Lowrance v. Coughlin, 88 Civ. 3343 (LBS).
| Decision Date | 08 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 88 Civ. 3343 (LBS).,88 Civ. 3343 (LBS). |
| Citation | 862 F. Supp. 1090 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
| Parties | Jory LOWRANCE, Plaintiff, v. Thomas COUGHLIN, III, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services; Charles Scully, Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility ("C.F."); Eugene LeFevre, former Superintendent of Clinton C.F.; Harold J. Smith, former Superintendent of Attica C.F.; Robert J. Henderson, former Superintendent of Auburn C.F.; John Wilmot, former Superintendent of Elmira C.F.; Everett W. Jones, former Superintendent of Great Meadow C.F.; James E. Sullivan, former Superintendent of Sing Sing C.F.; Robert Hoke, former Superintendent of Eastern C.F.; Robert H. Kulman, Superintendent of Sullivan C.F.; Louis F. Mann, Superintendent of Shawangunk C.F.; John Doe I-X; Dr. Adrian Kanaar, Consulting Physiatrist, Green Haven C.F.; Dr. Ira N. Weiner, Facilities Health Services Director, Auburn C.F.; Dr. Benjamin Dyett, Medical Director, Sing Sing C.F.; Dr. M.J. Shah, Medical Director, Elmira C.F.; Mr. Newkirk, Physician Assistant, Elmira C.F.; Catherine Vacca, Nurse Administrator, Shawangunk C.F.; Ms. Kurta, Nurse, Shawangunk C.F., all in their official and individual capacities; and the New York State Department of Correctional Services, Defendants. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York City, for plaintiff, Eric R. Dinallo, David M. Siegal, of counsel.
Atty. Gen. of the State of N.Y., New York City, for defendants; Richard Mathieu, of counsel.
This is an action brought by plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner who was incarcerated in New York State prisons from 1977 to 1994. Plaintiff is also known as Ya'Qub Shamsid-Deen, but is referred to in all New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") records by the name under which he was incarcerated, Jory Lowrance. Claiming violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).
In general, plaintiff claims that the named defendants, individually and jointly, acted under color of state law to deprive him of constitutionally protected rights guaranteed by the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, including the right of free exercise of religion, the right to fee speech, the right to petition the government for redress and have equal access to the courts, and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, plaintiff avers that defendants transferred plaintiff from prison to prison and carried out other punitive and wrongful actions — such as placement in segregated confinement, a cell search, and deprivation of adequate medical care — in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of the rights described above. As a separate violation, plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of adequate medical treatment for an injured knee, whether as a retaliatory act or not, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. These actions, plaintiff contends, were planned, ordered, and carried out with the actual or constructive knowledge of Commissioner Thomas Coughlin as well as those named defendants who were Superintendents, medical personnel, or "John Does" (Deputy Superintendents of Security).
Plaintiff requests that the Court declare that the transfers ordered by defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, and that the Court award plaintiff damages accordingly. Additionally, plaintiff requests an order stating that all written records of plaintiff's prior transfers either be expunged or be amended to indicate that those transfers were not implemented as a result of misconduct on the part of plaintiff; requiring that those new records be sent to appropriate prison and parole board personnel; and requiring that plaintiff be granted a new parole hearing based on records containing accurate information.
Defendants contest the allegations, both on legal and factual grounds. They deny any personal involvement in the allegedly retaliatory acts and claim that the transfers and confinement in segregation were predicated on valid, nonretaliatory motives. Characterizing plaintiff as an "agitator", defendants argue that some of plaintiff's transfers were due to his disciplinary record, while others were based on neutral administrative reasons relating to reassignment within the overall prison population. Additionally, defendants argue that adequate medical care was provided, and that, in any event, plaintiff's knee injury was not serious.
We held an eight day trial, involving substantial documentary evidence. In support of his case, plaintiff's counsel called three witnesses including plaintiff, plaintiff's wife, and a doctor testifying as an expert. The defense called four witnesses, all employees of the New York State Department of Corrections. The evidence adduced at trial illustrated, inter alia, that plaintiff was transferred seventeen times during a seven year period.1 Many of those transfers sent him back to prisons where he had been previously held. He was sent to Attica four separate times and was incarcerated at Auburn and Great Meadow on three occasions during this period. On nine occasions, plaintiff was transferred after having been at an institution for less than 90 days. One year, between April 1984 and April 1985, plaintiff was shuttled from prison to prison seven times.
