Lucas v. Ashcroft

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Paul C. Wilson, Judge
• Citation: Lucas v. Ashcroft, 688 S.W.3d 204 (Mo. 2024)
• Docket Number: SC 99931
• Decision Date: 30 April 2024
• Parties: Quinton LUCAS, Contestant, v. Missouri Secretary of State John R. ASHCROFT and Missouri State Auditor Scott Fitzpatrick, Contestees.
• topic: Administrative Law,Constitutional Law

688 S.W.3d 204

Quinton LUCAS, Contestant,

v.Missouri Secretary of State John R. ASHCROFT and Missouri State Auditor Scott Fitzpatrick, Contestees.

No. SC 99931

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued April 30, 2024

West Codenotes

Held Invalid

Mo. Const. art. 10, § 21

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: ELECTION CONTEST

Lucas was represented by Tara M. Kelly of the city attorney’s office in Kansas City, (816) 513-3117; James R. Layton of Tueth Keeny Cooper Mohan & Jackstadt PC in St. Louis, (314) 880-3600; Debo P. Adegbile of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP in New York City, (212) 230-8800; Andrew S. Dulberg and ivan Panchenko of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP in Boston, (617) 526-6000; and Britany Riley-Swanbeck of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP in Washington, D.C., (202) 663-6137.

The secretary of state and state auditor were represented by Jeff P. Johnson and Todd Scott of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Paul C. Wilson, Judge

Quinton Lucas brings an original action in this Court challenging the voters’ approval of Amendment No. 4 in the November 2022 general election. Specifically, Lucas claims the fiscal note summary printed on every ballot cast in that election materially misstated the fiscal note for the measure.

This case is not about whether the Kansas City Police Department is adequately funded or, if not, the amount of additional funds that would be needed to do so. Nor is this case about whether the auditor’s fiscal note for Amendment No. 4 was sufficient and fair. The former is a matter for Kansas City and the Board of Police Commissioners, not this Court, and the latter could have been challenged under section 116.190¹ before the election but was not. Instead, the only issue in this case is whether the auditor’s fiscal note summary - the very last thing each and every voter saw before voting "yes" or "no" on Amendment No. 4 – fairly and accurately summarized the auditor’s fiscal note as required by section 116.175.3. This Court concludes it did not and, therefore, orders a new election on this question to be conducted as part of the statewide general election on November 5, 2024.

BACKGROUND

Kansas City ("City") does not control the budget for the Kansas City Police Department ("Department"). Instead, that budget is overseen by the Board of Police Commissioners ("Board"). The Board is a state agency with five members. Since 1958, the City has been obligated to provide funds for the Department at whatever amount the Board requests, subject to a maximum set by statute. See § 84.730, RSMo Supp. 1958. Between 1958 and 2022, the City’s funding obligation was capped at 20 percent of the City’s general revenue, though the City was free to (and, at times, did) provide requested funding in excess of that cap.

A dispute arose in 2021 between the City and the Board regarding the use of funds the City appropriated in excess of the statutory maximum. In May 2021, the City Council passed two ordinances reallocating funds appropriated above the cap to certain community policing initiatives. After the City passed these ordinances, the general assembly took up two measures that would change the City’s funding obligation to the Board. The first of these measures, Senate Bill No. 678 ("SB 678"), increased the City’s statutory maximum funding obligation from 20 percent of the City’s general revenue to 25 percent. Concerned that SB 678 might constitute an unfunded mandate under article X, sections 16 and 21 of the Missouri Constitution, the general assembly also took up Senate Joint Resolution No. 38 ("SJR 38"), which proposed a constitutional amendment exempting certain legislation related to police funding (including SB 678) from article X’s prohibition against unfunded mandates. On May 18, 2022, the general assembly passed both SB 678 and SJR 38. The proposed constitutional amendment in the latter was put before the voters as Amendment No. 4.

