Lozada v. Weilminster

• Decision Date: 23 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 11–CV–2049 MKB.,11–CV–2049 MKB.
• Citation: 92 F.Supp.3d 76
• Parties: Melissa LOZADA, Plaintiff, v. Charles WEILMINSTER—Trooper 1287, Christopher Nolan—Trooper 5219, Wantagh Fire District, Courtney Baranowski, Jeff Lindgren, and Amanda Hutchison, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

92 F.Supp.3d 76

Melissa LOZADA, Plaintiff

v.Charles WEILMINSTER—Trooper 1287, Christopher Nolan—Trooper 5219, Wantagh Fire District, Courtney Baranowski, Jeff Lindgren, and Amanda Hutchison, Defendants.

No. 11–CV–2049 MKB.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 23, 2015.

Diana Lozada Ruiz, Law Office of Diana Lozada Ruiz, Esq., Mineola, NY, for Plaintiff.

Anne C. Leahey, Devitt Spellman Barrett, Smithtown, NY, Dorothy O. Nese, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Mineola, NY, Richard Alan Gash, Erika L. Omundson, Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris Levda & Meyers, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Melissa Lozada commenced the above-captioned action on April 27, 2011, against New York State Troopers Charles Weilminster and Christopher Nolan, (collectively, “State Defendants”), the Wantagh Fire District, and forty-one volunteer firefighters from the Wantagh Fire District, including Courtney Baranowski,¹ Jeff Lindgren and Amanda Hutchison,² (collectively, “Fire District Defendants”).³ Plaintiff's Complaint alleges violations of her civil rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.⁴

Specifically, Plaintiff brings claims for (1) violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech; (2) violations of her Fourth Amendment rights caused by (i) use of excessive force, (ii) false arrest, and (iii) malicious prosecution; (3) violations of her procedural due process rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) conspiracy; and (5) municipal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also brings claims for negligence and respondeat superior liability pursuant to New York state law. State Defendants and Fire District Defendants separately move for summary judgment.⁵ For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants State Defendants' motion in part and denies it in part, and grants Fire District Defendants' motion in its entirety.

I. Background

a. State Defendants

At the time of the events which are the basis for this action, State Defendants were New York State Troopers employed by the New York State Police, and were acting both under color of state law and under color of their authority as New York State Troopers. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 3; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 3.⁶ ) Neither of the State Defendants was the supervisor of the other, and neither had trained the other. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 12.)

b. Fire District Defendants

Baranowski and Hutchison were certified emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) who volunteered for the Wantagh Fire District. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 15, 82; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 15, 82.) At the time of the events at issue in this action, Baranowski was the senior medical personnel in the Fire District, and she had taken additional training courses to become “critical care certified.” (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 84; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 84.) Lindgren was a volunteer fire chief at the time of the incident that forms the basis for this action. (Tr. of Dep. of Jeff Lindgren, dated Feb. 11, 2013, annexed to FD Def. Mot. as Ex. J (“Lindgren Dep.”) 7:21–8:14.) As Chief in charge of the scene, Lindgren was in charge of scene safety and ensuring that the members of the Wantagh Fire District remained safe, and ensuring that the “aided”—Plaintiff, in this case—received proper medical attention. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 44–45; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶¶ 44–45.)

All EMTs at the Wantagh Fire District have regular meetings at which training topics are discussed, and may have received refresher training about how to properly complete certain forms, including a New York state-mandated Pre-hospital Care Report (“PCR”), and specifically the refusal of medical attention portion on the form (“RMA”). (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 86; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 86.) According to Defendants, generally, if a patient refuses to sign the RMA portion of the PCR, the EMTs do their best to try to get them to sign, but will get a supervisor or police officer to witness the refusal if the patient both insists and is of sound mind. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 29; Tr. of Dep. of Courtney Baranowski dated Jan. 4, 2013, annexed to FD Def. Mot. as Ex. H (“Baranowski Dep.”) 28:2–29:5; Tr. of Dep. of Amanda Hutchison dated Feb. 15, 2013, annexed to FD Def. Mot. as Ex. I (“Hutchison Dep.”) 35:4–36:17; Tr. of Dep. of Jason Jackowitz dated Feb. 18, 2013, annexed to FD Def. Mot. as Ex. K (“Jackowitz Dep.”) 22:2–24:20, 31:11–32:6; Lindgren Dep. 59:2–10.) Plaintiff disputes that this is the typical procedure in which fire district members are trained, arguing that they are trained to “compel a patient, by any means necessary, to sign the RMA for[m] in order to shield themselves from liability,” and will involve law enforcement to arrest the patient if she refuses to sign the form. (Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 29.)

