Lozeau v. Lake County, Mont., No. CV-95-082-M-RFC.

Decision Date04 April 2000
Docket NumberNo. CV-95-082-M-RFC.
Citation98 F.Supp.2d 1157
PartiesHarry LOZEAU, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LAKE COUNTY, MONTANA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Montana
98 F.Supp.2d 1157
Harry LOZEAU, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
LAKE COUNTY, MONTANA, et al., Defendants.
No. CV-95-082-M-RFC.
United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division.
April 4, 2000.

Page 1158

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Michael G. Alterowitz, Alterowitz Law Office, Missoula, MT, Stephen L. Pevar, American Civil Liberties Union, Denver, CO, Mark S. Connell, Connell Law Office, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiffs.

Robert J. Long, Kim Christopher, Office of the Lake County Attorney, Polson, Robert E. Sheridan, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, MT, for Defendants.

ORDER

CEBULL, United States Magistrate Judge.


Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' counsel's petition for fees. Having reviewed the parties briefs and the applicable law, the Court accepts the fee petition as timely and orders payment as detailed below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the above-captioned matter in 1995, alleging various illegal conditions at the Lake County Detention Center (LCDC). The parties resolved the suit by way of a 1996, Consent Decree. A short time later, Plaintiffs brought a contempt action for enforcement of the decree, filed in 1997. The parties settled the action upon Defendants' contemporaneous acknowledgment that they had failed to comply with a number of the decree's requirements. Defendants further agreed to ameliorate those failures.

In mid-1998, Plaintiffs' counsel received renewed complaints and ultimately filed two more contempt actions in 1999. Plaintiffs' contempt actions sought rectification of allegedly inadequate: (1) staffing; (2) medical record keeping; (3) lighting; (4) plumbing; and (5) fire safety. In his deposition, Sheriff William Barron testified that:

1. Before he assumed the role of Sheriff, he knew of problems with the dispensation of medicine at the jail, and that the staff was chronically overworked and demoralized;

2. A significant portion of his campaign platform involved bringing LCDC up to standards;

3. Medical treatment and records at LCDC were substandard but subsequently remedied with changes to medical record keeping and the hiring of a new medical provider;

4. Before January, 1999, LCDC was understaffed and guards were forced to cook meals, which required time away from other necessary duties, including the dispensation of medicine, making head counts and performing suicide watch;

5. In an attempt to remedy problems, and despite budgetary cuts, the jail budget "went way up" in 1999 from $310,000 to $538,000 and he hired additional LCDC personnel, including a night cook;

6. The county commissioners were concerned about jail conditions and wanted to "get the ACLU off their back" because they didn't "want to be tied up in lawsuits";

7. He hired Ed Todd as the full-time jail administrator, in contrast to a previous position in which the undersheriff attempted to handle administration while performing other duties;

8. He and the county commissioners relied upon the investigations and reports of experts brought to LCDC as a result of the contempt actions in effecting changes in staffing, plumbing, lighting, fire safety and overall funding;

9. He discovered after taking office in January, 1999, the problems with lighting, plumbing and fire safety; and

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10. ACLU complaints at the time he took office in January, 1999, had merit.

Jail Administrator Ed Todd corroborated Sheriff Barron's testimony. Mr. Todd noted that improvements had been ongoing since January, 1999, and that LCDC had since initiated a program of daily maintenance and sanitation checks, which allow LCDC personnel to frequently inspect the lighting, plumbing and cell conditions. Mr. Todd also testified that the collective goal has not been to only satisfy the terms of the Consent Decree, but to go about "the best way of doing" things. He also indicated that information concerning LCDC conditions uncovered during and after the filing of the contempt motions provided him with "ammunition" in his discussions with the county commissioners. The Court commends both Sheriff Barron and Mr. Todd for their candid testimony and efforts at reform.

Upon improvements in these areas, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the contempt actions. The parties also dismissed the underlying Consent Decree; in its stead, they executed a Private Settlement Agreement (settlement agreement). Pursuant to the fee-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), Plaintiffs now seek attorneys fees associated with the prosecution of the 1999 contempt actions.

