Loveridge v. United States
| Decision Date | 08 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-375L Consolidated,No. 16-1565L,No. 16-912L,No. 18-983L,16-912L,16-1565L,18-375L Consolidated,18-983L |
| Parties | PERRY LOVERIDGE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. ALBRIGHT, et al., Plaintiffs, and THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff, and THE UNITED STATES, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Motion for Summary Judgment; Rails-to-Trails; Oregon Law; Scope of Easements.
Thomas S. Stewart, Kansas City, MO, for Loveridge and Stimson Lumber plaintiffs. Elizabeth G. McCulley, Kansas City, MO, of counsel.
Meghan S. Largent, St. Louis MO, for Albright plaintiffs. Lindsay S.C. Brinton, St. Louis MO, of counsel.
James H. Hulme, Washington DC for Aeder plaintiffs. Laurel LaMontagne, Morgan Pankow, Washington DC, of counsel.
David W. Gehlert, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington DC, with whom was Prerak Shah, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
Now pending in these Trails Act1 cases are the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") filed by the plaintiffs in Albright v. United States, Aeder v. United States, Loveridge v. United States, Stimson Lumber v. United States, and the United States (the "government").2 At issue in the pending motions is the scope of 13 easements that plaintiffs' predecessors had provided to the Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad("POTB"). The Pacific Railway & Navigation Company ("Railroad") originally owned the relevant portions of the railway line, but the POTB eventually took ownership of the railroad line. See Loveridge v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 122, 129 (2018), recons. partially granted, 2019 WL 495578 (Feb. 8, 2019). A hiking trail, the Salmonberry Trail, is in development on the railway. Loveridge, 139 Fed. Cl. at 129.
Originally, 132 deeds were at issue in these cases. The parties agreed that 18 deeds granted fee simple interests to the POTB and 12 deeds conveyed easements. Of the remaining 102, the court ultimately determined that 89 conveyed a fee simple interest such that POTB owned the property and could transfer its rights to the trail operator of the Salmonberry Trail, without giving rise to a takings claim. Loveridge, 139 Fed. Cl. at 196; Loveridge, 2019 WL 495578 at *64. The court eventually determined that the remaining 13 source deeds conveyed easements, and that, therefore, plaintiffs claiming title under these 13 deeds had a potential claim for compensation based on the Notice of Interim Trail Use ("NITU") issued by the federal government pursuant to the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) to allow for creation of the Salmonberry Trail.
The pending motions for partial summary judgment concern 11 of the 13 deeds that the court determined conveyed easements and 1 deed which the parties previously agreed conveyed an easement but for which the parties now disagree on the scope of the easement. The plaintiffs argue that the terms of the 12 source deeds now at issue limit the easements to "railroad purposes," and therefore, the government interfered with their reversionary interests in the easements by issuing a NITU allowing for the SalmonberryTrail. Plaintiffs thus contend that the United States is liable for a taking of their reversionary interest and for imposing a new trail easement on their land.
The government argues that the 12 source deeds are broad enough to encompass the rail banking and trail use authorized by the NITU. Under the government's reading of the deeds, issuance of the NITU did not trigger the plaintiffs' reversionary interests and plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation for a taking of their reversionary interest or for use of the property as a trail.3
For the reasons discussed below, the parties' cross-motions are GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
As discussed in the court's prior decisions, these cases involve a nearly 80-mile railroad right of way in Oregon established in 1907 by the Railroad and later obtained by POTB. On July 26, 2016, the Surface Transportation Board ("STB"), an agency of the United States, issued a NITU authorizing railbanking and allowing a trail operator, the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to establish the Salmonberry Trail along the railway. A railbanking and trail use agreement between POTB and the SalmonberryTrail Intergovernmental Agency regarding the relevant railway corridor was entered on October 27, 2017.
