Lowell v. Lyft, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-cv-6251 (NSR),17-cv-6251 (NSR)
• Citation: 352 F.Supp.3d 248
• Parties: Harriet LOWELL and Westchester Disabled on the Move, Inc., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. LYFT, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

352 F.Supp.3d 248

Harriet LOWELL and Westchester Disabled on the Move, Inc., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,

v.LYFT, INC., Defendant.

No. 17-cv-6251 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed November 29, 2018

Andrew Charles White, Chantal Khalil, Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Sara Lynn Shudofsky, Harry Kinsler Fidler, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District JudgePlaintiffs Harriet Lowell and Westchester Disabled on the Move, Inc. ("WDOMI"), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, bring this putative class action against Defendant Lyft, Inc. in their amended complaint filed on December 6, 2017 ("Amended Complaint," ECF No. 20). Plaintiffs assert claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12184 ; New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 – 97; and New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), N.Y. City Admin. Code §§ 8-101 – 31.¹ Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) ("Defendant's Motion," ECF No. 31). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following facts are derived from the Amended Complaint and the documents appended thereto, and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.

Plaintiff Lowell resides in White Plains, New York and typically uses a motorized scooter to travel. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12 – 13.) To assist her in travel throughout Westchester County and in her bi-monthly trips to New York City, Plaintiff Lowell would like to use Defendant's transportation services. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 102.) Plaintiff WDOMI is a Yonkers, New York nonprofit, run largely by individuals with disabilities, and operates as an independent living center for individuals with disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 18 – 19.) WDOMI's mission includes the "empower[ing] people with disabilities to control their own lives, advoca[ting] for civil rights and a society free of barriers to people with disabilities" and "ensuring that people with mobility disabilities are able to effectively use the transportation services they require." (Id. ¶¶ 20 – 21.) Members of WDOMI "have been and will be injured" as a result of Defendant's actions, described below. (Id. ¶ 22.)

By downloading Defendant's ride-hailing application, a customer can remotely hail a nearby vehicle, select her destination, and pay through a payment method saved in the application. (Id. ¶ 33.) Defendant operates both in White Plains and in Westchester County. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 29.) Unlike New York's Boro Taxi services, or "for hire" livery services, Defendant is not subject to the Taxi and Limousine Commission's ("TLC") rules and regulations of accessibility for disabled individuals. (Id. ¶ 35.) While Defendant requires that its New York City drivers register with the TLC, Defendant is not subject to the TLC's 2014 agreement to make fifty percent of all taxis operating in New York City wheelchair accessible by 2020. (Id. ¶ 36.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant "pervasively and systematically" excludes people with mobility disabilities from its convenient transportation services. (Id. ¶ 38.) To support this allegation, Plaintiffs note that Defendant does not make wheelchair accessible vehicles ("WAVs") available in Westchester County; individuals who attempt to hail wheelchair accessible rides in that county receive a text message with alternative transportation services. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 48.) In areas where WAVs are available, users with mobility disabilities must toggle to the "Access Mode" function in Defendant's smartphone application to be matched with a WAV, and those individuals often experience long wait times. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 49.) While there are transportation alternatives to the service offered by Defendant, none are replacements for Defendant's services. New York City's subway is largely impossible for people with disabilities to use and its bus system is limited and "largely inefficient." (Id. ¶¶ 41 – 42.) Taxicabs do not offer the same convenience provided by Defendant's service, which includes the ability to pay without using cash or presenting a credit card to the driver.² (Id. ¶¶ 87 – 88.) Trips around Westchester County are difficult for Plaintiff Lowell because there is limited local paratransit. (Id. ¶ 105.)

Plaintiff Lowell learned of Defendant's ongoing discrimination from "friends and acquaintances who have mobility disabilities and have witnessed [Defendant]'s failure to provide equivalent, non-discriminatory service." (Id. ¶ 100.) A friend from White Plains told Plaintiff he tried to order an accessible Lyft, was informed that none were available, and received a text message from Defendant telling him to obtain an alternate method of transit. (Id. ) Because Defendant does not provide WAVs, Plaintiff Lowell and members of the putative class have been deterred from downloading Defendant's application or trying to access Defendant's services as any attempt would be futile even though access to Defendant's services would improve their lives. (Id. ¶¶ 101, 116.) If Plaintiff Lowell had equal access to Defendant's services, she would be able to travel about Westchester County more often. (Id. ¶ 105.) Additionally, Plaintiff Lowell would be able to visit New York City on a more frequent basis. (Id. ¶ 104.) Currently, she goes to and from New York City approximately twice a month and, because she cannot use Defendant's services, she must rely on her husband to transport her in their WAV. (Id. ¶ 102.)

Due to Defendant's failure to provide equal, accessible transportation, Plaintiffs cannot benefit from Defendant's services. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's actions are in violation of the ADA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief under the ADA and compensatory damages in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Specifically, Plaintiffs request that the Court require Defendant to develop and implement a remedial plan to ensure full and equal access to its services.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint due to lack of standing, the existence of an arbitration agreement in Defendant's terms of Service, and Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

When a court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case, it should dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC , 663 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011). "A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. , 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) ). In assessing whether there is subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, Conyers v. Rossides , 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009), but "the court may resolve [any] disputed jurisdictional fact issues by referring to evidence outside of the pleadings." Zappia Middle E. Const. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi , 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000). Lack of standing may be grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). See Buonasera v. Honest Co. , 208 F.Supp.3d 555, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A complaint must supply "factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level’ " to move beyond a motion to dismiss. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. , 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. However, the court is " ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ " or to credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

Further, a court is generally confined to the facts alleged in the complaint for the purposes of considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6). Cortec Indus. v. Sum Holding L.P. , 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991). A court may, however, consider documents attached to the complaint, statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, public records, and documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about, and relied upon, in bringing the suit. See Kleinman v. Elan Corp. , 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

The Court must first address whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring their Amended Complaint before determining whether Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for relief. See Buonasera v. Honest Co. , 208 F.Supp.3d 555, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that courts should consider jurisdictional issues such as standing first in a motion to dismiss analysis). Article III requires federal courts to adjudicate actual cases and...