Defendants, however, level objections to fees in any amount. First, Defendants argue Plaintiffs are barred under principles of contract law. The parties' settlement agreement provided that Plaintiffs' counsel would make a fee request within thirty (30) days of "the below date"; the settlement agreement was ultimately dated December 13, 1999. Notwithstanding this language, the parties subsequently submitted a proposed order, drafted by defense counsel, which read "Plaintiffs shall have 30 days in which to file a request for attorney fees and costs." The Court signed that Order on December 16, 2000. Plaintiffs filed the fee request twenty-nine (29) days later, within the time contemplated by this Court's Order but outside the time frame set forth by the settlement agreement. Defendants contend that under the terms of the parties' contract, Plaintiffs failed to timely file.

Defendants further assert that fees are inappropriate because Plaintiffs have submitted no proof of "actual violations" as contemplated by the terms of the PLRA, and the Court has issued no rulings as to the existence of those violations. Consequently, Defendants urge that the fee petition be summarily dismissed and that Plaintiffs' counsel take nothing from the prosecution of the aforementioned contempt actions.

DISCUSSION

Defendants' arguments require a three-step inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the fee petition can be considered timely filed. If the petition is timely filed, the analysis turns next to whether direct proof of an "actual violation" is a condition precedent to an award of attorneys fees. If Plaintiffs' petition survives this argument, the Court must then weigh the petition itself. This final step requires not only consideration of Defendants' objections but an independent evaluation and determination by the Court of reasonable fees and costs.

I. The Fee Petition Was Timely Filed.

A. Mutual Mistake

This inquiry is governed in part by contract law. Mont.Code Ann. § 28-2-1611 (1999) provides:

[w]hen, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties or a mistake of one party while the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done

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without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.

"For centuries courts of equity have exercised the right to reform contracts on the ground of mistake and to make them represent truly the intentions of the parties." Ayers v. Buswell, 73 Mont. 518, 524, 238 P. 591, 592 (1925) (citing 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 8 (4th ed.)). Every mistake involves negligence to some extent. Bitter Root Creamery Co. v. Muntzer, 90 Mont. 77, 89, 300 P. 251, 254 (1931) (citing Ayers, 238 P. at 594). If the negligence is excusable under the circumstances, and no rights of innocent third parties are involved, reformation is proper. Id. (citing Parchen v. Chessman, 49 Mont. 326, 142 P. 631 (1914); First State Bank of Philipsburg v. Mussigbrod, 83 Mont. 68, 271 P. 695 (1928)). The correct standard for reformation is by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Story v. Bozeman, 259 Mont. 207, 225, 856 P.2d 202, 213 (1993). Upon such showing, equity will intervene. See Humble v. St. John, 72 Mont. 519, 234 P. 475 (1925).

In Bitter Root, plaintiff argued that defendant should not be permitted reformation; the evidence showed that defendant negligently failed to read a note before signing it. 300 P. at 254. Rejecting this proposition, the Court reasoned, "[e]very mistake involves the idea of negligence to a greater or lesser degree. And, if the negligence consists of failing to read the document involved, and is excusable under the circumstances, and no rights of innocent third parties are involved, reformation may be had." Id. (internal citations omitted).

Similarly, in Mussigbrod, plaintiff's counsel argued that the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, coupled with defendant's negligent failure to read a mortgage, barred reformation. 271 P. at 701. Again, the Court rejected this contention in favor of the proposition that "where the mistake was mutual and the circumstances such as to excuse the negligence of the complaining party, relief, by way of cancellation or reformation, may be granted." Id. (citing Brundy v. Canby, 50 Mont. 454, 148 P. 315 (1915); Cox v. Hall, 54 Mont. 154, 168 P. 519 (1917); Kummrow v. Bank of Fergus County, 57 Mont. 390, 188 P. 649 (1920)).

Although this case cannot be so neatly classified, the parties' inability to pick a date and consistently apply it demonstrates that the requisite "meeting of the minds" did not occur as to the date upon which Plaintiffs would file their fee petition. In fact, the actions of both parties betray argument to the contrary. It is obvious that Plaintiffs believed the settlement agreement set a thirty day deadline tied to the date of the Court's Order; Plaintiffs communicated their desire to base the thirty day deadline upon the undersigned's signature before execution of the settlement agreement. It is equally obvious that Defendants interpreted the settlement agreement in precisely the same manner as Plaintiffs, submitting a proposed order that merely required the petition be filed within thirty days...

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