Love v. Simms

• Decision Date: 10 March 1824
• Citation: 6 L.Ed. 149,22 U.S. 515,9 Wheat. 515
• Parties: LOVE, Plaintiff in Error , v. SIMMS'S lessee, Defendant in Error
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

22 U.S. 515

6 L.Ed. 149

9 Wheat. 515

LOVE, Plaintiff in Error, v. SIMMS'S lessee, Defendant in Error.

March 10, 1824

ERROR to the Circuit Court of West Tennessee.

Feb. 23d.

This cause was argued by Mr. Eaton, for the

plaintiff in error,^a and Mr. Harper, for the defendant in error.

March 10th.

Mr. Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause comes up from the Circuit Court for the district of West Tennessee. The judgment in that Court is in favour of the plaintiff in ejectment, and error is brought to reverse that judgment, on the ground that the Court below instructed the jury that the plaintiff there had the better title, and ought to recover. The facts of the cause are exhibited in a bill of exceptions, and, so far as are necessary to illustrate this opinion, may be stated thus:

One Stockly Donaldson obtained a grant of lands of the State of North Carolina, in that region of territory which lies west of the Cumberland mountain, and now composes a part of West Tennesse. This grant issued upon an entry made in the office of John Armstrong.

After obtaining the patent, Donaldson executed a power of attorney to one Grant, to sell this land, and Grant accordingly sold it to one Allison, and executed a conveyance to him in due form. This deed bears date in 1795. But it appears, that two years previous to this sale, Donaldson himself had executed a title for the same land to one Adair. And the plaintiff in ejectment now makes title through Allison, while the defendant protects himself under the conveyance to Adair, but without connecting himself with it.

If the case rested here, there would be no difficulty in it; but, by the laws of North Carolina, no deed passes an estate, unless it be recorded in the county in which the land lies, and that within twelve months of its date. In this instance, the subsequent deed claims precedence, on the ground of prior registration, after the twelve months prescribed to the prior deed, and, of consequence, at a time when the prior deed was supposed to be altogether void, for want of registration.

On the point of registration the facts are these. The act of 1715, which is the registering act alluded to, has been suspended, as to the limitation of time, almost ever since its enactment. A similar provision in the land laws of that State, on the subject of registering grants, has also been the subject of a similar suspension. But as there was no County Court embracing within its jurisdiction that region of country in which this land lay, a new provision is introduced into the suspending act of 1788, by which it is enacted, that persons owning lands of this description, shall register them in the counties in which they reside; and a proviso, as to non-residents, is inserted, in these words: 'Provided always, that persons owning such lands in this State, west of the Cumberland mountain, and not residing therein, shall register their grants for such lands in Hawkins county.'

The holder of the junior conveyance from Donaldson, availed himself of this proviso, or (more properly speaking) enacting clause, and recorded it, with all his muniments of title, in Hawkins county. This took place in the year 1797, but the defendant below, the holder of the senior title from Donaldson, did not record his title until the year 1806, when, the State of Tennessee having created a county embracing this land, he committed his deed to registration in the county where the land lay; which was also done by the plaintiff below, four years afterwards. If, then, the registration in Hawkins county was a valid registration, and the effect of it was to vest the estate, to the prejudice of the prior conveyance from Donaldson, the plaintiff had the better title, and the charge was correct.

This question will now be examined.

It is obvious, that to attribute to the registration in Hawkins county the effect here contended for, it is necessary,

1. To attach to the provisions of the 5th section of the act of 1788, a variety of incidents, and to give it a latitude of construction which nothing but the unequivocal intent of the Legislature could countenance. The word land must be taken to mean muniments of title; the word grant, both patents and mesne conveyances; and words of enactment, which, in their direct and ordinary signification, are solely imperative, must be considered as importing a privilege or exemption. Besides which, all the provisions of the 5th section of the act of 1715, must be incorporated with the 5th section of that of 1788, in order to sustain the implication, that recording in Hawkins county shall make the one valid, or the failure to record in that place be fatal to the other. This view of the subject would lead to a protracted and subtle discussion, which the conclusions of this Court on other points, render now unnecessary to be pursued; and the subject is only noticed, to avoid the implication, that this Court has acquiesced in such a construction of the clause in question.

2. To give effect to the registration in Hawkins county, it is also obvious, that the 5th section of the act of 1788 must have continued in force until 1797, when the deed to Allison was recorded in that county. And this must either be inferred from the words of the section itself, or must be the effect of the subsequent reviving acts.

In their ordinary and direct signification, the words of the section in question certainly import perpetuity; and did it stand alone, such would be the effect given to it, whether in its operation it be considered imperative or remedial. But the context necessarily limits its duration. Both the title and preamble of the act, declare it to be to relieve persons, who would be sufferers from neglecting to record their muniments of title in due time. And it would be hard to conceive a reason why grants and mesne conveyances elsewhere, should be forced upon record within a limited time, and those for lands in this district of country left without limitation as to time. While there was no office assigned for their registration, a reason existed; but that reason is taken away, when we admit that a proper office was opened for that purpose.

The question, however, does not rest here; a recording law, unlimited in point of time, and unaffected by penalties, is an absurdity, since it destroys its own views, when it leaves the individual at large, to record or not, as he pleases. And if an...