c. April 28, 2009 incident

On April 28, 2009, at approximately 12:38 AM, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 8; FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 1; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff, who was alone in her vehicle and had been falling asleep while driving, ran her car off of the roadway and into a guardrail when she failed to navigate an exit ramp at Exit 28 on the westbound Southern State Parkway. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 8; see also FD Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2–3.) The impact caused the Plaintiff's airbag to deploy, and Plaintiff raised her arms and hands in front of her face to protect herself from injuries resulting from the airbag. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 9; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 9; FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 4.) The inflating airbag left a burn mark on the inside of Plaintiff's left elbow. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 9; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 9; FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 4.) According to Plaintiff, the airbag did not touch her face or hands, and Plaintiff was otherwise uninjured. (Pl. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 16; Tr. of Pl. Dep., dated Oct. 10, 2012, annexed to FD Def. Mot. as Ex. F. (“Pl. Dep.”) 52:3–8.) Plaintiff's vehicle eventually came to rest with a driver's side tire touching the guardrail; Plaintiff was initially unable to open the driver's side door. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff called 911 from her vehicle to report the accident, and exited her car while on the telephone to ascertain her location and the extent of the damage to her car. (State Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 10–11; Pl. State 56.1 ¶¶ 10–11; FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 6.) At least one other person also called 911 to report the accident. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 10; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff did not know whether the police or the ambulance arrived at the scene of the accident first, but ultimately the police, ambulance, and tow truck were all present. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 8.) Two fire chief vehicles and two engine trucks also arrived at the scene of the accident. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 10; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 10.) In total, about eight fire department members were present. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 48; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 48.) According to Plaintiff, except for one bystander who briefly asked if she was injured and left before Plaintiff telephoned 911, there were no bystanders or other members of the public around during the events which followed the emergency response. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 4; FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 7 (noting one bystander); Pl. Dep. 73:3–16 (same).)

i. State Defendants' response

In response to a notification that the accident had occurred, State Defendants arrived on the scene. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 12; see also FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 12.) When State Defendants arrived on the scene, they spoke with Plaintiff in order to determine what had happened and whether she was injured. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 13; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 13; see also FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 13.) Both then returned to their car to fill out an accident report. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 13; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 13; FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 13.)

ii. Fire District Defendants' response

Members of the Wantagh Fire District and a tow truck operator also responded to the scene following the 911 calls from Plaintiff and another individual. (State Def. 56.1 ¶ 14; Pl. State 56.1 ¶ 14.) Volunteer Fire Chiefs Lindgren and Jackowitz both received the call and reported directly to the scene in their “chief vehicles.” (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 14; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 14.) Volunteer EMTs and firefighters, including Baranowski and Hutchison, received the alarm call on their pagers and proceeded to the scene of the accident in an ambulance. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 15–18; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶¶ 15–18.) When the ambulance parked at the scene, Baranowski and Hutchison took the basic gear and basic life support (“BLS”) equipment from the ambulance and approached Plaintiff's vehicle. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 18–19; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶¶ 18–19.) They saw Plaintiff sitting in the front passenger seat of her vehicle with the door open and the dome light on. (FD Def. 56.1 ¶ 19; Pl. FD 56.1 ¶ 19.)

According to Fire District Defendants, at this point, Baranowski and Hutchison tried to perform a preliminary patient assessment by asking Plaintiff her name, birthdate, address, social security number and past medical history, but Plaintiff initially refused to provide any information, indicating at first that she did not have or did not know the answer to the questions. (Baranowski Dep. 187:3–188:22.) To Baranowski, Plaintiff at first appeared confused, though calm. (Baranowski Dep. 78:4–20.) Hutchison perceived that Plaintiff was not speaking normally, but noted that she was not slurring her words either. (Hutchison Dep. 139:4–13.) Soon after, around the time when Hutchison asked Plaintiff for her social security number, Plaintiff started to raise her voice and became belligerent, questioning why they needed this information. (Baranowski Dep. 76:19–79:16; Hutchison Dep. 82:4–82:22, 136:9–145:7.) The EMTs noticed a sweet odor, possibility indicative of alcohol or of a diabetic crisis, on Plaintiff's breath, and perceived that Plaintiff's pupils were dilated.⁷ (Baranowski Dep. 109:9–24, 231:14–232:6; Hutchison Dep. 145:13–17; see also State Def. 56.1...