In 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding 132 deeds. (Albright, ECF Nos. 20, 24; Loveridge, ECF Nos. 27, 34). The parties eventually agreed on the nature of 30 of these 132 deeds, and these initial cross-motions focused on, among other areas of dispute, whether the POTB's right of way under the remaining 102 deeds was granted in fee or was an easement, whether railbanking and trail use were within the scope of the easements, and the appropriate means of calculating just compensation. For case management purposes, the court first addressed whether the express source deeds conveyed fees or easements. The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth in its first opinion issued on August 13, 2018. Loveridge, 139 Fed. Cl. 122. The court concluded that 93 of the deeds conveyed a fee interest to the POTB.
The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration regarding 57 of the deeds. (Albright, ECF No. 58; Loveridge, ECF No. 55). The court issued its opinion on reconsideration on February 8, 2019, in which the court granted the plaintiffs' motion regarding 4 of the deeds. Thus, the court ultimately concluded that 89 deeds conveyed fees and 13 conveyed easements.4
Following the court's ruling on reconsideration, the parties renewed their motions for partial summary judgment regarding the issues remaining before the court. Albright, ECF Nos. 118 (Albright plaintiffs), 119 (Aeder plaintiffs), 120 (government); Loveridge, ECF Nos. 91 (Loveridge plaintiffs), 94 (government). The government in Stimson Lumber also filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding the scope of easements. Stimson Lumber, ECF No. 24.5
The 12 source deeds now before the court are: Carstens 72/530, Turner 72/528, Wright-Blodgett 15/493, Wright-Blodgett 105/393, Hannan 72/549, Byrom 5/310, Wheeler 16/2, Beals Land Co. 18/41, DuBois Lumber Co. 23/298, Mendenhall 72/550, Western Timber 77/108, and Brighton Mills 58/292.
The partial summary judgment motions regarding the scope of easements in Albright and Aeder concern the Carstens 72/530, Turner 72/528, Wright-Blodgett 15/493, Wright-Blodgett 105/393, and Hannan 72/549 source deeds and involve 12 plaintiffs. Albright, ECF No. 120.
The partial summary judgment motions regarding scope of easements in Loveridge concern the Byrom 5/310, Wright-Blodgett 15/493, Wright-Blodgett 105/393, Brighton Mills 58/292, Wheeler 16/2, Beals 18/41, DuBois Lumber Co. 23/298, Mendenhall72/550, and Carstens 72/530 source deeds and involve 19 plaintiffs. Loveridge, ECF No. 94.
The summary judgment motions regarding the scope of easements in Stimson Lumber concern the Western Timber Co. 77/108, Dubois Lumber Co. 12/298, and Wright-Blodgett 105/393 source deeds and involve 7 plaintiffs.6 Stimson Lumber, ECF No. 24.
Briefing on the motions, including supplemental briefing, was completed on April 3, 2020. The court held oral argument on April 23, 2020.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." RCFC 56(a). A genuine dispute is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor, and a material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
"Questions of law are particularly appropriate for summary judgment." Oenga v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 629, 634 (2010) (). "The interpretation of a deed is a question of law for the court." Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 529, 540 n.12 (2011) (citation omitted).
This court applies the law of the applicable state to determine the scope of source deeds. Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Here, plaintiffs' property is in Oregon, and therefore, Oregon property law is controlling. The Oregon Court of Appeals recently addressed the rules for interpreting the scope of an easement in Tressel v. Williams, 420 P.3d 31, 35 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).7 See also Eugene Water & Elec. Bd. v. Miller, 417 P.3d 456, 462 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (). This framework will be applied to determine the scope of the 12 easements at issue in this case.
Under Oregon law, "[t]he interpretation of an express easement is a question of law." Tressel, 420 P.3d at 35. In interpreting an express easement, the court's "fundamental task is to discern the nature and scope of the easement's purpose and to give effect to that purpose in a practical manner." Tressel, 420 P.3d at 35 (quotingWatson v. Banducci, 973 P.2d 395, 400 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)); Eugene Water, 417 P.3d at 461-62; see Or. Rev. Stat. § 42.240 ().
"When interpreting an express easement, the court must 'look first to the words of the easement, viewing them in the context of the entire document.'" Tressel, 420 P.3d at 35 (quoting Kell v. Oppenlander, 961 P.2d 861, 863 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)); see Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 964 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Or. 1998) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial