Lowe v. Com., Record No. 0080-00-3.
Decision Date | 17 October 2000 |
Docket Number | Record No. 0080-00-3. |
Citation | 33 Va. App. 583,535 S.E.2d 689 |
Parties | Kerry Leecoya LOWE v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Joseph R. Winston, Richmond (Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender; Public Defender Commission, on brief), for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: COLEMAN, WILLIS and ELDER, JJ.
Kerry Leecoya Lowe (appellant) appeals from his bench trial convictions for malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51 and trespass in violation of Code § 18,2-119.1 On appeal, he contends (1) his first conviction was for unlawful rather than malicious wounding, as, per the trial court's sentencing order, and, therefore, that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory range; and (2) his conviction for trespass was invalid because it was not lesser included in the charged offense of statutory burglary while armed with a deadly weapon. In light of the trial court's nunc pro tunc order clarifying the nature of appellant's convictions, we affirm the sentence imposed for malicious wounding as within the statutory range, and we reverse and dismiss the trespass conviction because trespass under Code § 18.2-119 is not a lesser included offense of statutory burglary under Code § 18.2-91.
Appellant originally was charged with malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51 and statutory burglary while rarmed with a deadly weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-91.2 After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the circuit court (trial court) held as follows:
I am going to reduce the breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon to trespassing. I find the defendant guilty of trespassing. .. . And I think under the facts of this case, the malicious wounding has been proven, as well. So I find the defendant guilty of malicious wounding.
At the sentencing hearing on November 3, 1999, the trial court reiterated that it had found appellant guilty of malicious wounding and trespassing. It sentenced him as follows:
[H]aving found you guilty of the offense of trespass, I sentence you to twelve months in jail suspended on condition that you be on probation supervision for a period of four years, upon your release from confinement. On the charge of malicious wounding, I sentence you to ten years in prison. I will require you to serve five years. The balance of the five years will be suspended [on various conditions] ...
The trial court's original sentencing order, coupled with its nunc pro tunc order, confirmed appellant was convicted for (1) malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51 and sentenced to serve ten years with five years suspended; and (2) trespass in violation of Code § 18.2-419 and sentenced to twelve months, all suspended on condition of four years supervised probation.
Appellant registered no objection in the trial court to his conviction for trespass under an indictment for statutory burglary while armed with a deadly weapon.
Appellant contends on appeal that he was convicted for unlawful wounding and that the sentence imposed in the original sentencing order exceeds the sentence permitted for unlawful wounding. However, based on the trial court's nunc pro tune order, see discussion supra note 1, the sentencing order now reflects that appellant was convicted for malicious wounding, and the sentence imposed in that order is within the range authorized by statute. See Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-51. Therefore, assuming without deciding that Rule 5A:18 does not bar our consideration of this issue, the error of which appellant complained has ceased to exist, and we affirm the sentence imposed for appellant's malicious wounding conviction.
Fontaine v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 156, 165, 487 S.E.2d 241, 244 (1997) (citations omitted). Acquiescence requires something more than a mere failure to object. See id. ( ). We proceed, therefore, to examine the merits of this assignment of error.
We take guidance from our decision in Crump, in which we held that trespass under Code § 18.2-121 is not a lesser included offense of statutory burglary under Code § 18.2-91. See 13 Va.App. at 290-91, 411 S.E.2d at 240-41.
Id. at 291, 411 S.E.2d at 241 (citation omitted).4
Further, Code § 18.2-119 contains at least one element which Code § 18.2-91 does not, either directly or by reference to any other Code section. Code § 18.2-119 requires proof that the accused "goes upon or remains upon the lands, buildings or premises of another... after having been forbidden to do so" by any of several different means, including orally, by posting or other writing, or by order of court. (Emphasis added). For this reason also, Code § 18.2-119 is not a lesser included offense of Code § 18.2-91, and the Commonwealth, by charging a violation of Code § 18.2-91, did not also charge a violation of Code § 18.2-119.
For these reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed for appellant's malicious wounding conviction but reverse and dismiss his trespass conviction based on our holding that trespass under Code § 18.2-119 is not a lesser included offense of statutory burglary under Dode § 18.2-91, the offense with which appellant was charged.
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