Luangkhot v. State, Nos. S12G0895
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
| Writing for the Court | HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice. |
| Citation | 736 S.E.2d 397,292 Ga. 423 |
| Docket Number | S12G0912.,Nos. S12G0895,S12G0905 |
| Decision Date | 07 January 2013 |
| Parties | LUANGKHOT v. The STATE. Phommachanh v. The State. Saleumsy v. The State. |
292 Ga. 423
736 S.E.2d 397
LUANGKHOT
v.
The STATE.
Phommachanh
v.
The State.
Saleumsy
v.
The State.
Nos. S12G0895
S12G0905
S12G0912.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan. 7, 2013.
Reconsideration Denied Feb. 18, 2013.
Bruce S. Harvey, Jennifer S. Hanson, K. Julie Hojnacki, for appellant (case no. S12G0895).
David D. Marshall, for appellant (case no. S12G0905).
Garland, Samuel & Loeb, John A. Garland, Donald F. Samuel, for appellant (case no. S12G0912).
Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., Rodney K. Miles, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.
Appellants Khamone Luangkhot, Isaac Saleumsy, and Santisouk Phommachanh, along with approximately 34 others, were indicted in Gwinnett County in connection with an alleged ecstacy trafficking ring. The indictments resulted from a multi-jurisdictional investigation led by the Atlanta High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) task force and conducted in collaboration with state prosecutors. As part of the investigation, the Gwinnett County District Attorney obtained a series of investigative warrants from Gwinnett County Superior Court authorizing the interception of telephone conversations from 18 different telephone lines. Prior to trial, Appellants moved to suppress the evidence investigators had obtained through these wiretaps, contending that the Gwinnett court lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrants. The motions were denied, and, on interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Luangkhot v. State, 313 Ga.App. 599, 722 S.E.2d 193 (2012). We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed the Georgia wiretap statute, OCGA § 16–11–64, as authorizing superior courts to issue wiretap warrants that are effective outside their judicial circuits. Having reviewed the applicable law, we conclude that superior courts do not currently possess the authority to issue wiretap warrants for interceptions conducted outside the boundaries of their respective judicial circuits. Accordingly, the Gwinnett County Superior Court did not have the authority to issue the warrants in this case, and we thus must reverse.
The material facts are not in dispute. The indictments alleged that the narcotics distribution ring in which Appellants were involved was operating out of Gwinnett County. The HIDTA "wire room," the listening post from which the communications were intercepted, was located in Fulton County.
As to the telephones that were monitored, the State did not attempt to prove that any of them were ever used in
Gwinnett County.1 Thus, in sum, while the charged crimes were alleged to have been committed in Gwinnett County, the State did not show that any of the interceptions made pursuant to the wiretap warrants took place in Gwinnett County.
Based on these facts, the issue presented is whether the Gwinnett County Superior Court possessed the authority, solely by virtue of its having jurisdiction over the crimes, to authorize interceptions conducted outside its judicial circuit boundaries. Because the issue presented is a question of law involving undisputed facts, our standard of review is de novo. Wilder v. State, 290 Ga. 13(2), 717 S.E.2d 457 (2011).
1. In the construction of statutes,
the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. In so doing, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words. Where the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.... In addition, when we are interpreting a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly had full knowledge of the existing state of the law and enacted the statute with reference to it. We construe statutes in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts.
Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693, 695–696(2), 681 S.E.2d 116 (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). We examine the text of the Georgia wiretap statute with these canons of statutory construction in mind.
The Georgia wiretap statute provides:
Upon written application, under oath, of the prosecuting attorney having jurisdiction over prosecution of the crime under investigation, or the Attorney General, made before a judge of superior court, said court may issue an investigation warrant permitting the use of [a wiretapping] device ... for the surveillance of such person or place to the
extent the same is consistent with and subject to the terms, conditions, and procedures provided for by Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated, as amended.
OCGA § 16–11–64(c) (2011). The statute thus confers the power to issue wiretap warrants generally on superior court judges. Although the statute contains no express restrictions on which superior courts are empowered to issue wiretap warrants in a particular case, it does incorporate by reference the "terms, conditions, and procedures provided for by" the federal wiretap statute. Id.
This provision incorporating the federal law was added to the statute as part of Georgia's Support of the War on Terrorism Act of 2002. See Ga. L.2002, p. 1432, § 1. In the 2002 amendments to the wiretap statute, the legislature deleted eight subparagraphs of procedural standards and replaced them with a single paragraph referring to the federal law. Compare Ga. L.2002, p. 1432, § 3 (enacting current OCGA §§ 16–11–64(b) & (c) ), with Ga. L.2000, p. 491, § 2 (former OCGA § 16–11–64(b) ). It thus appears that these amendments were intended to streamline Georgia's rules in this area and harmonize them with federal standards. Though we have long recognized that state-authorized wiretaps must comply with both federal and state statutory requirements, see Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751(2), 353 S.E.2d 19 (1987) ; Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312(1), 314 S.E.2d 421 (1984), our current statute's express deference to the federal statute underscores this point. Accordingly, we look to the federal statute and case law for guidance regarding the jurisdictional question presented in this case.
2. The federal law governing the use of wiretaps...
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...that language is used.") (punctuation and citation omitted).77 Deal, 294 Ga. at 172-73 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337;accord Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423, 424 (1), 736 S.E.2d 397 (2013).78 In the Interest of L.T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 592, 754 S.E.2d 380 (2014) (punctuation omitted); accord Ga. Tr......
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Sw. Emergency Physicians, P.C. v. Quinney, A18A0871.
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Dimauro v. State, A17A0180
...v. Hendry, 292 Ga. 1, 3 (1), 734 S.E.2d 46 (2012) (same).75 Deal, 294 Ga. at 172-73 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 ; see also Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423, 424 (1), 736 S.E.2d 397 (2013) (same).76 Luangkhot, 292 Ga. at 424 (1), 736 S.E.2d 397 (punctuation omitted); see also Deal, 294 Ga. at 173......
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