Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd.

• Decision Date: 12 October 1987
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 77914,77926
• Citation: 428 Mich. 439,410 N.W.2d 706
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: , 56 USLW 2108, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,505 Ethel LOWE, by her Conservator, Frank F. Gazley, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESTATE MOTORS LIMITED, a Michigan Corporation, Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants, and Newark Auto Products, a division of Newark Auto Top Company, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and MERCEDES BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. RAYBURNELL NEIGHBORS and Newark Auto Products, a division of Newark Auto Top Company, a foreign corporation, Third-Party Defendants. Ethel LOWE, by her Conservator, Frank F. Gazley, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESTATE MOTORS LIMITED, a Michigan Corporation, Defendant, and Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendant- Appellant and Newark Auto Products, a division of Newark Auto Top Company, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and MERCEDES BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. RAYBURNELL NEIGHBORS and Newark Auto Products, a division of Newark Auto Top Company, a foreign corporation, Third-Party Defendants.

Page 706

410 N.W.2d 706

428 Mich. 439, 56 USLW 2108,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,505

Ethel LOWE, by her Conservator, Frank F. Gazley, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESTATE MOTORS LIMITED, a Michigan Corporation, Mercedes-Benz

of North America, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants,

and

Newark Auto Products, a division of Newark Auto Top Company,

a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellant,

and

MERCEDES BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. RAYBURNELL NEIGHBORS and Newark Auto Products, a division of

Newark Auto Top Company, a foreign corporation,

Third-Party Defendants.

Ethel LOWE, by her Conservator, Frank F. Gazley, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESTATE MOTORS LIMITED, a Michigan Corporation, Defendant, and Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., a foreign corporation,

Defendant- Appellant

and

Newark Auto Products, a division of Newark Auto Top Company,

a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee,

and

MERCEDES BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. RAYBURNELL NEIGHBORS and Newark Auto Products, a division of

Newark Auto Top Company, a foreign corporation,

Third-Party Defendants.

Docket Nos. 77914, 77926.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 15, 1987.

Decided Aug. 4, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1987.

Gerald Tuchow Law Offices, P.C., by Stephen J. Trahey, Flat Rock, for Ethel Lowe.

Fitzgerald, Young, Peters, Dakmak & Bruno by Neill T. Peters, Stuart J. Snider, Robert L. Sharbaugh, Detroit, Allan G. Freund, Jeffrey C. Poll, Montvale, N.J., for Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.

Kitch, Saurbier, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C., Mark D. Willmarth, Susan Healy Zitterman, Anthony G. Arnone, Detroit, for Newark Auto Products.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, Detroit, for amici curiae, the Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

RILEY, Chief Justice.

In this automobile products liability action, we review the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court's interlocutory denial of plaintiff's motion to strike an affirmative defense pled by defendants, and a motion in limine to preclude the introduction of any evidence concerning plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt. The issue we consider is limited to the admissibility of evidence concerning the existence of and failure to use seat belts for the purpose of (1) attempting to establish the affirmative defense of comparative negligence, and (2) defending the design of the vehicle in cases in which the "crashworthiness" doctrine is asserted as a theory of liability. We hold that the introduction of evidence concerning

the existence of and failure to use seat belts is not to be treated differently than evidence concerning the existence of and failure to use safety devices generally, and, [428 Mich. 445] therefore, that such evidence may be admissible for either purpose provided a proper foundation is established. For purposes of comparative negligence, applicable in all products liability cases by legislative act, ¹ evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt may raise a factual issue to be submitted for jury consideration. In crashworthiness cases evidence of restraint systems is relevant to whether the vehicle as a whole was defective in design.

FACTS AND PROCEDURES

On April 18, 1979, plaintiff was a passenger in the rear seat of a 1979 Mercedes 300D owned and driven by her son, third-party defendant Rayburnell Neighbors. ² While traveling southbound on I 75 near Lima, Ohio, Mr. Neighbors lost control of the vehicle when approaching a construction zone. The vehicle sideswiped a construction truck parked in the right lane, traversed the southbound lanes, and struck a concrete dividing barrier. At some point after the initial impact, the right rear door opened, and plaintiff was ejected from the vehicle, sustaining multiple injuries.