Missouri statutes provide that, when a proposed constitutional amendment is put to the voters, the text of the measure does not appear on the ballot. Rather, printed on the ballot is a "ballot title" consisting of two parts. § 116.010(4). The first part of the ballot title is a summary statement of the measure in the form of a question, which is prepared by the secretary of state (or the general assembly may do so when it proposes the constitutional amendment). §§ 116.010(4), 116.155, 116.160. The second part is a summary of the fiscal note for the measure. §§ 116.010(4), 116.170. Both the fiscal note and the summary of that fiscal note are prepared by the state auditor, though the general assembly may (but is not required to) prepare the fiscal note summary for constitutional amendments it proposes. §§ 116.155, 116.170.

For Amendment No. 4, the general assembly prepared the summary statement, and the auditor prepared the fiscal note and the fiscal note summary. The ballot title for Amendment No. 4, in its entirety, read:

Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to authorize laws, passed before December 31, 2025, that increase minimum funding² for a police force established by a state board of police commissioners to ensure such police force has additional resources to serve its communities?

State and local governmental entities estimate no additional costs or savings related to this proposal.

On November 8, 2022, Missouri voters approved Amendment No. 4. Lucas timely brought an election contest in this Court seeking a new election under sections 115.555 and 115.593.

ANALYSIS

The only issue in this case is whether the fiscal note summary for Amendment No. 4 so materially misstated the fiscal note and misled the voters about the fiscal note’s contents that it constituted an irregularity of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on the fairness of the election and the validity of the results. The Court concludes it did. A new election is the only remedy authorized by statute for such circumstances. § 115.593. Accordingly, the Court orders that remedy.

I. This Court Has Original Jurisdiction in This Election Contest

Lucas contends this Court has original jurisdiction to hear election contests involving a proposed constitutional amendment and, therefore, filed his petition in this Court in the first instance. The secretary of state and the auditor³ (collectively, the "state") concede this Court has jurisdiction, citing section article VII, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution, which states the "general assembly shall designate by general law the court or judge by whom the several classes of election contests shall be tried[,]" and section 115.555, which designates this Court to hear contests involving proposed constitutional amendments.⁴

That the parties considered this a settled question is not surprising. This Court held it had original jurisdiction over such matters in Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 193 n.2 (Mo. banc 2015) ("This Court has jurisdiction to hear this [chapter 115 election contest] pursuant to Mo. Const. art. VII, sec. 5 and section 115.555."), and Shoemyer v. Missouri Secretary of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 172 ml (Mo. banc 2015) (citing Dotson and Gantt v. Brown, 244 Mo. 271, 149 S.W. 644, 646 (Mo. banc 1912)). As discussed below, these cases were correctly decided. Even if they were not, however, stare decisis requires this Court to follow Dotson and Shoemyer and hold it has original jurisdiction in this case.

A. Stare Decisis Requires This Court to Follow Dotson and Shoemyer

[1–3] Our common law system has developed on the assumption legal precedents must be followed. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the First 69 (Lewis ed. 1900); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Authority and Aspiration, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1971, 1978-81 (2021) (discussing the historical recognition of stare decisis as a legal principle). This principle, the doctrine of stare decisis, ensures similar cases are treated similarly in accordance with basic principles of justice. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) ("[I]t is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion.’ " (quoting The Federalist No. 78, (Alexander Hamilton))), superseded on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Stare decisis "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals[.]" Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986). Thus, "[m]ere disagreement by the current Court … is not a satisfactory basis for violating the doctrine of stare decisis[.]" Crabtree v. Bugby, 967 S.W.2d 66, 71-72 (Mo. banc 1998), overruled on other grounds by Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. banc 2014). In this way, stare decisis "promotes security in the law," Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 379 (internal quotation omitted), and "contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact." Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617.

[4] Of course, judicial precedent is not absolute. While precedent must be fol- lowed to prevent the arbitrary interpretation and application of the law, departure from precedent is warranted when the application of prior decisions would be "evidently contrary to reason" or "flatly absurd or unjust," Blackstone, supra, at 70. This Court has also indicated departure from precedent is warranted when it results in "recurring injustice or absurd results," Crabtree, 967 S.W.2d at 71-72; the precedent is demonstrated unreasonable or incorrect through the passage of time and experience, Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 156 S.W.3d 333, 334-35 (Mo. banc 2005); or it is "clearly erroneous and manifestly...