Lubbock County v. Trammel's Bail Bonds, No. 01-0406.

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Writing for the Court: Rodriguez
• Citation: 80 S.W.3d 580
• Decision Date: 20 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-0406.
• Parties: LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS, Petitioner, v. TRAMMEL'S LUBBOCK BAIL BONDS, Gomez Bail Bonds, and Allstate Bail Bonds, Respondents.

Page 580

80 S.W.3d 580 LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS, Petitioner,
v.
TRAMMEL'S LUBBOCK BAIL BONDS, Gomez Bail Bonds, and Allstate Bail Bonds, Respondents. No. 01-0406. Supreme Court of Texas. Argued February 20, 2002. Decided June 20, 2002. Rehearing Denied August 22, 2002.

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Charlotte Bingham, Lubbock, for Petitioner.

Broadus A. Spivey, Francis Y. Pan, Spivey & Ainsworth, Austin, for Respondent.

Justice RODRIGUEZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issues in this case are: (1) whether Lubbock County's bail-bond service charge is unlawful because it is not authorized by any statute; (2) whether the presentment statute, Texas Local Government Code section 89.004(a), is jurisdictional; and (3) whether the presentment statute delays accrual of a claim for the reimbursement of funds against a county until the claim has been presented to and is rejected by the county commissioners court. We conclude that fact questions remain on the extent to which the bail-bond service charge was used for providing copies to the bail-bond companies and was thus authorized by statute. We also reaffirm that the presentment statute is not jurisdictional. Further, we overrule City of Taylor v. Hodges, 143 Tex. 441, 186 S.W.2d 61 (1945), and Jones County v. Moore, 4 S.W.2d 289 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1928, writ ref d), and hold that the presentment statute does not delay the accrual of a cause of action against a county for reimbursement of unauthorized charges. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment in part, reverse in part, and render judgment as explained below.

I.

In 1985, Lubbock County began charging bail-bond providers a ten-dollar bond service charge per criminal defendant. In exchange, the County gave the bail-bond providers copies of bonds and print-outs of records to help them track their bonds. Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds, Gomez Bail Bonds, and Allstate Bail Bonds paid the service charges on each bond until June 1992, when the County discontinued the service charge in the wake of this Court's decision in Camacho v. Samoa lego, 831 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1992). In Cantorho, we held that El Paso County's system of preconviction bail-bond fees lacked statutory authority. Id. at 815.

A.

On June 17, 1993, Trammel's served a presentment letter on the County under section 89.004(a) of the Local Government Code. That section provides: "A person may not sue on a claim against a county unless the person has presented the claim to the commissioners court and the commissioners court has neglected or refused to pay all or part of the claim."¹ Trammel's

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letter demanded a refund of all previously paid fees, threatening to sue if the County failed to refund the money within thirty days. The County did not respond, and Trammel's filed suit on August 11, 1993. Gomez and Allstate intervened as plaintiffs on March 11, 1994, but did not serve the County with a presentment letter until August 19, 1997.

On December 28, 1998, the County moved for partial summary judgment against Trammel's, alleging that limitations, or alternatively laches, barred recovery on any claim accruing more than two years before Trammel's presented its claim to the County. The County also moved for summary judgment on Gomez's and Allstate's claims, alleging that their failure to present their claims to the County before intervening in the suit prevented the court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. In addition, the County argued that limitations barred any possible recovery by Gomez and Allstate because presentment was made five years after the bond service charge was discontinued. On June 17, 1999, Trammel's, Gomez, and Allstate filed a joint motion for summary judgment against the County, arguing that they were entitled, as a matter of law, to a refund of all bond service charges they had paid because the service charge was not authorized by statute and was therefore unlawful under this Court's holding in Camacho.

The trial court concluded that limitations barred Trammel's claims for service charges paid before June 17, 1991, two years before Trammel's presented its claim to the county commissioners court. The trial court therefore granted the County's motion against Trammel's and rendered a partial summary judgment for the County on Trammel's claims accruing before June 17, 1991. However, the trial court granted in part Trammel's motion for summary judgment, awarding Trammel's the bond service charges it had paid from June 17, 1991, to June 17, 1993. The trial court also granted the County's motion for summary judgment against Gomez and Allstate, ruling that limitations barred all their claims, and rendered judgment that they take nothing. The trial court denied Gomez's and Allstate's motion. Only the bail-bond companies appealed to the court of appeals.

B.

With regard to the bail-bond companies' claim that the bond service charge was not authorized by any statute and was therefore unlawful under this Court's holding in Camacho, the court of appeals concluded that fact issues precluded summary judgment. 60 S.W.3d 145, 152. The court of appeals held that material questions of fact remained regarding the extent to which the service charge was for the copies and print-outs provided to the bail-bond companies and was thus authorized by Texas Government Code section 552.261. Id.

Following our opinion in Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.1998), the court of appeals further held that section 89.004(a) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Id. at 151. Finally, the court of appeals held that limitations does not begin to run in suits against counties until presentment to and rejection by the commissioners court. Id. at 149. Therefore, the court of appeals concluded, limitations did not begin to run on Trammel's claim until July 17, 1993 (the date specified in Trammel's demand letter), when the claim was impliedly rejected by the Connty.

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Id. Similarly, because Gomez and Allstate had not yet presented their claims to the County when they joined the suit, their claims had not yet accrued and limitations did not bar them. Id. at 150. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the extent, if any, to which the bond service charge was authorized by section 552.261 of the Government Code.

C.

The bail-bond companies filed a petition for review,...