Lower v. Segal

• Decision Date: 04 June 1896
• Citation: 34 A. 945,59 N.J.L. 66
• Parties: LOWER v. SEGAL.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

34 A. 945

59 N.J.L. 66

LOWER

v. SEGAL.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 4, 1896.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The plaintiff brings her action as administratrix of John W. Lower, deceased, alleging by the first count that on July 5, 1894, the deceased was a bricklayer employed by defendant, Adolph Segal, in the construction of a building in Philadelphia, and that, the defendant did not provide a secure scaffold, and the same fell while deceased was standing on it, and he sustained injuries from which he died in a few minutes.

The declaration further alleges the issuing of letters of administration by the surrogate of Camden county to the plaintiff, dated July 11, 1894, and that deceased left, him surviving, Lillie D. Lower, his widow, and a daughter.

The declaration also sets out two statutes of the state of Pennsylvania, to wit, section 19 of Act No. 358, approved April 15, 1851 (Pamph. Laws of that year, p. 674), which reads as follows:

"That whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned."

And an act of the said state of Pennsylvania, entitled "An act relating to damages for injuries producing death" (Act No. 323):

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in general assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, that the persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased and no other relative; and the sum recovered shall go to them in the proportion they would take his other personal estate in case of intestacy and without liability to creditors.

"Sec. 2. That the declaration shall state who are the parties entitled in such action; the action shall be brought within one year after the death, and not thereafter."

Demurrer to declaration sustained.

Argued February term, 1896, before the CHIEF JUSTICE and DIXON, MAGIE, and GARRISON, JJ.

Cortlandt Parker, Jr., for plaintiff.

Howard Carrow, for defendant.

GARRISON, J. (after stating the facts). The cause of action in this case arose in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff is an administratrix appointed by the courts of New Jersey. The statute of this state providing for the recovery of damages in cases where the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, negligence, or default (Revision, p. 294), confers no right of action in such case. It creates a rule unknown to the common law, and is therefore inoperative for the redress of wrongs done in other jurisdictions. For a like reason the statute of Pennsylvania, propria vigore, confers no right to sue in this state for a cause of action created by that jurisdiction, and occurring there. The statute of Pennsylvania is, however, not repugnant to our domestic policy, as is evinced by our having modified the common law upon like principles in the interest of our own citizens. It is therefore the duty of our courts to recognize and enforce the rule of the sister commonwealth....