Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 395

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWARREN
Citation18 L.Ed.2d 1010,388 U.S. 1,87 S.Ct. 1817
PartiesRichard Perry LOVING et ux., Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Docket NumberNo. 395
Decision Date12 June 1967

388 U.S. 1
87 S.Ct. 1817
18 L.Ed.2d 1010
Richard Perry LOVING et ux., Appellants,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.

No. 395.
Argued April 10, 1967.
Decided June 12, 1967.

Philip J. Hirschkop, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, Bernard S. Cohen, Alexandria, Va., for appellants.

R. D. McIlwaine, III, Richmond, Va., for appellee.

William M. Marutani, Philadelphia, Pa., for Japanese American Citizens League, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.

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Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 For reasons which seem to us to reflect the central meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that these statutes cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.

In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court

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of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:

'Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.'

After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having been decided by October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state officials from enforcing their convictions. On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims to the highest state court.

The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the antimiscegenation statutes and, after

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modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions.2 The Lovings appealed this decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966, 385 U.S. 986, 87 S.Ct. 595, 17 L.Ed.2d 448.

The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20—58 of the Virginia Code:

'Leaving State to evade law.—If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20—59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.'

Section 20—59, which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:

'Punishment for marriage.—If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.'

Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20—57, which automatically voids all marriages between 'a white person and a colored person' without any judicial proceeding,3 and §§ 20—54 and 1—14 which,

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respectively, define 'white persons' and 'colored persons and Indians' for purposes of the statutory prohibitions.4 The Lovings have never disputed in the course of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a 'colored person' or that Mr. Loving is a 'white person' within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia statutes.

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Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications.5 Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period. 6 The present statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central features of this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of a 'white person' marrying other than another 'white person,'7 a prohibition against issuing marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that

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the applicants' statements as to their race are correct,8 certificates of 'racial composition' to be kept by both local and state registrars,9 and the carrying forward of earlier prohibitions against racial intermarriage.10

I.

In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its 1955 decision in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, as stating the reasons supporting the validity of these laws. In Naim, the state court concluded that the State's legitimate purposes were 'to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride,' obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. Id., at 90, 87 S.E.2d, at 756. The court also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.

While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888), the State does not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so in light of Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), and Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942). Instead, the State argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an interracial element

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as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second argument advanced by the State assumes the validity of its equal application theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on racial classifications, the question of constitutionality would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages. On this question, the State argues, the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial marriages.

Because we reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's contention...

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1602 practice notes
  • BJRL v. State of Utah, Civ. No. C86-324G.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • January 28, 1987
    ...(1973) (certain procedural impediments to women's decision to terminate her pregnancy violate Fourteenth Amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (statute preventing marriages between persons on basis of racial classification violates due p......
  • Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, Civil No. 14–1253 (PG).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Puerto Rico
    • October 21, 2014
    ...U.S. at 810, 93 S.Ct. 37. Decided five years after the Supreme Court struck down race-based restrictions on marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), Baker was a mandatory appeal brought under then–28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)'s procedure. The dismissal was a......
  • Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, Civ. A. No. C 71-251
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • February 22, 1973
    ...the development of low income public housing but preferred to prevent it must be said to have acted affirmatively. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 C. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION A brief examination of existing housing patterns and the racial characteristics of p......
  • Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sers., Nos. 10–2204
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • May 31, 2012
    ...802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (marriage). Consonantly, Congress has never purported to lay down a general code defining marriage or p......
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1578 cases
  • BJRL v. State of Utah, Civ. No. C86-324G.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • January 28, 1987
    ...(1973) (certain procedural impediments to women's decision to terminate her pregnancy violate Fourteenth Amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (statute preventing marriages between persons on basis of racial classification violates due p......
  • Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, Civil No. 14–1253 (PG).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Puerto Rico
    • October 21, 2014
    ...U.S. at 810, 93 S.Ct. 37. Decided five years after the Supreme Court struck down race-based restrictions on marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), Baker was a mandatory appeal brought under then–28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)'s procedure. The dismissal was a......
  • Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, Civ. A. No. C 71-251
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • February 22, 1973
    ...the development of low income public housing but preferred to prevent it must be said to have acted affirmatively. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 C. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION A brief examination of existing housing patterns and the racial characteristics of p......
  • Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sers., Nos. 10–2204
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • May 31, 2012
    ...802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (marriage). Consonantly, Congress has never purported to lay down a general code defining marriage or p......
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  • The Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 8, June 2022
    • June 1, 2022
    ...de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976). (267.) Craddick, 1 Am. Samoa 2d at 12 (quoting the trial court). (268.) Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (269.) Id. (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)). (270.) Id. (271.) See id. at 12-14. (272.) Id. at 14. (273.) See id. at 1......
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    ...supra note 44, at 570. (49.) Murray, supra note 40, at 2038. (50.) Id. at 2056-60. (51.) Id. at 2046. (52.) See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11 -12 (1967) (striking down the Racial Integrity Act of 1927 as an impermissible expression and endorsement of "White (53.) Buck v. Bell, 274 U......
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