Lowery v. State Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1899
• Citation: 54 N.E. 442,153 Ind. 100
• Parties: LOWERY v. STATE LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

153 Ind. 100

54 N.E. 442

LOWERY

v.STATE LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 7, 1899.

Appeal from superior court, Marion county; James M. Leathers, Judge.

Action by Robert W. Lowery against the State Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Hefrom & Carlon, for appellant. Charles F. Coffin, for appellee.

HADLEY, J.

Appellant is prosecuting this action to secure a perpetual injunction against appellee's issuance of certain contracts, and the payment of money on those already issued. Appellant alleges in his complaint that appellee is an insurance company organized and doing business, under an act of the general assembly approved February 10, 1899, on the mutual principle; that he is a policy holder and member in appellee company, and that said company has issued, and is continuing to issue, and will, if not restrained, continue to issue, certain contracts, designated “Vice Counselor's Contracts,” which, for reasons specifically alleged, are charged to be in violation of its charter, and in derogation of the rights of the great body of its members. No demurrer was filed to the complaint. Appellee answers the complaint in a single paragraph, in which it is averred that it has issued, and intends to continue the issuance of, said contracts, to the full limit of one thousand; and facts are set forth in detail by which appellee avers and seeks to show that the contracts complained of are contracts for services to be rendered the company, and in compliance with the law and its charter and by-laws, and the most profitable and economical method of conducting the company's business the directors have been able to devise. Appellant's demurrer to the answer for insufficiency of facts was overruled. The attorney general has intervened and filed a brief. The auditor of state has also filed a brief.

At the very threshold of the investigation we are met with the question, has the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this suit? A negative answer ends the inquiry. Appellant's complaint discloses that he is a policy holder and member of appellee, and that appellee is organized and doing business under the act of February 10, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 30), the seventeenth section of which act provides as follows: “No order, judgment or decree, providing for an accounting or enjoining, restraining or interfering with the prosecution of the business of any insurance corporation, association or society, organized or doing business under the provisions of this act, or appointing a temporary or permanent receiver thereof, shall be made or granted otherwise than upon the application of the attorney general on his own motion, or after his approval of a request in writing therefor by the auditor of state, except in an action by a judgment creditor or in proceedings supplementary to execution.” The question of jurisdiction was not raised in the court below, and it is insisted that it cannot be raised for the first time in this court, and must be deemed as waived by the appellee. This insistence must be accepted as true, if the court below had authority to exercise its jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit; otherwise, denied. A court is a creature of the law, instituted for the determination of questions of law and fact under defined restrictions and limitations. The territorial limits of its power, the subjectsand classes over which its power may be exercised, the terms upon which it may put its power into action, are as firmly and clearly established as the right to adjudicate when authorized to do so; and, though a court of general jurisdiction, it must proceed in the manner and upon the conditions imposed by the law, and an assumption of jurisdiction over a subject or a person, upon terms denied by the law, is as unwarranted and futile as the assumption of jurisdiction without its territorial limits. A departure from the limits and terms of jurisdiction is usurpation of power that imparts no validity whatever to its judgments and decrees. Works, Jur. p. 28, § 10, and authorities cited. Hence, we have the generally accepted rule that, when a court proceeds without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, its judgment is wholly void; and, adopting as our own the words of the court in Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 498, “it is equally unimportant how technically correct and precisely certain in point of form its record may appear, its judgment is void to every intent, and for every purpose, and must be so declared by every court in which it is presented.” A void judgment implies no judgment at all, and its nonexistence may be declared upon collateral attack, upon suggestion of an amicus curiæ, or by the court at any time upon its own motion. The rule is stated in 12 Enc. Pl. & Prac. p. 190, as follows: “When it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, it will take notice of the defect, whether objection is made or not, and will dismiss or stay proceedings ex mero motu; and it is its duty to do so, without determining any other matter involved in the litigation.” And the duty is not affected by the acquiescence or agreement of the parties to submit to the jurisdiction, since jurisdiction that cannot be acquired without consent cannot be bestowed with it. McCoy v. Able, 131 Ind. 417, 30 N. E. 528, and 31 N. E. 453;Huber v. Beck, 6 Ind. App. 47, 32 N. E. 1025;Davis v. Davis, 36 Ind. 160;Doctor v. Hartman, 74 Ind. 221;Insurance Co. v. Erlandson, 84 Iowa, 193, 50 N. W. 881;Chipman v. City of Waterbury, 59 Conn. 496, 22 Atl. 289; Phillips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 187; Stough v. Railway Co., 71 Iowa, 641, 33 N. W. 149;Evans v. Iles, 7 Ohio St. 233-235;Sanders v. Pierce, 68 Vt. 468, 35 Atl. 377;McKinnon v. Hall, 10 Colo. App. 291, 50 Pac. 1052.

But the point is made that the question we have here does not relate to the subject-matter of the suit, but to the want of legal capacity in the plaintiff to bring the action. We think the question reaches further than the capacity of the plaintiff to sue. The mandate of the statute is “that no order, judgment or decree, enjoining or interfering with the business of an insurance company organized under the act, shall be made otherwise than upon the application of the attorney general.” Here we have very explicit language that a court shall have no power to enjoin or interfere with the business of an insurance company, except upon the condition stated, namely, the application of the attorney general. That the assembly had the power to fix terms to such suits cannot be doubted, and that...