This decision constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. As set forth below, we find that nine out of the seventeen transfers, as well as four out of six placements in segregative confinement were retaliatory. Moreover, the defendants subjected plaintiff to a cell search in retaliation for plaintiff's legal and religious activities and deprived him of adequate medical care.
We do not decide whether an apparent policy to frequently transfer a prisoner perceived to be a "troublemaker" in order to lessen his influence on the prisoner population in any particular institution in and of itself constitutes a constitutional violation, even though one may well disagree whether this is sound as a policy matter. Our focus in this case is on whether constitutional violation occurs when the motivation behind frequent transfers is to retaliate against the exercise of protected rights.
As a separate violation, independent of the retaliation, we find that plaintiff was deprived of adequate medical care, including physician-prescribed surgery for nearly two years as well as post-operative physical therapy for at least four months, causing plaintiff painful buckling and grinding in an injured knee. Further, we conclude that plaintiff is entitled to 1) an order setting forth which misbehavior reports should be expunged and ordering them expunged, and 2) unless mooted by plaintiff's release on parole subsequent to this trial, a new parole hearing based on records containing accurate information.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for compensatory or other retroactive relief against states and state officials in their official capacity, absent a waiver or consent, neither of which is present here. However, because the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply to actions for prospective, equitable, or injunctive relief against state officials charged with violating federal law, such suits are not prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). A lawsuit brought under the doctrine established in Ex parte Young is not deemed to be an action against the state. Instead, such an action proceeds against the state officer who, by acting contrary to federal law, acts without authority and therefore, under these circumstances, does not act in a representative capacity.2 While creating "the `well-recognized irony' that an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment," clearly the Ex parte Young doctrine rests on the need "to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105, 104 S.Ct. 900, 910, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
At trial in the instant case, plaintiff abandoned his claim for injunctive relief with regard to future retaliatory transfers. However, plaintiff still seeks the following relief: 1) monetary damages; 2) an order requiring defendants to amend inaccurate transfer codes in plaintiff's record and expunge these records of misbehavior reports that have been previously ordered expunged; and 3) an order that plaintiff be granted a new parole hearing that encompasses those amendments or expungements. At trial and in their posttrial brief, defendants moved to dismiss that portion of the action which seeks relief against defendants in their official capacity. Tr. at 467. Defendants' motion is granted only insofar as we dismiss that portion of the action as against the state agency and as to any claim for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacity. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1362-63, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). However, plaintiff may still pursue the claims regarding his records and new parole hearing against defendants in their official capacity, as well as the claim for monetary damages against defendants in their personal capacity.3
Since plaintiff seeks prospective relief with regard to his records and a new parole hearing, there is no Eleventh Amendment problem. In this sense, this case is distinguishable from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 573,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pollard v. The Geo Group Inc, 07-16112.
...Cir.1990); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir.1986); Gardner v. Wilson, 959 F.Supp. 1224, 1228 (C.D.Cal.1997); Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y.1994). There is no need for the district court to craft new standards or remedies to address Pollard's claims. Accordingly, th......
-
Romer v. Morgenthau
...the information is likely to be relied on in a constitutionally significant way." (Plaintiff's Memo at 10, citing Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.Supp. 1090, 1119 (S.D.N.Y.1994)). However, Romer's claim here is for damages from having been deprived of due process rather than for expungement of ......
-
Johnson v. Rodriguez
...v. Levi, 622 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.1980); James; McCrery v. Mark, 823 F.Supp. 288 (E.D.Penn.1993); Goldhardt. Contrast Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.Supp. 1090, 1099 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (stating that the Southern District of New York has recognized a constitutional right to accurate information in a p......
-
Pollard v. the Geo Group Inc.
...Cir.1990); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir.1986);Gardner v. Wilson, 959 F.Supp. 1224, 1228 (C.D.Cal.1997); Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y.1994). There is no need for the district court to craft new standards or remedies to address Pollard's claims. Accordingly, the......
-
WELL, AT LEAST THEY TRIED: DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE AS PRISON OFFICIALS' LIABILITY SCAPEGOAT FOR OBJECTIVELY INHUMANE PRISON CONDITIONS DURING COVID-19.
...necessity rendered the prison official's denial of the procedure deliberately indifferent). (98) See, e.g., Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F. Supp. 1090, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding refusal to give physician-prescribed operation constitutes deliberate indifference); Meadows v. Huttonsville Cor......