Plaintiff commenced this action asserting negligent design and breach of implied warranty theories of liability. ³ She alleged that the cause of the accident was attributable to a defectively designed floor mat which had wedged under the brake pedal, contributing to the driver's loss of control of the automobile, and further that her injuries were also caused by a defectively designed door and door-locking mechanism which rendered the automobile uncrashworthy. ⁴ Defendants include Mercedes-Benz of North America (MBNA), Estate Motors Limited, a local distributor from which the automobile was purchased, and Newark Auto Products, manufacturer of the floor mat.

Defendant MBNA asserted an affirmative defense of comparative negligence on the basis of the plaintiff's failure to use the available three-point seat restraint provided for rear seat passengers. ⁵ Plaintiff moved to strike that affirmative defense and to exclude at trial the admission of any evidence concerning that safety device, and her failure to use it. In support of her motions, plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, her failure to wear a seat belt did not constitute negligence because plaintiff "owed no duty" to defendant to wear a seat belt, that her failure to wear a seat belt did not contribute to the cause of the accident, and that it did not violate her duty to avoid consequences or minimize damages. Plaintiff relied upon the authority of Selmo v. Baratono, 28 Mich.App. 217, 184 N.W.2d 367 (1970), and Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich.App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969).

The trial court denied both motions on August 1, 1983. The court reasoned that where there is evidence of availability of seat belts and of a causal relationship between the injuries sustained and the failure to use seat belts, it would be proper to submit the issue of comparative negligence to the jury. ⁶ Furthermore, the court ruled that MBNA could introduce seat belt evidence in its defense of the crashworthiness design of the automobile as a whole. Finally, while unclear, the court seems to have ruled that plaintiff could be precluded from any recovery against MBNA if her failure to use the available seat restraint could be shown to be the proximate cause of her enhanced injuries, rather than the product's lack of fitness. ⁷

Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals which reversed in a two-to-one decision. Lowe v. Estate Motors, 147 Mich.App. 523, 382 N.W.2d 811 (1985). The Court of Appeals, relying upon Romankewiz, supra, and the extension of the Romankewiz rationale in Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, 135 Mich.App. 350, 354 N.W.2d 336 (1984), held that the failure to use a seat restraint was not, as a matter of law, a deviation from the general duty to exercise ordinary care, and concluded, therefore, that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was not admissible as evidence of comparative negligence. The majority did not address the admissibility of such evidence with respect to the issue of crashworthiness design, but, nonetheless, reversed the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motions in toto. The dissenting judge was of the opinion that the comparative negligence defense was primarily a factual matter, the resolution of which, consistent with general negligence principles, is appropriately within the province of the jury.

We granted the defendants' applications for leave to appeal. 425 Mich. 872 (1986).

I

This interlocutory appeal involves relatively limited questions concerning the permissible admissibility of seat belt evidence within the context of the substantive issues implicated in this automobile products liability action. We are required to decide the admissibility of such evidence for two entirely independent purposes: first, to attempt to establish the partial defense of comparative negligence; second, to defend the crashworthiness design of the vehicle. All relevant evidence is generally admissible, MRE 402. Our decision in this case, therefore, requires some discussion of the law of comparative negligence and products liability to the extent that it necessarily relates to the viability of the defense plaintiff sought to strike and the evidence plaintiff sought to exclude.

Thus, the resolution of the issues presented depends upon (1) whether failure to use a seat belt may properly be held, as a matter of law, not to constitute a deviation from the general duty to exercise reasonable care for one's own safety, under any circumstances and in all cases; and (2) whether seat-restraint evidence is irrelevant to an automobile's safety design. Unless those issues may be resolved in the affirmative, the evidence in question may not properly be excluded and withheld from the jury's consideration, consistent with the applicable common-law principles to which we are bound.

On the basis of our obligation to analyze and decide the issues presented by applying the common-law principles of negligence developed in our prior decisions in a consistent manner, we are compelled to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Contrary to the assertions in Justice Archer's dissent, and unlike Justice Archer, we do not, however, presume to decide whether failure to use a seat belt is or is not a deviation from the general and universal duty of an automobile passenger to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. We hold, rather, that because reasonable minds might differ, that question may not be withheld from jury decision.

With regard to the second issue, which is presented entirely independent of the first, we conclude that, because an automobile's seat belt restraint system is directly relevant to that vehicle's safety design, such evidence may not be excluded with respect to the limited issue of the vehicle's crashworthiness design. We delimitate, however, the permissible scope of such evidence for this latter purpose.

II

The doctrinal origin of the judicially created rule disallowing evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt in this jurisdiction may be traced to the Court of Appeals decision in Romankewi...