Lovejoy v. Beeson

• Decision Date: 12 April 1899
• Parties: LOVEJOY v. BEESON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

25 So. 599

121 Ala. 605

LOVEJOY v. BEESON.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 12, 1899

Appeal from circuit court, Etowah county, J. A. Bilbro, Judge.

This was a statutory contest of the election of the probate judge of Etowah county, which was instituted on the petition of William B. Beeson, the contestant of the election of John H Lovejoy. From a judgment in favor of the petitioner, the respondent appeals, and assigns the rendition thereof as error. Reversed.

Dortch & Martin, for appellant.

Denson & Tanner, for appellee.

DOWDELL J.

The appeal in this case is taken from the circuit court of Etowah county on a statutory contest of election of probate judge the ground of contest being that the election held in Gadsden precinct, in said county, was invalid for the reason that it was held in a place other than the court house, as required by law. This is the sole ground, and there is no pretense that there was any fraud or unfairness in the holding of said election, or that any voter was prevented from voting, or failed to vote, by reason of the failure to hold the election in the court house. Since the institution of this contest and the appeal to this court, the legislature has, by an act approved December 14, 1898, cured the irregularity, as it is termed, and ratified and confirmed the election as held on the first Monday in August, 1898, in said Gadsden precinct. This act of the legislature is assailed by the appellee as being unconstitutional, in that it disturbs vested rights and also for that it is offensive to section 5, art. 8, of the constitution, which provides, "The general assembly shall pass laws, not inconsistent with this constitution, to regulate and govern elections in this state, and all such laws shall be uniform throughout the state." We think it a clear proposition that the act does not in any manner interfere with vested rights. The office of probate judge is a public office, created for governmental purposes, and not for the sole benefit of any single person. It cannot, in any sense or manner, ever be said to become the subject of property rights. "It has in it no element of property. It is not alienable or inheritable. It is a personal public trust, created for the benefit of the state, and not for the benefit of the individual who may happen to be its incumbent." Ex parte Lambert, 52 Ala. 82. For the same reasons it may be said it cannot be the subject of contract rights. Being, therefore, neither the subject of property nor contract rights, the suggestion that the act in question is an invasion of vested rights is unsupported by reason or argument. It is true, the act falls under the class of statutes denominated "retrospective laws." As to such, in the absence of any express constitutional inhibition, and where contract or property rights are not involved, and only public rights, as of public office, are involved, the power of the legislature is full and complete. In matters of public concern affecting governmental interests in carrying out the will of the people, legislative action becomes of the highest importance; and the courts should not by any narrow construction obstruct the attainment of the ends and purposes of the lawmaking power. There can be no doubt of the power of the legislature to enact laws which may modify or affect the results of prior transactions. It seems to be a well-settled rule, where contract or property rights are not involved, that what may be authorized by the legislature in the first instance may, after the thing done, be ratified by the legislature. Mr. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional...