Lovell v. United Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2010
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 09-00146 ACK-LEK
• Citation: 728 F.Supp.2d 1096
• Parties: Maria LOVELL and Kimberly themselves and all similarly situated class members, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Jacquelyn Shook, and Bernadette Erwin, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

728 F.Supp.2d 1096

Maria LOVELL and Kimberly themselves and all similarly situated class members, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Jacquelyn Shook, and Bernadette Erwin, Defendants.

Civ. No. 09-00146 ACK-LEK.

United States District Court,

D. Hawai'i.

July 26, 2010.

Carl M. Varady, Thomas R. Grande, Grande Law Offices, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey S. Harris, Torkildson Katz Moore Hetherington & Harris, Honolulu, HI, John T. Murray, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Atlanta, GA, Kari Erickson Levine, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING RESOLUTION OF EARLIER-FILED FEDERAL CLASS ACTION

ALAN C. KAY, Senior District Judge.

BACKGROUND ¹

I. The Present Action

On March 18, 2009, Plaintiffs Maria Lovell and Kimberly Sullivan filed a class action complaint ("Complaint" or "Compl.") in the Circuit Court for the First Circuit of the State of Hawai'i against Defendants United Airlines, Inc. ("United"), Jacquelyn Shook, and Bernadette Erwin. The Complaint alleges that on April 1, 2003, United instituted a policy and practice requiring all part-time employees to work at least thirty hours/five days per week ("Policy"). Compl. ¶ 14.

Plaintiffs were part-time employees with disabilities who worked as reservation and sales representatives at United's reservation center in Honolulu, Hawai'i. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 12, 28. They indicated to United that they could not work thirty hours/five days per week. Id. ¶¶ 15, 30. Shook and Erwin were employed with United as supervisors and took part in the implementation of the Policy against Plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 26, 35. Unable to comply with the Policy, Lovell retired "involuntarily" on April 3, 2003, and Sullivan's employment was terminated on May 26, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 16, 32.

Plaintiffs claim that United's Policy violates Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 378-2 in Count I of the Complaint and that it offends the express public policy of the State of Hawai'i in Count II. Id. ¶¶ 47, 55. They assert that Shook and Erwin acted as United's agents and aided and abetted in the implementation of the Policy, in contravention of the statute and state public policy. Id. ¶¶ 26, 35. Plaintiffs seek to advance these claims on behalf of themselves, as well as all others similarly situated. Id. ¶ 38.²

On April 6, 2009, Defendants removed the case to this Court. Doc. No. 1. They asserted that the Court has jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), which is codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). On April 8, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand. Doc. No. 6. On August 18, 2009, 2009 WL 3172680, Magistrate Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi issued a findings and recommendation to deny Plaintiffs' motion to remand ("8/18/09 F & R"). Doc. No. 32. Judge Kobayashi concluded that Plaintiffs had fraudulently joined Shook and Erwin, as no actionable claim was stated against those Defendants. 8/18/09 F & R at 7-11. She therefore determined that Shook's and Erwin's citizenship should not be considered for purposes of determining diversity. Id. at 7-11. She found that the citizenship of the remaining opposing parties was diverse, as Plaintiffs are citizens of the State of Hawai'i and United is a citizen of the State of Illinois. Id. at 6-7. She further determined that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. at 6. Accordingly, Judge Kobayashi found that the Court has diversity jurisdiction and recommended that Plaintiffs' motion for a remand be denied. Id. at 12. Because she found the Court has diversity jurisdiction, Judge Kobayashi declined to address whether the Court has jurisdiction under CAFA. Id. at 11-12.

On October 2, 2009, 2009 WL 3172729, this Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation to Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Remand to State Court ("10/2/09 Order"). Doc. No. 38. On October 9, 2009, Plaintiffs appealed the 10/2/09 Order to the Ninth Circuit. Doc. No. 39. On February 10, 2010, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied Plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file an application for permission to appeal. Doc. No. 45.

On February 18, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Earlier-Filed Federal Class Action ("Motion").³ Doc. No. 46. On March 16, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition (doc. no. 52), and on March 22, 2010, Defendant filed its reply (doc. no. 56). In opposition to the motion to stay, Plaintiffs also filed a Supplemental Declaration on April 1, 2010 (doc. no. 57) and a Second Supplemental Declaration on April 8, 2010 (doc. no. 59). On April 5, 2010, Magistrate Judge Kobayashi held a hearing on Defendant's Motion. See Doc. No. 58.

On April 28, 2010, 2010 WL 1783565, Magistrate Judge Kobayashi granted Defendant's Motion ("4/28/10 Order"). Doc. No. 61. On May 13, 2010, Plaintiffs appealed the 4/28/10 Order to the district judge ("Plaintiffs' Appeal"). Doc. No. 62. On May 27, 2010, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Appeal from the Magistrate Judge's Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Earlier-Filed Federal Action ("Opposition").

II. The Seattle Action

On September 28, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed a complaint in the Western District of Washington against United Airlines, Inc. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Airlines, Inc., Case No. C06-01407 TSZ (W.D.Wash) (the "Seattle Action"). In that action, the EEOC alleges, inter alia, that United violated the Americans withDisabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ("ADA"), by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for the charging parties and similarly situated individuals who could not work a minimum of thirty hours and five days per week. Seattle Compl. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff Maria Lovell is one of the charging parties in the Seattle Action. Seattle Compl. ¶¶ 2, 7. In the Seattle Action, the EEOC requests, inter alia, injunctive relief to enjoin Defendant from failing to accommodate qualified employees' disabilities and appropriate relief to make whole the charging parties and similarly situated individuals by providing compensation for past pecuniary losses and appropriate back pay and benefits. Seattle Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ A, C, D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Local Rule 74.1, any party may appeal from a magistrate judge's order determining a non-dispositive pretrial matter or, if a reconsideration order has issued, the magistrate judge's reconsideration order on such a matter. The district judge shall consider the appeal and shall set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Local Rule 74.1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). The district judge may also reconsider sua sponte any matter determined by a magistrate judge. See Local Rule 74.1.

"The clearly erroneous standard applies to the magistrate judge's factual findings while the contrary to law standard applies to the magistrate judge's legal conclusions, which are reviewed de novo." Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D.Cal.2007). Under the "clearly erroneous" standard, the magistrate judge's ruling must be accepted unless, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 576-77 (9th Cir.1988) (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). The district judge may not simply substitute his or her judgment for that of the magistrate judge. See Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir.1991). " 'A decision is contrary to law if it applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to consider an element of the applicable standard.' " Na Pali Haweo Cmty. Ass'n v. Grande, 252 F.R.D. 672, 674 (D.Haw.2008).

Motions to stay are non-dispositive motions and thus are reviewed under the clearly erroneous and contrary to law standard of review. Sylvester v. Menu Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 07-00409 ACK-KSC, 2007 WL 4291024, *2 (D.Haw. Dec. 05, 2007) (citing Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 862, 864 (D.Or.2002)); see also McClelland v. Merck & Co., Civ. No. 06-00543 JMS-BMK, 2007 WL 178293, *2 (D.Haw. Jan. 19, 2007).

DISCUSSION

I. The First-to-File Rule

The "first-to-file" rule (also called the "first-filed" or the "prior pending action" rule) dictates that, in the absence of "exceptional circumstances," the later-filed action should be stayed, transferred, or dismissed with leave to plead the counterclaims in the prior pending action. See Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir.1982) ("There is a generally recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits a district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same parties and issues has already been filed in another district.");Church of Scientology of California v. United States Dept. of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 749-50 (9th Cir.1979) ("[T]he doctrine of federal comity [is] a discretionary doctrine which permits one district to decline judgment on an issue which is properly before another district.... The purpose of the comity principle is of paramount importance. The doctrine is designed to avoid placing an unnecessary burden on the federal judiciary, and to avoid the embarrassment of conflicting judgments.... '[T]he first to file rule normally serves the purpose of promoting efficiency well and should not be disregarded lightly.' "); EEOC v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir.1988) (first-to-file rule should not be departed from except in cases of "rare or extraordinary circumstances, inequitable conduct, bad faith, or forum shopping").

In applying the first-to-file rule, "a court looks at three threshold factors: (1)...