Lovejoy v. City of Montgomery

• Decision Date: 13 February 1913
• Citation: 180 Ala. 473,61 So. 597
• Parties: LOVEJOY v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

61 So. 597

180 Ala. 473

LOVEJOY v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 13, 1913

Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; Gaston Gunter, Judge.

T.E Lovejoy was convicted of violating a municipal ordinance of the City of Montgomery, prohibiting the engaging in the business of banking without first obtaining a license from the City of Montgomery, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the question whether Acts 1911, p 54, § 6, is constitutional to this court for determination. Question answered in the affirmative.

See also, 61 So. 600.

Ball & Samford, Steiner, Crum & Weil, and Ray Rushton, all of Montgomery, for appellant.

R.B. Evins, of Greensboro, for State Banking Department. John V. Smith, of Montgomery, for appellee.

DE GRAFFENRIED, J.

The Court of Appeals, in this case, under the provisions of the statute (act approved April 18, 1911, Acts 1911, p. 449, § 1), submits to this court the question as to whether section 6 of the act "to create a banking department of the state of Alabama and through this department to regulate examine and supervise banks and banking, and to punish certain prohibited acts relating thereto," approved March 2, 1911 (Acts of Alabama 1911, pp. 50, 54), is void because of the provisions of section 45 of the Constitution of the state of Alabama.

To the consideration of this single question we address ourselves in the following opinion.

1. The above section 45 of our Constitution provides that "each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, etc." The title of the act now under consideration is above quoted, and the title shows that the "grand and comprehensive subject" of the act is, in fact, the regulation of the business of banking in this state. "To regulate banks and banking" is in fact to regulate the business of banks and banking. Subdivision 6 of the act above referred to is in the following language: "Each bank carrying on a banking business in the state of Alabama, shall, on the call of the superintendent, pay annually into the treasury of the state between the first day of January and the first day of April of each year, to be used as an aid in defraying the expenses of the banking department of the state in proportion to the capital, surplus and undivided profits of the bank as follows"--and goes on fixing a schedule of rates, after which it is stated that "no other assessment or license of any kind shall be levied against or collected from any bank or banking institution as such, except the ordinary taxes assessed against property in general, and except that, after January 1, 1912, municipalities may levy a license in proportion to the capital, surplus and undivided profits of the bank, of not more than the following amounts, to wit," and goes on to fix a schedule according to the capital, surplus, and undivided profits.

2. It is a solemn thing for a court to strike down a statute. A statute is, at least presumably, an expression by the people of their will through their representatives selected by them for the purpose of making their laws. "The Legislature has a power which is so transcendent that it cannot be confined within any bounds, either for causes or persons, except such as are written in the organic law." Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, 44 Am.Rep. 128. "He who assails a statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional assumes the burden of vindicating his position beyond a reasonable doubt." State ex rel. Meyer v. Greene, 154 Ala. 254, 46 So. 268; State ex rel. City of Mobile v. Board of Revenue & Road Commissioners of Mobile County, 61 So. 368. Presumptively, therefore, all statutes are constitutional, and the burden is on him who assails a statute as violative of a particular clause of the Constitution to show that it does, in fact, contravene the particular provision of the fundamental law.

In addition to this, our decisions show that this court has interpreted this section in a "very broad and liberal spirit, which is proper, not only because no act should be lightly declared unconstitutional, but also because the general purpose of the section should be kept in view, and it should not be so construed as to operate as an unreasonable restraint on important legislation. One who formulates the title to an act may make it as broad and comprehensive as he pleases, and the act will be upheld if the matters provided for are referable and cognate to the subject expressed, or if the matter provided for is not incongruous to the subject, or where all its provisions are allied to the subject expressed or, as is usually said, germane and cognate to it or complementary to the idea expressed in the title. The test is said to be whether we can find anything in the bill which can be referred to the subject."...