Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 76-1618

• Decision Date: 30 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 76-1618,76-1618
• Citation: 547 F.2d 310
• Parties: , 7 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,106 The LUBRIZOL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Russell E. TRAIN, Administrator, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 310

547 F.2d 310

9 ERC 1478, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,106

The LUBRIZOL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Russell E. TRAIN, Administrator, and the United States

Environmental Protection Agency, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 76-1618.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued June 22, 1976.

Decided Nov. 30, 1976.

Frederick M. Coleman, U.S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, Earl Salo, Alfred T. Ghiorzi, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Peter R. Taft, Edmund B. Clark, E.P.A., Paul Loizeaux, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellants.

Geoffrey K. Barnes, James Van Carson, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and CELEBREZZE and PECK, Circuit Judges.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appeals from the granting of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of regulations promulgated under § 211(a) of the Clean Air Act ¹ requiring the registration of motor vehicle fuels and fuel additives. Registration of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 40 Fed.Reg. 52009 (1975). The regulations define "fuel" to include motor vehicle engine oil, a substance added to an engine as a lubricant rather than as a source of propulsion. 40 Fed.Reg. at 52013. This action was brought by the Lubrizol Corporation, a major manufacturer of petroleum products, which contends that the Administrator of the EPA exceeded his authority under § 211(a) by requiring the registration of motor vehicle engine oil and its additives.

On January 5, 1976, Lubrizol filed a complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction in the Northern District of Ohio. Previously, on December 8, 1975, Lubrizol had filed a petition to review the same regulations in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit asserting as a basis for jurisdiction § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act. ² Thus, identical actions were filed in the District of Columbia Circuit and the Northern District of Ohio. ³ The EPA moved to dismiss the district court action arguing that § 307(b)(1) vests exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the District of Columbia Circuit Court to review regulations promulgated under § 211. Lubrizol argues that § 307(b)(1) jurisdiction is limited to "controls or prohibitions" issued under § 211(c) and that registration requirements under § 211(a) are reviewable in district courts. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss holding that it had jurisdiction to review the regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Because we conclude that Congress intended that jurisdiction to review registration requirements promulgated under § 211(a) lies exclusively in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, we reverse.

Section 211 gives the Administrator the authority to regulate fuels and fuel additives. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c. The regulatory process prescribed by § 211 is bifurcated. The first step in regulating a fuel or fuel additive is registration under § 211(a):

(T)he Administrator may by regulation designate any fuel or fuel additive and, after such date or dates as may be prescribed by him, no manufacturer or processor of any such fuel or additive may sell, offer for sale, or introduce into commerce such fuel or additive unless the Administrator has registered such fuel or additive in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.

42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(a). The function of the registration process is information gathering. Section 211(b) gives the Administrator the authority to require manufacturers of fuels and fuel additives to supply the EPA with detailed information about their products. ⁴ 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(b)(1), (2). The information gathered during the registration phase becomes the primary basis for the Administrator's decision whether to invoke his authority to "control or prohibit" the introduction of a fuel or fuel additive into commerce under § 211(c):

The Administrator may, from time to time on the basis of information obtained under subsection (b) of this section or other information available to him, by regulation, control or prohibit the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine (A) if any emission products of such fuel or fuel additive will endanger the public health or welfare, or (B) if emission products of such fuel or fuel additive will impair to a significant degree the performance of any emission control device or system which is in general use, or which the Administrator finds has been developed to a point where in a reasonable time it would be in general use were such regulation to be promulgated.

42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1).

Although the District Court acknowledged that registration is an integral step in § 211's regulatory process and conceded that "frustration of the information gathering function could emasculate a seemingly workable control program," the Court concluded that Congress had intended to differentiate registration under § 211(a) and "control and prohibition" under § 211(c) for purposes of judicial review. The District Court rested this conclusion on the fact that § 211(a) was originally enacted as part of the Air Quality Act of 1967 ⁵ while § 211(c) and § 307(b)(1) were both added by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. ⁶ The District Court assumed that prior to 1970, regulations under the Clean Air Act would be reviewable by district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act. From this assumption the Court reasoned that Congress had meant to limit § 307(b)(1) jurisdiction to a review of agency action under new authority granted by the 1970 amendments and had not meant to disturb the jurisdiction of district courts to review administrative actions undertaken pursuant to prior existing law. The District Court cites no authority for its assumption that district courts had jurisdiction to review registration requirements prior to 1970 or that Congress, in enacting § 307(b) (1), had acquiesced in a bifurcated system of review for § 211 regulations. We believe that the District Court underestimated the extent and nature of the changes to the structure of the Clean Air Act wrought by the 1970 amendments. ⁷

As the District Court noted, the Clean Air Act was not the product of a single legislative act but was developed incrementally. The emphasis in the original act was on regional regulation of air quality. ⁸ The states set standards for their regions and were responsible for enforcement. ⁹ The federal government was relegated to the relatively minor role of providing technical assistance to state and local governments and conducting general research. ¹⁰ The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 represented a dramatic departure from previous policy. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 63-64, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975). Although enacted in the form of amendments to existing law, the 1970 legislation changed the focus of the existing regulatory structure by shifting primary responsibility in a number of areas from the states to the federal government. ¹¹ Dissatisfied with state efforts to curtail air pollution, Congress endowed the federal government with much greater authority and responsibility to combat air pollution which was now perceived as a national problem. ¹² The federal effort was concentrated in a new agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, whose Administrator was charged with coordinating the national war against air pollution. ¹³

The evolution of the Administrator's authority to regulate fuels and fuel additives exemplifies the radical change in the structure of the Clean Air Act. Section 211(a) was originally enacted as § 210 of the Air Quality Act of 1967. ¹⁴ It had been apparent for a long time that automobile emissions were a major source of air pollution.[ ¹⁵ ] The 1967 Act authorized the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to collect data on the composition of fuels and fuel additives through an industry-wide registration program. ¹⁶ The only function of the registration program was "to insure full access to the technical information needed to evaluate the possible health hazard of such materials." H.R.Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1967, at p. 1958. There was no provision in the Act for the Secretary to take any direct action based on the information he received during registration. ¹⁷ H.Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in Legis.His. at 894. The lack of federal regulatory authority over fuels and fuel additives was perceived as a major weakness in existing law. ¹⁸ During hearings on the need for amending the Clean Air Act, it became evident that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the existing registration program for fuels and fuel additives. ¹⁹ Congress responded by replacing § 210 with § 211 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c, as amended Pub.L. No. 91-604, §§ 8(a), 9(a), 84 Stat. 1694-98 (Dec. 31, 1970). Section 211(a) retained the registration provision of prior law, but its function was radically altered. See 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at pp. 5384-85. Registration, which had served an amorphous function prior to 1970, now has become an important step in a national program to regulate fuels and fuel additives. ²⁰ Before a fuel or a fuel additive may be regulated under § 211(c), it must be registered under § 211(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c. The data gathered during the registration phase forms a major part of the administrative record upon which the decision to control or prohibit is made. ²¹ The administrative record also serves as the primary basis for judicial review of regulations promulgated under § 211. More than anything else, the integral relationship of subsection (a) registration and subsection (c) control and prohibition in the...