opened the door, causing a red light to turn on. The other button closed the door, and a green light turned on indicating the door was closed. If a door was unsecured, the red light would flash. After the inmates retrieved the toilet paper, the officer on the tier gave an "all clear" command, and the officer at the control panel closed each door.

On February 12, 2010, Berghorst was distributing toilet paper on the tiers, and Montgomery was at the control panel on the second tier opening the cell doors.Neither Berghorst nor Montgomery received any formal training on the operation of the control panel, and their training in this respect was generally limited to "on the job" instructions from fellow officers. According to Defendants, "no formal training was necessary because the control panels were self-explanatory and easy to use." (ECF No. 54 ¶ 48.)

When Montgomery opened the door to Plaintiff's cell, Plaintiff remained on his bunk because he did not hear the signal for inmates to retrieve their toilet paper. Accordingly, Plaintiff did not retrieve his toilet paper when the cell door opened. Officer Berghorst gave Officer Montgomery the "all clear" command to close the doors on the third tier, including the door to cell 317. Upon receiving the "all clear" from Berghorst, Montgomery pressed the buttons to close the section of doors on the third tier that included cell 317.

After noticing that Plaintiff had failed to retrieve his toilet paper, Berghorst instructed Plaintiff to come to the cell door to get the toilet paper. Then, Berghorst manually opened the door to cell 317. It is undisputed that Berghorst did not inform Montgomery that he had manually opened the cell door. Shortly after Berghorst opened the door, Montgomery noticed that the light to cell 317 was red and flashing, indicating that the door was not closed all the way.⁴ Montgomery could not see Plaintiff's cell door from the control panel. Without confirming whether the cell doorway was clear, Montgomery pressed the "close" button to cell 317 a second time. According to Montgomery, he closed the door to cell 317 because he was "concerned about the safety of Defendant Berghorst." (ECF No. 54-1 ¶ 89.) When Plaintiff bent over to retrieve the roll of toilet paper, as directed by Defendant Berghorst, the door closed on Plaintiff, crushing his head into the doorjamb. Plaintiff allegedly could not remove his head or body from the door's pathway before the door struck him.As a result of being struck by the closing door, Plaintiff experienced significant pain and was bleeding from his head.

According to Plaintiff, Berghorst did not call for medical staff to attend to Plaintiff in his cell but, instead, ordered Plaintiff to walk down from the third tier to the first tier and sent Plaintiff to the infirmary without an escort. Defendants, however, contend that Plaintiff never asked for help or informed anyone that he needed help going down the stairs. Plaintiff was later transported to Doctors Hospital of Manteca ("DHM") for treatment and was subsequently diagnosed with whiplash and closed head injury. He was discharged with a prescription for Motrin and returned to the infirmary at DVI on February 13, 2010.

Defendant Galanis treated Plaintiff upon his return from DHM. Plaintiff continued to feel dizzy and nauseous when he returned to his cell, and he subsequently vomited and started going in and out of consciousness. After Plaintiff's cellmate called "man down," Defendant Galanis reported to Plaintiff's cell. When Galanis entered the cell, Plaintiff was lying down on the bottom bunk. According to Defendants, Galanis immediately attempted to take his vital signs and to get a verbal response from Plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, does not remember Galanis taking his vital signs, but recalls Galanis hitting Plaintiff's chest "very, very hard" with open hands while telling him to get up. (Id. ¶ 96.) According to Plaintiff, he was unable to catch his breath because Galanis pounded his chest more than five times. Plaintiff asked Galanis to stop hitting him, and Galanis stopped.

Subsequently, Plaintiff was again transported to DHM where he was treated and diagnosed with a concussion. As a result of having his head injured in the cell block door, Plaintiff has suffered panic attacks, seizures, partial paralysis, chronic headaches, migraines, severe dizziness, nausea, vomiting and stuttering.

At the time of the alleged events, Defendant Salinas and Defendant Rackley were, respectively, the Warden and Chief Deputy Warden at DVI, and were responsible for inmate safety and the proper training and operations of correctional officers.Neither Salinas nor Rackley knew Plaintiff, they were not present when he sustained his head injury on February 12, 2010, and they had no knowledge of the medical treatment Plaintiff received and required from DVI and DHM. According to Defendants, Salinas and Rackley never received a complaint, nor were informed, that the cell doors in C-wing were dangerous, closed rapidly, were improperly maintained or operated, or otherwise posed a threat to the health and safety of the inmates housed in that unit.

STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment should be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. at 324.

The Supreme Court explained:

[T]he party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Id. at 323.

In attempting to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way, "before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (quotation omitted). As the Supreme Court explained,

[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial."

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